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Executive Summary
T h i s  study analyzes Ihc role of foreign capital in the economic development of 
Thailand. In the two decades under study (1970-1990) foreign capital has played a 
considerable role. While in the 1960s the inflow of external finance (or its 
counterpart, the current-account deficit) was always relatively small, it increased 
substantially in the 1970s and 1980s.
Two periods are identified in which foreign capital inflows played a central 
role. In the first period, roughly between 1975 and 1985, foreign commercial loans 
were received by the public sector. The second period, after 1986, was dominated by 
non-debt creating flows of direct and portfolio investments to the private sector.
To a considerable extent the origin of the two booms in foreign capital 
inflows have to be sought at the international supply side of funds. In the 1970s, oil 
dollars created excess liquidity in the international financial markets which, rather 
suddenly, increased the access of developing countries to commercial loans. In the 
late 1980s, the realignments of the major currencies led to an outflow of 
investments from Japan and the Asian newly-industrialized economies (NIEs).
This study traces the impact of these inflows on the patterns of Thailand's 
domestic savings and investment, on the rate and structure of economic growth, and 
on macroeconomic stability. There is particular focus on the policy problems that 
the inflows created, and on how actual economic policy responded to them. The 
methodology' of the study starts with the macroeconomic balance identity, according 
to which investments are financed by, and are equal to, domestic savings and 
foreign capital inflows. The analysis of the impact of capital inflow s on the patterns 
of investment and savings is the central feature of the study. It is shown that the 
aggregate savings and investments are the sum of the savings and investments of 
distinct institutions (such as households, private corporations, state enterprises, and 
government) among which each has its own specific behavior and, therefore, its 
own specific reaction to the inflows of foreign finance.
In the first period mentioned, capital inflows financed a higher level of 
public sector investment, particularly investment by state enterprises. The inflows 
were also associated with a decline in public sector savings rates. In fact, the public 
sector deficit increased by more than the rise in capital inflows, so that the claims 
on the domestic capital market also increased. The outcome of this process was a
xv
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rapid increase in external and domestic public sector debt and debt servicing 
obligations. The combination of an expansionary public sector policy and a cautious 
monetary policy led to tight conditions on the domestic financial markets. 
Furthermore, the (too) conservative exchange rate policy led to an appreciation of 
the exchange rate with respect to major trading partners’ currencies. The 
combination of these factors resulted in a fall in private sector confidence and in 
very low levels of private investment and growth.
These problems were attacked with a set of radical adjustment policies in 
the mid-1980s. The Baht was devalued, a cap was placed on public sector external 
borrowing, prices charged by state enterprises were increased and their investments 
were curtailed, and government spending was strictly controlled.
These adjustment policies were painful and they contributed to the 
recession of the mid-1980s. At the same time, the adjustments were very successful; 
when the second wave of foreign capital inflows started in 1987, macroeconomic 
balance had already been restored and the Thai economy was ready to fully benefit 
from the impulse provided by these new inflows.
The second boom in foreign capital inflows was dominated by foreign 
direct and portfolio investments. The nature of this period is quite different, because 
there is a direct link between the foreign funds and production and exports. The 
devaluation of 1984 and the currency realignments after the 1985 Plaza Agreement 
made Thailand an attractive place for investors from Japan and the NIEs. They 
invest in Thailand to do simple processing of products to be exported to the United 
States and the European Community (EC). The inflow was associated not only with 
a phenomenal increase in private investment and an unprecedented growth boom, 
but also with speculative binges in the Securities Exchange of Thailand (SET) and 
in the property markets.
Gradually, it has become clear that non-debt-creating capital inflows also 
lead to policy problems. The investments led to a very rapid increase in export 
production, but the growth of imports was faster still, leading to a very high current 
account deficit. Alternatively, one could say that domestic savings have not 
increased fast enough to keep track with the high level of investment. But apart 
from the macroeconomic concerns, the study also observes that the pattern of 
growth induced by foreign investment led to growing imbalances in the Thai 
economy. The productivity and income gaps between the modem industrial sector, 
on which the investments concentrate, and the large agricultural sector widened. 
The private sector investment boom also outran the capability of the public sector to 
provide the infrastructural support for the private sector.
The general conclusions of the study may be summarised in four points.
1. Foreign capital inflows are associated with an increase in the level of 
investment of the receiving sector. In the 1970s, this was the public 
sector and in the late 1980s the private sector.
2. The inflows also have an effect on the savings of the receiving sector. 
In the first period, the capital inflows were associated with a decline in 
the public sector savings ratio. Apparently, the access to foreign funds 
invited a relaxation of revenue efforts. The capital inflows in the more 
recent years had a different impact. The private savings ratio 
increased, but by far less than the investment ratio, so that the private
xv/
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sector resource gap widened significantly. In both periods, therefore, 
foreign capital inflows were associated with growing macroeconomic 
imbalances.
3. But capital inflows are also associated with sectoral imbalances. The 
large increase in public sector investment in the first boom period 
eventually crowed out private investment. And in the recent period, 
the high level o f private investment outpaced the ability o f the public 
sector to provide the supporting infrastructure and also led to growing 
imbalances within the private sector. The modern industrial sector, on 
which the foreign investment concentrates, is growing away from the 
more traditional agricultural and rural sector, where most of the Thai 
labor force still works.
4. These growing macroeconomic and sectoral imbalances define the 
policy problems created by the foreign capital inflows. At the end of 
the first period a painful and radical adjustment programed was 
necessary to restore the balances. In the more recent period, the 
financial surplus of the public sector would seem to make the increase 
in the public investment necessary to reduce the infrastructural 
bottlenecks and sectoral imbalances possible. But, on the other hand, 
given the high level of private investment, any increase in public 
spending will further undermine the macroeconomic stability. This 
policy dilemma was not yet fully resolved by the end of the period 
under study.
The study recommends that economic policy use public investments, and 
try to steer private investment, in order to reduce the sectoral imbalances. 
Macroeconomic stability is best defended by an increase in private savings, 
although it is not easy to identify policy instruments that are very effective in doing 
so. In the end. it would appear, that the relatively low level o f domestic savings 
remains the main policy problem of Thailand.
Chapter 1
Introduction
O B JE C T IV E S O F TH E STUDY
T h e  role o f international finance in Thailand's economic development has become 
crucial in recent years. The growth boom since 1987 was initiated and sustained by 
high levels o f foreign investment. The capital inflows were accompanied by quite 
effective macroeconomic management, so that several years of double-digit growth 
has so far not led to an unbearable acceleration of inflation. Recent experience has 
thus shown that external finance can significantly contribute to economic growth. 
This success is not just the outcome of the upturn in foreign investment since 1987. 
The Thai government's adjustment policies in the preceding years had restored 
macroeconomic balances from their highly unstable levels of the early 1980s. In 
particular, the public sector deficit had been drastically reduced. The analysis of 
these successful structural adjustment policies— which contrast very sharply with 
the ineffective efforts in many other countries— will be a worthwhile aspect of this 
study. Still, this study asserts that there are also serious questions about the longer- 
term sustainability of the current pattern of growth. It will be argued that the 
sustainability will be undermined by:
•  The growing imbalance between the main productive sectors. The 
study concludes that one of the main features of foreign finance- 
driven development is that it concentrates investment in the modern 
sector of the economy and increases the segmentation of the economic 
structure into a low productivity segment (mainly agriculture) and a 
high productivity modem sector. A very uneven income distribution 
is the consequence of this unbalanced development.
•  The emerging discrepancy between private sector growth and the 
provision of public goods. The present level o f public services in, for 
example, infrastructure and education is considered by many to be 
below the levels necessary to sustain private sector development.
•  Macroeconomic imbalances, in particular, the widening domestic 
savings gap and the inability even of a very high growth of export 
earnings to keep pace with the explosive growth of import demand.
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These three sets of problems raise important questions on macroeconomic 
policy and management for which this study will formulate recommendations.
There were also earlier years in which international capital flows influ­
enced the Thai economy's fate. In an earlier period, roughly between 1975 and 
1985, the inflow of funds w'as mainly directed at the public sector Macroeconomic 
management at that time was far less effective and serious imbalances emerged, 
which could only be corrected through a painful adjustment process in the 1980s.
The experience of both periods make clear that such large inflows of funds 
can lead to serious macroeconomic imbalances and to considerable policy problems. 
This study analyzes these problems and seeks to come to policy recommendations to 
deal with them.
The central focus of the study is on the interaction between international 
capital flows and domestic adjustment and macroeconomic policies. In the first 
period, the increase in capital inflows was directed at the public sector, while the 
recent years present a period of large capital inflows directed at the private sector. 
In both periods, the rise of inflows of foreign finance was associated with sharp 
increases in the investment ratio of the receiving sector. This is to be expected as 
foreign funds are often linked to specific investment projects. But, and probably less 
to be expected, the sectoral investment-savings gap increased by far more than the 
capital inflow. The public-sector lending boom was associated with a rise in public 
investment and a fall in the public-sector savings ratio, resulting in a drastic 
deterioration of the investment-savings gap.
The private-sector foreign investment boom of the last few years is assoc­
iated with a very sharp increase in private investment and only a mild recovery of 
private savings. The outcome is that the savings surplus that the private sector used 
has changed into a very substantial savings gap.
The experience of the public-sector loan boom in the period 1975-1985 
may contain some warnings for the present period. Initially, in the late 1970s, the 
loan-induced investment boom led to rapid growth, but when, around 1980, the 
world economy entered a period of instability this growth momentum could not be 
sustained. The external debt burden that accumulated in the earlier years then made 
the adjustment much more difficult. The capital inflows of the last few years are 
dominated by direct and portfolio investments and thus do not create an external 
debt. But such flows are very sensitive to foreign confidence in the Thai economy. If 
growing imbalances and instability were to undermine such confidence, capital in­
flows might quickly stop and even reverse. That is why the warning signs have to be 
taken seriously by policy makers.
TH E ROLE OF POLICIES
Another important undertaking of this study is the reassessment of the role 
of policy. Often a primary role is given to some preconceived set of “appropriate” 
adjustment policies to achieve economic stability and create a basis for sustainable 
growth. This study suggests that, in the realm of external financing, policies have 
been much more accommodating than motivating. Massive availability of foreign 
finance in the 1970s, in excess of the finance needed to adjust to external shocks, 
encouraged the public sector in particular to engage in large-scale investment pro-
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grams it otherwise might not have undertaken In the 1980s, after the debt crisis 
broke out, no adequate adjustment finance was available and what was there was 
heavily conditioned on policy reforms prescribed by multilateral creditor agencies 
and the donor community.
In these adjustment schemes, increasing weight is given to the private sec­
tor via privatization and liberalization programs. Presumed inefficient state inter­
vention underlies such reform proposals. The role of the state has been always com­
paratively small in Thailand and the adjustments since the mid-1980s have reduced 
it farther. These policy reforms have been very successful, as they made the recent 
private-sector investment boom possible. At the same time, this same private-sector 
boom raises serious questions about the proper balance between the public and 
private sectors and about the role of the state in indicative steering of private sector 
development.
METHODOLOGY
This study tries to assess the role of external finance in the processes o f ' 
growth and structural change in Thailand. The basic characteristic of the methodol­
ogy is the focus on the interaction between international financial flows and the 
savings and investment behavior of the main institutional agents in the society that 
receives the funds. The minimal disaggregation of agents studied here already goes 
much beyond conventional approaches to debt and adjustment. It is hypothesized 
that structural differences in the spending behavior of households and unincorpo­
rated businesses, private (financial and non-financial) corporations, public enter­
prises and the government sector provide a complex environment to assess adjust­
ment processes and evaluate the effectiveness of structural adjustment policies and 
debt management in a developing economy. Much of the argument will be centered 
around the macroeconomic accumulation balance disaggregated as follows:
I -  S =  (I/j -  S/7) + (Ic -  Sc) +  (ly -  Sy) + (Ig -  Sg)
M - E  + R
(F/j + Fc + F5 + Fg) -  dRES (1.1)
I Gross Domestic Investment
s Gross National Savings
M Imports of goods and services
E Exports of goods and services
R Net factor payments and current transfers overseas
F Net capital inflows
dRES = Change in international reserves
for institutions (subscripts): h = households and unincorporated businesses; 
c = private corporate enterprises; s = public enterprises; and g = government.
The key argument of the study centers around two major hypotheses. The 
first is that the inflow of external finance is, to a large extent, determined by factors 
on the international supply side of funds, and that changes in these inflows have
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significantly affected the domestic spending patterns of the various institutions in 
Thailand during the past two decades. This is not to belittle domestic factors, but 
this study shows that the major influence was external, to which particular domestic 
circumstances responded. Second, the capability of the economy to respond to shifts 
in the availability of difTcrcnt sources of external finance depends on the economy s 
structure and the diverging savings and investment behavior of the major institu­
tional agents, thereby giving particular attention to the nature and adjustment 
behavior of private sector agents as they operate in difTcrent institutional and 
market contexts (for example, segmented financial markets, competitive versus 
oligopolistic markets, among others). In Thailand, there is a clear dichotomy 
between the savings and investment behavior of the large corporate business sector 
operating in oligopolistically-structured markets and with strong links with the 
formal banking system and that of the vast (in terms of units and people) and 
heterogeneous sector of small-scale firms and unincorporated businesses, including 
small farmers and informal service sector establishments. Unlike many other studies 
related to the main subject of this book, this study emphasizes the macroeconomic 
importance of this heterogeneous private sector behavior and hypothesizes that it 
strongly affects the scope of effective macroeconomic policies.
In the two decades under study, the relationship of developing countries 
like Thailand with international financial markets went through a process of fun­
damental change which was accompanied by many shocks. The central question of 
this study is how these changes and shocks in the area of international finance have 
affected the rate and pattern of economic growth, the stability of the economy and 
the role and effectiveness of economic policy.
In terms of the accounting identity represented by Equation 1.1, it is thus 
suggested that, first, an initial causality in the adjustment process would run from 
the external financing conditions (F) to the investmcnt-savings balances of the 
domestic institutions (1/ -  S/) and the flow-of-funds interactions among them and 
then to the current account balance (M -  E + R) and, second, that the private sector 
accumulation balances [(I/, -  S/j) + (Ic -  Sc)] are not purely accommodating to the 
imbalances of the external sector (F) and of the public sector [(Ig -  Sgj + (I5 -  S.y)l, 
but have their own behavioral autonomy which may limit the possibilities for 
adjustment.
To address the main hypotheses, this study integrates four methodological
steps:
• An analysis of Thailand's economic structure and of the country's 
main economic agents. To this purpose, a simple Social Accounting 
Matrix (SAM) is designed, called the Macroeconomic Social 
Accounting Framework (MSAF). Two MSAFs, for 1975 and for 
1985, are presented in Chapter 2. They describe the place and role of 
the institutions in Thailand's economic structure and the changes in 
this 10-year period.
• Changes in the availability of external finance and in other external 
variables affecting the Thai economy are used to identify five sub­
periods in the two decades 1970-1990. Each of these periods is 
characterized by a particular set of international conditions, and the 
adjustment of the Thai economy to these conditions is analyzed in the
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various chapters. Chapter 3 describes the international environment 
as it has affected Thailand and trends in international finance in the 
various periods under study. This chapter also includes a 
decomposition analysis of external shocks and domestic adjustment
•  The adjustment o f the Thai economy is driven by the adjustments in 
savings and investment levels of the main economic agents. Chapter 
4 presents a disaggregated analysis of savings and investment trends 
and behavior of the four main sectors, and Chapter 5 complements 
this with an analysis o f the intersectoral financial intermediation. The 
focus is particularly on how external finance affected these patterns.
•  These adjustments at the sectoral and intersectoral levels are guided 
by policy interventions. Economic policy both reacts to external 
events and steers the economy to generate rapid growth and maintain 
stability. Chapter 6 contains an analysis and an assessment of policy 
regimes.
These analytical steps provide the building bricks for the assessment of 
adjustment processes and the scope for macroeconomic management in Thailand, 
but they have also been designed to provide a comparative country analysis. In a 
larger project conducted by the Institute of Social Studies in The Hague, similar 
questions are asked and the same methodology is used in four other in-depth coun­
try studies, covering the Philippines, Pakistan, Tan2an ia  and Mexico and, on a 
cross-section basis, key hypotheses are also tested for a sample of 25 other develop­
ing countries.
PER IO D IZ A T IO N
In the analysis of the impact of international finance and external shocks in 
Thailand's recent economic history, the last two decades are divided into five 
periods. Most tables present period averages rather than annual observations of eco­
nomic variables, because we are more interested in medium-term adjustments than 
in short-run fluctuations.
The differences in the external conditions provide the basis for the defini­
tion of the periods.
In the first period (1970-1974), external shocks related mainly to prices: 
the average annual growth rates of export and import prices were phenomenal. 
Capital inflows in this period were still modest; the average current-account deficit 
of 1.5 percent of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is still well in line with the longer- 
run average as observed over the 1960s.
The second period, 1975-1979, was the period in which access to interna­
tional financial markets opened up for countries like Thailand. International bor­
rowing expanded rapidly in response, as is reflected in the rapid rise of the average 
level of the current-account deficit, or in other words, the rapid growth of capital 
inflows.
The third period again shows high rates of growth for import prices (the 
second oil shock) and a substantial increase in the average level of international in­
terest rates, while world trade stagnated in this period.
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The third period again shows high rates of growth for import prices (the 
second oil shock) and a substantial increase in the average level of international in­
terest rates, while world trade stagnated in this period
The period 1983-1986 covers the years of debt crisis and adjustment: inter­
national lending became more costly after the increase in international interest rates 
after 1979 and access to international finance became more difficult after the 
Mexican debt crisis of 1982. The growth of world trade was very modest and terms 
o f trade for developing countries declined.
The capital inflows of the final period are quite substantially in excess of 
the current-account deficit and their composition is fundamentally different from 
those of the preceding periods. The composition of the capital inflows shifted dra­
matically from public-sector borrowing to private-sector capital inflows. The rela­
tive exchange rates of the world's major currencies (yen and dollar) substantially 
changed from the previous period.
O UTLIN E OF THE STUDY
Chapter 2 aims to provide a description of the structure of the Thai 
economy and the major changes in it. To this purpose, an MSAF is constructed. The 
MSAF provides an integrated accounting system for the analysis as a whole and 
should be regarded as a particular format of a SAM. The MSAF links the incomes 
and outlays of the main institutional sectors studied in this book, i.e., households 
and incorporated businesses, private corporations, public enterprises, the 
government and foreign agents, to the structure of production and to the process of 
income generation and distribution. More than in most SAMs constructed for 
developing countries, the MSAF reserves substantial space for the financial 
structure of the economy. This is captured through the flow-of-funds block, which 
identifies the savings and investments of the main institutional agents, as well as 
the channels through which financial intermediation takes place. External finance 
is also part of the flow-of-funds block and the MSAF thus enables identifying the 
allocation of foreign resources in the economy and the channels through which 
these affect the rest of the system. As MSAFs have been constructed for several 
years (1975 and 1985), they permit an analysis of the structural change of the Thai 
economy during the past two turbulent decades. In addition, the chapter also 
discusses the macroeconomic stability during the process of growth and change.
Chapter 3 analyzes in detail Thailand's commercial and financial relation­
ships with the rest of the world. The role of foreign capital in the Thai economy is 
studied by disaggregating the capital inflows into direct investment, portfolio in­
vestment and loans. The issues of capital flight and external debt are also discussed. 
The country's external trade of goods and services are analyzed, as are the outward 
remittances of interest payments and of profits and dividends as a result of the for­
eign direct and portfolio investment boom in recent years. In the last section of 
Chapter 3, a decomposition method is applied to assess the nature of the impact of 
external shocks on the Thai economy and the country's adjustment to the shocks. 
The analysis identifies shocks in terms of trade, the world interest rate, world trade 
growth and debt accumulation burden. It further identifies whether the adjustment
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has fallen on consumption (and savings) or investment spending on import or 
export growth.
As the decomposition analysis is based on ex-post information, it is possi­
ble that the observed trends in the current account balance underestimate the actual
shocks some (anticipated) domestic adjustments may compensate for them.
Therefore, external shock variables are also included in the analysis of the savings 
and investment behavior of the principal institutional agents. Chapters 4 and 5 
analyze these patterns and the main determinants underlying their savings, invest­
ment and portfolio decisions. This is done, after a description of the institutional 
setting (i.e., the operations of firms and of commodity and financial markets) in 
which these take place, through econometric tests.
Chapter 4 attempts to make an analysis of the relationship between exter­
nal finance and accumulation behavior at a disaggregated level concerning the four 
economic agents. By doing so, the analysis consequently tests the hypothesis that 
accumulation behavior, savings and investments, differ considerably between the 
four economic agents. Deriving estimates of total savings and investments from the 
sum of these component parts should make it possible to indicate the effect of capi­
tal inflows on the country's economic stability.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis o f Chapter 4 by looking at the domestic 
intersectoral financial relationships using Flow-of-Funds statistics. The analysis of 
financial intermediation and portfolio behavior in this chapter extends the flow-of- 
funds analysis of Chapter 2 (see MSAFs). The analysis identifies public and private 
sector agents' demand for and claims on domestic and foreign financial assets. The 
main channel for intersectoral financial intermediation is the financial system. The 
chapter analyzes the interaction between international financial flows and domestic 
financial intermediation and tries to identify the mechanisms and determ inants of 
financial ‘crowding-out’ of private investment through public sector investment.
Chapter 6 describes and analyzes how economic policy-making has 
evolved over the period under study. Changes have occurred in objectives and in­
struments of policies and in the agencies involved and their relative influences. 
These changes are traced and the effectiveness of the policies is assessed. In particu­
lar, the analysis will focus on how successful economic policy has been in dealing 
with the challenges put up by the changing role of international finance.
Chapter 7 summarizes the findings of preceding chapters and provides an 
assessment of the success or failure of adjustment as it occurred. Policies are 
recommended on macroeconomic management concerning external finance for a 
more sustainable growth and sectorial balance.
The next chapter, Chapter 2, will first provide a discussion on the pattern 
of growth and structural changes in the Thai economy over the past two decades.

Chapter 2
Growth and Structural Change 
in the Thai Economy
INTRODUCTION
S i n c e  the end of the Second World War, Thailand has gone through a process of 
rapid growth and dramatic structural change. Over these years, the country has 
changed from a solely agricultural economy into an emerging newly-industrializing 
economy (NIE).
Thailand's growth rates have always been high. In the 1960s, the country's 
average growth rate of real GDP was around 8 percent and in the 1970s it reached 
almost 7 percent a year. In the first half of the 1980s, when external and internal 
conditions were not so favorable, the growth rate fell to 6.1 percent a year. The 
years 1987-1990 surpassed any earlier achievements, with an average growth rate of
11.2 percent a year. The ,rWorld Development Report 1990” lists the average 
growth rates of some 100 developing countries between 1965 and 1988 (see World 
Bank 1990). Only seven of these countries, including, of course, Hong Kong, Korea 
and Singapore, experienced more rapid growth than Thailand. In the last few years, 
Thailand has certainly been the world's fastest growing economy.
Many have attempted to explain the Thai economy's good performance 
(see, for example, Jansen 1991). Factors that have been mentioned include the 
country's rich natural resource base, hardworking population, the relationships with 
the dynamic Southeast Asian region and political and macroeconomic stability.
The development strategy that has steered the process of growth and 
change has three outstanding characteristics: its outward perspective, its focus on 
modem industry, and its bias towards the private sector.
Thailand has always tried to maintain and intensify its trade and financial 
links with the world economy. The country's initial efforts at industrialization were, 
o f course, accompanied by protection against imports, but these never took an ex­
cessive form. The "World Development Report 1987” (see World Bank 1987, p. 83) 
classifies the trade strategies— tariffs and import controls, export incentives and ex­
change rate policies, for example— of a sample of 41 developing countries into four 
categories: from strongly outward oriented to moderately outward to moderately in ­
ward and strongly inward oriented.
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Two periods are studied (1963-1973 and 1973-1985). About three-quarters 
of the countries fall into the two inward-looking categories, but 1 hailand is included 
in the moderately outward oriented group for both periods. Protection did exist for 
some industries, but this did not result in a strong anti-export bias. At a relatively 
early stage, already in the 1970s, Thailand realized that rapid growth would only be 
possible if exports rose rapidly. Gradually the country shifted to an cxpoit 
orientation: the import protection remained, but was accompanied by a more active 
export promotion policy.
Also, the country's financial linkages to the world economy were relatively 
free. Foreign investment was and is welcomed and even actively invited through 
incentives. Large domestic corporations and Thai banks arc increasingly active on 
international financial markets (sec the section on financial development and 
stmctural change later in this chapter).
A second characteristic of Thailand's development strategy has been the 
priority given to the modern sector. Thailand's political power block consists o f an 
alliance between the political elite and the economic bourgeoisie. This coalition is 
strongly biased in favor of modern industries in urban areas and against the agricul­
tural sector and urban workers. This bias is shown in various policy interventions. 
The main thrust of public policy has been to create conditions for private industrial 
accumulation. That attempt has taken three main forms.
The first was through direct subsidy to industry in the form of investment 
incentives such as tax deductions. A second policy feature has been the attempt to 
shift relative prices in favor of industrial activities. Tariffs and import controls pro­
tected the domestic market and allowed corporations to increase product prices. At 
the same time, input prices, particularly of labor and imported inputs, were kept 
low. Food prices were also kept low, so that the real wage level did not need to be 
increased. In addition, trade union activity was repressed. The tariff structure and 
the overvalued currency helped to control the cost of imported inputs to the indus­
trial sector at the expense of the exporting agricultural sector. A third form of public 
policy favoring industrial accumulation was the country's macroeconomic policies. 
Short-term monetary and fiscal policies were, for the most part, left to the techno­
crats. who executed rather conservative policies: the fiscal deficit was generally 
small and monetary policies were restricted to defending the exchange rate. With 
the exception of some periods, these policies were highly successful: inflation was 
generally low and largely determined by world inflation; up to the late 1970s the 
current-account deficit was modest and up to the 1980s the exchange rate was ex­
ceptionally stable. These conditions helped to create an economic environment of 
stability and confidence which must have helped to stimulate domestic and foreign 
investment (the macroeconomic conditions will be further analyzed later in this 
chapter and economic policies will be analyzed in detail in Chapter 6).
Thus, the three strands of economic policy directly and indirectly favored 
industrial accumulation. This modern sector bias was further strengthened by 
financial factors. Domestic financial institutions have shown a strong preference to 
lend to large-scale modern firms, rather than to small-scale household businesses. 
And, as we will analyze in more detail in Chapter 3, international financial inflows, 
upon which Thailand came increasingly to depend since the mid-1970s, were also 
primarily directed at the modern sector of the economy.
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The third aspect of Thailand's development strategy has been its strong 
reliance on the private sector as the leading agent. Public sector policies are 
generally defined to serve private sector needs. There arc close personal links 
between political leaders and major business leaders. The major political parties are 
run by, or closely associated with, modern business. There is no effective 
countervailing power in the form of, for instance, political parties representing labor 
or farmers' interests. The links between politicians and the business world are so 
tight that frequent allegations of corruption are made. The military leaders, who 
staged a coup in February 1991, stated as the main reason that the government was 
guilty of excessive corruption.
In this political context, the role o f the public sector in the economy has 
been restricted. The size of the government is comparatively small and the role for 
state enterprises much more restricted than in most developing countries. The 
“World Development Report 1990” lists the 1988 Government Expenditure/Gross 
National Product (GNP) ratio of 54 developing countries (sec World Bank 1990) 
Only 10 of these countries had a lower ratio than Thailand. The role of the public 
sector (government and state enterprises) can be seen from the ratio of public sector 
investment to GDP. FitzGerald and Sarmad (1990) have collected data on that ratio 
for a sample of 23 developing countries over the period 1970 to 1988. The average 
public investment/GDP ratio of the sample ranged between 8 and 10 percent over 
this period. The same ratio for Thailand was much lower, between 6 and 8 percent.
Thailand's development strategy includes many elements— the bias to­
wards the modern sector and against agriculture, or the close ties between govern­
ment and dominant business groups are examples— that, in other countries, led to 
economic stagnation and inertia. Some reasons may be suggested why. in the case 
of Thailand, they did not inhibit a dynamic development. In the first place, the bias 
against agriculture did not prevent a rapid growth of agricultural output. The avail­
ability of new lands made growth and diversification possible and profitable w ithout 
much investment or incentives. A second reason is that trade and other distortions 
have always been relatively modest, that is, not leading to a prohibitive anti-export 
bias. A third factor has been that, on the whole, cautious fiscal and monetary 
policies have created an atmosphere of confidence with domestic and foreign 
investors.
In the remainder of this chapter, some relevant aspects of the Thai econ­
omy's development are further analyzed. In the next section, the changes in the Thai 
economy's structure arc studied. In the subsequent section, the social aspects of 
development are highlighted. The section after that will analyzes domestic financial 
intermediation and the growing integration with international financial markets. 
The last section looks at macroeconomic stability during the process of grow th and 
change.
THE STRUCTURE OF THE THAI ECONOMY
Thailand's economic structure has changed considerably over the last few 
decades. The dominant features of this change are, of course, the rapid 
industrialization and the decline of the agricultural sector's share in production. But 
many other important shifts also occurred.
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In this chapter the social accounting method is used as a framework to de­
scribe the economic structure and to analyze structural change. The SAM is a 
summary table that integrates the accounts of production and income generation 
with the accounts of income distribution and social groups. This presentation has 
the great advantage that the interrelations between the structure of production, 
distributional issues, employment and capital accumulation can be identified
Social accounts have been constructed for the Thai economy for the years 
1975 and 1985. These accounts emphasize the links between the principal economic 
agents of the economy in the process of production, income formation and capital 
accumulation. The principal agents in our presentation are: (1) households and 
unincorporated businesses, (2) private corporations, (3) government enterprises, 
(4) government, (5) financial institutions, and (6) the rest of the world. These 
agents are involved in four production activities and in the use of four types of 
commodities: (a) agriculture, (b) industry, (c) construction and public utilities, and 
(d) services. Most SAMs for developing countries give more detail, for example, 
breaking down households into many subgroups and specifying production sectors 
with much more disaggregation. On the other hand, our presentation gives full 
weight to the processes of capital accumulation and financial intermediation, where 
most SAMs are highly aggregated. In the context of this study, it was particularly 
desirable to design SAMs that would allow the analysis of flows of external finance 
and their interrelationships with the structure of production, income distribution 
and accumulation. The mainly aggregate nature of our accounts has led us to apply 
the label “Macroeconomic Social Accounting Framework” (MSAF).
The main purpose of the MSAFs presented here is to give a one-page 
summary of the circular flow in the Thai economy and the structural changes 
therein. In the Appendix to this chapter, the concept of the MSAF is further intro­
duced and the compilation of the two MSAFs for 1975 and 1985 is explained. Table
2.1 presents the MSAF for 1975 and Table 2.2 the MSAF for 1985.
In Tables 2.1 and 2.2, rows 1 to 4 give a detailed breakdown of inter­
mediate and final demand for four types of commodities, while columns 1 to 4 break 
down total supply into intermediate deliveries, domestic Value Added and imports. 
The block of row 5, column 1 (5,1) to row 7, column 4 (7,4) distributes the Value 
Added over the factors of production (wages and corporate and unincorporated 
profit incomes) and in block (8,5) to (10,7) these factoral incomes are allocated over 
the institutions (households, private corporations and state enterprises).
Very striking is the large role for the household sector, not only as a 
receiver of wage incomes but, even more so, as an earner of profits of 
unincorporated enterprises. These are the incomes of small-scale family-based 
businesses.
The savings of institutions are recorded in block (13,8) to (22,12). The 
savings of the private corporations are split into those of non-financial enterprises 
(14,9) and those of financial institutions (18,9; 19,9; and 20,9). Foreign savings,
i.e., the current account of the balance of payments, are in cell (22,12). The 
investments undertaken by households, private and public corporations and the 
government are in block (1,13) to (4,16).
The flow-of-funds block (13,13) to (22,22) shows how the savings are used 
or how the investments are financed. The block distinguishes between direct finan­
cial transfers among non-financial institutions (cells [13,13] to [16,16]) and be­
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tween domestic and international financial intermediation. All three channels of 
finance are very important. Direct transfers (for example, equity acquisition, bond 
purchases, trade credits) accounted, in 1985, for almost as much as the funds 
obtained from domestic financial institutions. International finance was an even 
more important source of funds (see Table 2.2). The advantage of the MSAFs 
becomes clear when they are used to describe the structure, and changes in the 
structure, o f the Thai economy. Compared to other accounts of economic 
development, where sector-by-sector and issue-by-issue trends are analyzed, the 
MSAF allows not only an insight into these trends but also shows immediately 
(changes in) the interactions between sectors and institutions. In comparing MSAFs 
of two different years, it should be noted that the MSAFs are in current prices: any 
change between the two years is thus the result of volume changes and relative price 
changes. In this section we will look specifically at the changes in the structure of 
production and final demand.
The structure of production changed in predictable ways. As usually 
happens during the process of economic development, the agricultural sector's share 
in value added in current factor cost declined from 24.2 percent in 1975 to 15.7 per­
cent in 1985, while the industrial sector's share increased from 24.2 to 27.8 percent, 
and that of the services sector increased from 46.2 to 50.7 percent.
In Table 2.3 we have brought together data on the sectoral distribution of 
value added (at constant 1972 market prices) for a longer period than covered by the 
two MSAFs. The major shift in the distribution of value added is the rapid decline 
of the share of agriculture; as a result, the share of most other sectors increased. In 
the constant prices of Table 2.3, the decline in the share of agriculture is somewhat 
less than in the MSAFs (which are in current prices), and the increase in the shares 
of the industrial and services sectors is also less. This shows that an important 
element of the process of structural change is the change in relative prices. The 
relative price of agriculture and of public utilities with respect to other economic 
activities declined, whereas the relative prices of manufacturing and services 
activities increased.
Industrialization in Thailand began in the 1960s; in 1961 the first 
Development Plan was published. The early attempts followed the usual pattern of 
import-substitution— tariffs and import controls, together with other investment 
incentives, aimed at creating an industrial sector producing for the domestic market, 
but rather quickly an export orientation emerged.
In the analysis of the pattern of industrialization in Table 2.4 (derived from 
Jansen 1991), the manufacturing sector of the MSAF is further detailed along two 
criteria. Natural resource-based industries (NR) are processing domestically- 
produced primary commodities for export or home consumption. Import-dependent 
industries (ID) import raw materials and intermediate goods for final processing or 
assembling into goods that are then exported or consumed locally. Both NR and ID 
industries may substitute local production for importation of final goods. A second 
criterion by which industries are classified in Table 2.4 is the market orientation. 
Depending on their export-output ratio, industries are grouped into those that have 
a significant export-orientation and those that are mainly or exclusively oriented 
towards the domestic market. The classification applied here has the advantage that 
it shows more immediately the extent of linkages between the various sectors of the 
economy and the balance-of-payments consequences of industrialization.
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T able 2.1 M acroeconomic Social Accounting Fram ew ork-ThaiIand-1975
1
AGR
2
MEG
3
CON ST R
4
SERV
SUB
TOTAL
1 Agriculture 4,863 49,877 250 1,874 56,865
2 Mining and Manufacturing 10,447 68,391 19,141 24,840 122,818
3 Construction and Public Utilities 259 3,722 536 2,950 7,466
4 Services and Others 3,878 19,818 6,810 20,280 50,786
SUBTOTAL 19,447 141,808 26,737 49,943 237,935
5 Wages 5,389 14,230 3,053 39,871 62,542
6 Uninc. Profits 60,250 32,421 0 76,523 169,194
7 Corp. Profits 0 19,041 11,479 9,220 39,740
TOTAL VALUE ADDED 65,639 65,692 14,532 125,614 271,477
8 Households
9 Private Corporations
10 State Enterprises
11 Government 4,532 17,906 728 8,676 31,842
12 Rest of World 3,020 60,697 5 5,961 69,683
13 Households
14 Private Corporations
15 State Enterprises.
16 Government
17 Other Wealth
18 Bank of Thailand
19 Commercial Banks
20 Other Financial Institutions
21 Informal Finance
22 Rest of World
GRAND TOTAL 92,638 286,103 42,002 190,194 610,937
EMPLOYMENT (’000) 14,181 1,479 256 3,461 19317
As Table 2.4 shows, the growth rates of the ID industries surpassed those 
of the NR industries in most of the periods presented. Only in the years 1980-1985, 
when overall industrial growth was very modest under the impact o f adverse 
internal and external conditions, did the NR industries grow somewhat faster (or 
rather, their growth rates declined somewhat less).
The main impetus for industrial growth in the 1960s came from the indus­
tries producing for the domestic market, but even at this early stage of industriali­
zation the country's rich natural resource base provided a competitive advantage for 
some export-oriented industrial activities—food processing, for example.
In the 1970s, the export-oriented NR industries grew slightly faster than in 
the 1960s and a number of ID sectors (for example, textiles, basic metals and metal 
products, electrical machines and appliances) were able to shift from an exclusive 
orientation on the domestic market to export markets. By the 1980s, the export 
markets had become the leading force in the growth of the industrial sector.
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(million baht)
5
WAG
6
IIIN.PR
7
CORP.PR
8
III!
9
PR.CORP
10
ST.ENT
11
GVT
28,532
87,616
2,822
92,322
72
4,141
550
26,527
211,292 31,290
62,666 169,194
35,015
4,725
1,046
3,834
211
9,125
4,857
2,642
119
1,892
367
273
2,688
801
26,094
24,158
2,347
7,957
-25
1,592
287
62,666 169,194 39,740 242,477 42,636 4,725 43,009
(Continued on page 16)
This pattern of industrialization, characterized by the rapid growth of 
import-dependent industries and the shift toward export-oriented industries, is also 
reflected in another aspect of structural change that the comparison of the two 
MSAFs brings out: the rapid increase in trade ratios. The share of exports o f goods 
and services in total (intermediate and final) demand increased from 9.1 percent in 
MSAF75 to 10.8 percent in MSAF85, and the share of imports in total supply from
11.4 to 12.1 percent in the years between 1975 and 1985. The export/GDP ratio 
stood at 18 percent in the early 1970s and had increased to 24 percent by the early 
1980s. In the most recent period (1987-1990), the ratio made a further jum p to 34 
percent. The import/GDP ratio followed a similar path— from around 20 percent in 
the early 1970s to 29 percent in the early 1980s, and further to 37 percent in the last 
few years (see Table 3.7 of Chapter 3). The spectacular rise in trade ratios in recent 
years is the outcome of an acceleration in the process of industrialization, character­
ized by the growth of export-oriented, but highly import-dependent, activities.
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T able 2.1 (Continued)
12 13 14 15 16
RoW HII PR.CORP ST.ENT GVT
1 Agriculture 6,616 172
2 Mining and Manufacturing 33,648 5,244 16,847 1,072 1,415
3 Construction and Public Utilities 97 8,418 16,600 3,850 8,265
4 Services and Others 15,333 1,338 3,384 478 939
SUBTOTAL 55,694 15,172 36,831 5,400 10,619
5 Wages 124
6 Uninc. Profits
7 Corp. Profits
TOTAL VALUE ADDED
8 Households 1,100
9 Private Corporations 3,887
10 State Enterprises
11 Government 584
12 Rest of World
13 Households
14 Private Corporations 3,116 1,171
15 State Enterprises. 928 2,495
16 Government 74 1,474 159
17 Other Wealth 749 3,681 916
18 Bank of Thailand 1,695 63 391
19 Commercial Banks 11,934 353 160 39
20 Other Financial Institutions 1,956 -120 -2,431
21 Informal Finance 2,428
22 Rest of World 12,316 4,819 638 934
GRAND TOTAL 73,705 37,124 48,086 8,387 12,047
EMPLOYMENT (’000)
As a result of these radical increases in trade ratios, Thailand has become a 
very open economy indeed. The development of the Thai economic structure has 
been more defined by its external relations than by an increased interdependence 
among the domestic sectors. This can be shown by using the MSAFs to calculate the 
multipliers that define the intersectoral linkages. In input-output analysis, the use of 
multiplier analysis is often used to show the interactions among sectors and to 
simulate the effects o f exogenous changes.
In the input-output model, an endogenous vector of sectoral output (q) can 
be derived from a matrix of (fixed) input-output coefficients (A) and a vector of 
exogenous final demand (f):
q = Aq + f  = ( I - A ) - f f
where (I -  Ay-1  is the Leontief multiplier matrix. By changing elements of the 
final demand vector, new sectoral output can be simulated under the assumptions of 
fixed production technology, fixed relative prices and no capacity constraints in 
production. The multipliers indicate the backward (in columns) and forward (in 
rows) inter-industry linkages.
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(m illion bah l)
GDFCF
17
STOCKS
18
BoT
19
CO.BK
20
OTIIFIN
21 22 
1F.FIN RoW
GRAND
TOTAL
172 381 92,638
24,578 13,302 286,103
38,491 -7,424 1,039 336 42,002
6,139 -913 -17 190,194
69,380 5,346 -17 1,039 336 610,937
62,666
169,194
39,740
242,477
42,636
4,725
43,009
73,704
6,286 2,316 2,428 37,124
7,908 189 11,544 48,086
-10 175 2,452 8,387
-402 1,809 765 211 12,047
5,346
1,211 149 3,484
3,285 1,906 19,269
2,487 1,462 289 3,930
2,428
-1,869 -436 16,402
69,380 5,346 3,484 19,269 3,930 2,428 16,402
Similar to the input-output table, the MSAF can be interpreted as a static 
model of the economy. Grouping the MSAF in endogenous and exogenous accounts 
is, however, somewhat more complicated than in the more technical input-output 
model. Usual assumptions are that government, rest-of-the-world and capital 
accounts are exogenous. The rationale is that government spending depends on dis­
crete policy decisions, export demand is determined by the state of the world econ­
omy, and investment decisions are autonomous, dependent on firm strategy and 
perceptions of the future. Aggregating the exogenous accounts into one vector (x), 
defining the total incomes of the endogenous accounts as vector y, and defining the 
transactions of the endogenous accounts relative to total income (average spending 
propensities) by matrix A, yields the following model:
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T abic 2.2 M acroeconom ic Social A ccounting Fram ew ork - Thailand - 1985
1
AGR
2
MFC
3
CONSTR
4
SERV
Sub
total
1 Agriculture
2 Mining and Manufacturing
3 Construction and Public Utilities
4 Services and Others
23,049
45,354
1,245
13,032
125,670
300,377
17,977
83,376
785
79,601
11,654
32,755
4,972
132,776
16,168
88,735
154,476
558,108
47,044
217,898
SUBTOTAL 82,680 527,401 124,794 242,650 977,525
5 Wages
6 Uninc. Profits
7 Corp. Profits
23,104
118,228
0
74,058 
59,330 
117,329
17,543
0
34,702
167,735
230,762
57,691
282,440
408,320
209,722
TOTAL VALUE ADDED 141,332 250,717 52,245 456,188 900,482
8 Households
9 Privates Corporations
10 State Enterprises
11 Government: Net Direct Tax
12 Rest o f World
1,859
14,545
89,480
237,508
1,571
963
21,007
21,057
113,917
274,073
13 Households
14 Private Corporations
15 Stale Enterprises
16 Government
17 Other Wealth
18 Bank of Thailand
19 Commercial Banks
20 Other Financial Institutions
2 1 Informal Finance
22 Rest o f World
GRAND TOTAL 240,416 1,105,106 179,573 740,902 2,265,997
EMPLOYMENT (’000) 18,090 2,159 664 5,346 26,259
y Ay + x (I -  A f-^x
where (I -  A )-1  is the aggregate multiplier matrix. This model can be used to simu­
late the effects of changes in the exogenous variables (for example an increase in 
government spending, or in capital inflows from abroad, or in private investment) 
on the endogenous production, consumption and income distribution structure. The 
MSAF multipliers are more comprehensive than the input-output multipliers. They 
include the effects of changes in exogenous demand on factor income generation, 
institutional income distribution and current transfer payments, and on consump­
tion. Accordingly, the number of assumptions also increase: not only is it assumed 
that technology and relative prices are constant (as in the case of input-output 
multipliers), but also that linear relationships are assumed to exist between income 
and factor shares, current transfers and consumption patterns.
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(million bahi)
5
WAG
6
UIN.PR
7
CORP.PR
8
HH
9
PR.CORP
10
ST.ENT
11
GVT
62,916
272,465
9,354
317,931
276
16,408
4,877
121,356
662,666 142,917
304,227 408,320
162,200
47,522
9,194
22,551
675
70,266
16,945
22,721
226
13,273
13,323
1,199
21,507
8,802
89,896
83,497
20,700
-3,090
861
1,586
3,675
304,227 408320 209,722 784,981 199,551 47,522 171335
(Continued on page 20)
In Table 2.5, the aggregate multipliers for the MSAF75 and MSAF85 are 
given. Multipliers are shown for column and row totals. Column multipliers give 
the effects o f an exogenous injection in the respective accounts, and row multipliers 
those of an injection in all accounts. A high column multiplier means a high degree 
of integration of a particular account with the rest of the system in response to an 
exogenous injection into the system. Table 2.5 shows that the accounts 
“agriculture,” “labor income,” “unincorporated capital” and “services” have the 
highest sum of the column multipliers. They have thus the highest backward link­
age effects. The accounts “households,” “mining and manufacturing,” “services,” 
and “unincorporated capital” show the highest row multipliers, or the highest 
forward linkages.
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Tabic 2.2 (continued)
12 13 14 15 16
RoW IIII PR.CRP ST.ENT GVT
1 Agriculture 13,871 700
2 Mining and Manufacturing 171,890 86,683 7,989 2,663
3 Construction and Public Utilities 38 39,520 18,082 27,706 27,706
4 Services and Others 59,452 5,550 5,905 13,701
SUBTOTAL 245,251 40,220 110315 41,600 44,070
5 Wages 21,787
6 Uninc. Profits
7 Corp. Profits
TOTAL VALUE ADDED 21,787
8 Households 743
9 Privates Corporations 6,650
10 State Enterprises
11 Government: Net Direct Tax 4,649
12 Rest of World
13 Households 19,068 5,638 3,898
14 Private Corporations 25,227 939 649
15 State Enterprises 3,178 6,409
16 Government 7,784 618 2,035
17 Other Wealth 35,451
18 Bank of Thailand 362 20 99 33
19 Commercial Banks 52,322 -2,395 827 4,339
20 Other Financial Institutions 23,885
21 Informal Finance 5,419
22 Rest of World 40,514 23,505 19,294 10,794
GRANDTOTAL 319,594 155,219 189,760 70,432 70,192
EMPLOYMENT (’000)
It is striking that, between 1975 and 1985, the values of most o f the 
multipliers seem to have fallen. Normally, one may expect that, with economic 
development, the interdependencies between sectors and institutions would increase. 
The opposite seems to have occurred in Thailand. This could be attributed to the 
change in the structure of the economy, whereby the accounts with relatively high 
linkages, such as agriculture and households, have seen their share in total 
production and income falling, while some accounts with much lower linkages, 
such as corporate capital income and private corporations and state enterprises, saw 
their share rising. The decline of the value of the multipliers themselves can, 
however, also be observed for almost all accounts, and this may be related to the 
pattern of development whereby the economy has become more open and import 
dependent and leakages to abroad have increased. The Thai economy's increased 
openness to the world's commodity' and financial markets is thus associated with the 
declining intersectoral linkages within the economy.
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(million baht)
17 18 19 20 21 22 GRAND
WEALTH BoT CO.BK OTHFIN IF.FIN RoW TOTAL
8,177 240,416
-11,100 1105,106
1,168 2,542 1,536 179,573
-891 740,902
-2,645 2,542 1,536 2265,997
304,227
408,320
209,722
922,269
784,981
199,551
47,522
171,335
319,594
6,487 21,505 3,308 5,419 155,219
26,288 4,026 49,134 189,760
11,836 559 409 27,341 70,432
8,845 10,759 -2,849 16,676 29,414 70,192
233 35,684
10,919 6,565 99 5,351 24,309
2,000 1,391 2,617 -5,026 57,661
241 4,511 -1,437 162 -1,101 29,936
5,419
7,039 2,864 1,103 105,113
35,684 24309 57,661 29,936 5,419 105,113
THE CHANGING SOCIAL STRUCTURE
The most striking structural characteristic of the Thai economy is the large 
role of the institutional sector “households” or, as its full title is, the sector of 
“households and unincorporated enterprises.” The household sector in Thailand is 
not primarily a collection of consumption units. It is dominated by self-employed 
family businesses. This is clear from the MSAF85, which shows that capital income 
from unincorporated businesses is the main source of household income.
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T able 2.3 V alue Added Per Sector in Constant (1972) Prices
(percentage distribution)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1990
Agriculture 27.0 24.8 20.6 19.9 14.4
Mining and Quarrying 2.9 2.1 2.6 2.5 2.9
Manufacturing 16.0 19.9 21.7 20.7 24.7
- light 11.0 13.8 14.3 14.6 16.5
- heavy 5.0 6.1 7.4 6.1 8.2
Construction 5.3 3.7 4.5 4.2 5.2
Electricity and Water Supply 1.0 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.0
Transportation and Communications 6.5 6.1 6.7 7.1 7.1
- public 1.4 1.6 2.4 3.4 3.7
- private 5.1 4.5 4.3 3.7 3.4
Wholesale and Retail Trade 17.4 17.1 16.9 16.3 17.6
Banking, Insurance and Real Estate 2.5 2.6 2.8 3.0 5.3
Ownership of Dwellings 5.6 5.5 4.8 4.4 3.6
Public Administration and Defense 4.4 4.7 5.2 5.4 3.8
Services 11.5 11.9 12.2 13.9 12.3
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0 100.0
T able 2.4 Pattern o f Industrialization (growth rates o f M anufactured  
Value Added at constant 1972 prices)
Share in 
1988 MFG
1960-70 1970-80 1980-85 1985 88 GDP
Natural Resource-based Industries
Export-oriented 7.3 8.2 7.0 9.9 24
Domestic demand-oriented 10.8 7.3 3.7 6.8 21
Total 9.1 7.7 5.3 8.4 45
Import-dependent Industries
Export-oriented - 12.3 5.1 14.1 33
Domestic market-oriented 15.8 11.7 1.5 11.9 22
Total 15.8 12.0 3.5 13.2 55
TOTAL MANUFACTURING 11.6 9;8 4 3 11.0 100
Note: The classification is based on information from Input-Output tables for 1975, 1980 and 1985.
ID industries are those that have an import requirement per unit of output of 25 percent or more; 
for NR industries that requirement was below 25 percent. Export-oriented industries exported in 
1980 10 percent or more of their output and domestic demand-oriented industries exported less 
than 10 percent of output Before 1970 all ID industries were domestic demand-oriented; even in 
1975 their export-output ratios were, in general, still low. O f course, over the years export 
orientation and import dependency may have changed so that the classification inevitably has an 
element of arbitrariness. It should, therefore, be used with caution.
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T abic 2.5 M SAF M ultipliers
Sum of:
MSAF75 MSAF85
columns rows columns rows
1 Agriculture 8.550 5.090 7.592 3.726
2 Mining and Manufacturing 6.267 11.452 5.274 11.411
3 Construction and Public Utilities. 6.893 1.492 6.615 1.646
4 Services 8.265 8.784 7.377 8.465
5 Labor Income 8.509 3.815 7.544 4.200
6 Unincorporate Capital 8.509 9.142 7.544 6.081
7 Corporated Capital 3.438 2.595 3.789 3.189
8 Households 7.509 14.708 6.544 12.562
9 Private Corporations 2.607 3.350 3.304 3.613
10 State Enterprises 1.189 1.309 1.031 1.723
The 1975 Social Accounting Matrix for Thailand (SAM75), constructed by 
the National Economic and Social Development Board (NESDB) and the World 
Bank, uses the term "informal sector” and describes it as a sector producing the 
same type of commodity as the formal sector, but under different conditions. The 
informal firms are said to operate neoclassically, with flexible wages and prices, and 
to have limited access to domestic and external credit. Formal sector corporations 
have more price rigidity and easy access to credit (see NESDB-IBRD 1982). It could 
also be added that informal sector firms (or unincorporated enterprises) generally 
are small-scale firms using predominantly family-labor in labor-intensive and sim ­
ple production processes. According to the SAM75, informal firms dominate agri­
culture and are of substantial importance in light industries, transport, trade and 
services.
This informal or unincorporated sector overlaps with the institution 
"households” of the MSAF. The gross operating surplus of the small household 
firms in agriculture, industry, trade and services accounted for 62 percent o f value 
added at factor cost in 1975. This proportion fell to 45 percent in the MSAF85. It is 
important to emphasize that, in a country such as Thailand, households are not just 
consumption units, but much more production units earning a profit income. In the 
analysis of accumulation behavior in Chapter 4, we will come back to this.
The declining share of the unincorporated business sector firms in value 
added is balanced by an increase in the wage share (from 23 to 31 percent) and in 
the share of the gross operating surplus of corporations (from 15 to 23 percent). 
There is a rapid process of concentration of capital going on in Thailand, shifting 
production and income to large-scale units using wage labor. This process is also 
reflected in employment data: the categories "own account workers” and “unpaid 
family workers” accounted for 83 percent of the labor force in 1975; by 1984 this 
share had fallen to 74 percent. This process is partly due to the changing production 
structure. The agricultural sector's share in value added— the sector where house­
hold firms dominate— had fallen from 24 percent in 1975 to 16 percent in 1985, 
whereas the share of the sectors where the corporate form dominates 
(manufacturing, construction, public utilities) increased from 30 to 34 percent. But
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also within sectors the formalization of production occurs, with large firms growing 
faster than, or replacing, small-scale informal units.
The MSAFs give an impression of the changes in the distribution of that 
income over the various economic agents. With the formalization of the economy 
and the concentration of capital, as already observed, the income shares of 
“corporate capital” and "wages and salaries” increased and that of “unincorporated 
capital” declined. This pattern can be observed in all four production sectors.
Another factor influencing income distribution is the structure of labor 
productivity. Data on labor productivity, summarized in Table 2.6, show that the 
gaps between the sectors are wide. This table also shows that productivity growth 
rates have not been very different over the period studied; this implies, of course, 
that the absolute differences between the productivity level of the low productivity 
sectors (agriculture) and other sectors have widened. Gaps in productivity are thus 
widening and it is likely that this process is associated with a growing income 
inequality.
Table 2.6 V alue Added Per W orker (labor productivity)
(Value Added at constant, 1972, prices)
('000 baht)
1972 1980 1985 1989 1989/1972
Agriculture 3.7 3.9 4.4 5.9 1.6
Manufacturing 25.3 36.3 39.4 40.7 1.6
Construction 31.0 30.9 28.6 24.3 0.8
Electricity and Water 95.3 98.9 97.8 141.4 1.5
Transport and 34.1 44.0 53.0 56.6 1.7
Communications 
Trade and Services 27.6 32.9 35.1 38.7 1.4
TOTAL 10.6 133 15.2 21.1 2.0
Note: Labor productivity has been estimated by dividing sectoral Value Added by sectoral employment.
The MSAFs show that between 1975 and 1985 there was a considerable 
transformation of the tax structure. Indirect taxes on the various types of commodi­
ties are shown in row 11, columns 1 to 4 of the MSAF. Direct taxes on institutions 
and other direct transfers to the government are shown in row 11, columns 8 to 10. 
There was a shift toward indirect taxes and, within that group, toward taxes on 
manufactured goods and away from agricultural commodities. There was also an 
increase in the direct tax burden on the household sector. If we assume, as is usually 
done, that all indirect taxes fall on household consumption, then the overall direct 
and indirect tax burden on households has significantly increased, from 11.8 per­
cent of GDP (or 14.7 percent of household income) in 1975 to 13.4 percent (or 17.4 
percent o f household income) in 1985.
In summary, as a result of these processes, incomes have shifted to the 
formal sector of the economy and the tax burden on households has increased. It is
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likely that, as an outcome of that process, the size distribution of income has 
become more unequal. Available data confirm that impression. Household surveys 
have been conducted in 1962/63, 1968/69, 1975/76, 1980/81 and 1985/86. Over 
these years the income distribution (as measured by Gini-coelficients) has become 
increasingly unequal. Over the same period, the incidence of poverty (proportion of 
population living below the poverty line) has tended to fajl. Thailand's rapid eco­
nomic growth has ensured that many people could improve their standard of living, 
but the gains were very uneven, favoring those in the urban modern sector. Clearly, 
growth and diversification within agriculture occured and rural households do have 
increasing access to non-agricultural incomes from rural non-farm activities or from 
urban employment, but these new opportunities have, so far, not been sufficient to 
start closing the gap. The surveys show that those households that are active in the 
agricultural sector, live in rural locations and have little education have the lowest 
incomes and have experienced the slowest growth of income over the years (see 
Krongkaew 1985 and Hutaserani and Jitsuchon 1988). A simulation exercise 
undertaken by Hutaserani and Jitsuchon relating the determinants of income 
distribution and poverty to the economic changes that occurred from 1985 to 1988 
suggested that the recent growth spurt consolidated earlier trends: the income 
distribution remained highly unequal and poverty incidence fell further. The highly 
unequal income distribution is a main social problem. The gap between the top 20 
percent of the population, who in the 1985/86 survey earned 56 percent of all 
income, and the bottom 20 percent, who earned only 5 percent of total income, 
becomes too large.
FINANCIAL DEVELOPMENT AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE
The rapid process of concentration in production is certainly stimulated by 
the financial development over the period. Already in 1975, Thailand had a fairly 
well-developed financial system (see Jansen 1990, Chapter 2), and by 1985 the 
M2/GDP ratio had increased to 0.58, compared to, for example, only 0.20 in the 
Philippines.
The most striking development between 1975 and 1985 is Thailand's rapid 
integration into the international financial markets. This is shown in row/column 
22 of the MSAF. Column 22 shows the funds received from international financial 
markets by private corporations (row 14), state enterprises (row 15), government 
(row 16) and financial institutions (rows 18 to 20). Row 22 shows the funds sent to 
international financial markets (including repayment of debts) by private corpora­
tions (column 14), state enterprises (column 15), government (column 16) and fi­
nancial institutions (columns 18 to 20). In Table 2.7, the funds so obtained or spent 
are expressed as percentage of GDP.
The years 1975 and 1985 are comparable in the sense that the current 
account deficit was of the same order of magnitude at around 4 percent of GDP. 
This implies that the total net financial inflow was also equal, at 4 percent of GDP. 
But, in 1985, this net result is the outcome of a much higher level of financial 
inflows and outflows. The public sector (state enterprises and government) in 
particular has increased its involvement in international financial markets, although 
the private sector is still the biggest party.
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T able 2.7 Integration with International Financial M arkets (as percentage  
of GDP)
1975 1985
Funds obtained from abroad
- private corporations 3.81 5.39
- state enterprises 0.81 2.15
- government 0.07 2.90
- financial institutions 0.72 -0.08
Total 5.41 10.36
Foreign assets acquired
- private corporations 1.59 2.32
- state enterprises 0.21 1.90
- government 0.31 1.06
- financial institutions -0.76 1.08
Total 1.35 6.36
Net flows received
- private corporations 2.22 3.07
- state enterprises 0.60 0.25
government -0.24 1 84
- financial institutions 1.48 -1.16
Total 4.06 4.00
Source: MSAF75 and MSAF85.
The increasing “financial openness” is combined with, and partly related 
to, the rise in the “trade openness” that was already observed: the export/GDP ratio 
and the import/GDP ratio increased rapidly. The Thai economy has always been 
comparatively open and, in recent times, this openness has further increased and 
has also been extended from commodity to financial markets. The growing 
openness reflects, on the one hand, the flexibility of the economy to respond to 
external opportunities but, on the other hand, has also increased the economy's 
vulnerability to external shocks (that aspect will be further explored in Chapter 3).
The interaction with the international financial markets is also reflected in 
the debt statistics. Thailand's long-term external debt increased from US$0.7 billion 
in 1970 to US$18.6 billion in 1990 (for further data and discussion, see Chapter 3). 
Particularly in the early 1980s, the imminent threat of a debt crisis was felt. The 
major share of this debt is held by the public sector. The substantial interaction of 
the private sector with the international financial markets, as shown in Table 2.7, is 
more of a two-way interaction wherein, in some years, shortages of funds are cov­
ered on foreign markets but, in other years, the loans are repaid or foreign assets are
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accumulated. The interaction of the public sector with the international financial 
markets shows a more substantial net inflow of funds.
Table 2.7 also suggests that the interaction with the international financial 
markets is mainly undertaken directly by the main economic agents and not inter­
mediated through the local financial system. But monetary institutions (central and 
commercial banks) also have increased their activities on the international financial 
markets, as is shown in Table 2.8. In fact, the net foreign asset position of the 
monetary system has always been positive, although in the period 1970-1983 the 
trend for this surplus declined. In that period, both the external asset position (as 
proportion of GDP) was falling and the borrowing from abroad was increasing. In 
the last two years, a very rapid accumulation of international reserves took place as 
the result o f large capital inflows related to direct and portfolio investments, as well 
as to short-term capital inflows, in response to the high level of domestic interest 
rates and the high level of domestic credit demand. Over the entire period, foreign 
assets holdings as percentage of GDP remained relatively stable. These predominate 
(more than three-quarters) the foreign reserves in the hands of the central bank. 
Foreign liabilities are, again, about three-quarters, owed by the commercial banks. 
There have been fluctuations from year to year, reflecting the rise and fall in 
domestic demand for credit and supply of deposits.
Table 2.8 Foreign Assets and L iabilities M onetary System  (as percentage 
of GDP)
Foreign Assets Foreign Liabilities
1970 13.04 2.41
1971 12.67 2.52
1972 14.15 3.77
1973 13.07 4.45
1974 13.82 4.27
1975 14.81 4.06
1976 13.00 3.64
1977 11.67 4.91
1978 12.87 6.95
1979 14.12 7.74
1980 11.85 4.89
1981 11.53 6.56
1982 10.65 5.55
1983 9.16 7.01
1984 10.66 7.44
1985 11.20 7.20
1986 12.84 5.26
1987 13.70 4.87
1988 14.88 5 21
1989 19.14 5.20
1990 20.33 5.36
The stock of foreign assets and liabilities of the Bank of Thailand and of the commercial banks as 
percentage o f GDP.
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An important question that arises is whether the increasing role of inter­
national finance had an impact on the level or pattern of investment. Time series 
analysis (see Chapter 3) shows that total net capital inflows (as percentage of GDP) 
increased rapidly after 1976 and were, until 1985, at a substantially higher level 
than before. The analysis in Chapter 4 will show that these capital inflows financed 
a high level of public sector investment. The high capital inflows that were experi­
enced in the more recent years are associated with a sharp increase in private sector 
investment. In Chapter 4, we will come back to the relationships between inter­
national finance and domestic accumulation patterns and behavior.
STR UC T UR A L C H ANG E AND M ACR O EC O N O M IC  STA BILITY
Thailand's rapid growth and stmctural change was accompanied by, on the 
whole, a remarkable degree of macroeconomic stability. Information on some se­
lected stability indicators is brought together in Table 2.9. A long period (three 
decades) is covered in the table in order to put the individual periods in the proper 
long-term perspective.
Table 2.9 Stability Indicators
1960 64 1965 69 1970-74 1975-79 1980-82 1983 86 1987 90
Inflation 1.7 2.7 9.0 7.0 12.6 2.2 4.4
(CPI)
Domestic 2.2 2.8 0.9 3.7 6.9 2.0 -0.2
inflation
CAB -0.5 -1.3 -1.6 -5.0 -5.4 -3.9 -3.0
Budget -0.5 -1.7 -3.0 -3.0 -3.9 -3.2 +2.6
balance
DSR 12.8 13 15.4 20.3 12.4
NER 20.9 20.8 20.6 20.3 21.7 24.9 25.5
RER 93 87 87 88 91 93 93*
growth 7.5 8.6 5.8 8.0 5.1 5.7 11.2
Note: Inflation
Domestic
inflation
CAB
Budget
balance
DSR
NER
RER
growth
= rate of inflation, Consumer prices (CPI).
= rate of domestic inflation; CPI corrected for changes in import prices
(weighted by the import share in GDP) and for changes in export prices
(weighted by the export share in GDP).
= Current Account Balance as percentage of GDP.
-  Government budget balance as percentage of GDP.
-  External debt service payments as percentage of exports of goods and services.
= Nominal exchange rate; baht per one US dollar.
= Real exchange rate index: NER * Pusa /Pth, where Pusa is the wholesale
price index of the USA and Pth is the CPI of Thailand. 1960=100 
growth rate real GDP.
* 1987-1989
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Inflation, as reflected in the consumer price index, is the outcome of 
domestic and external factors. International prices have a direct impact on the 
domestic price level. The Thai government has no active pricing policy and the 
import cost of most commodities are immediately translated into domestic consumer 
prices. The same applies to the export side. Thailand is an exporter o f some major 
food items (rice, sugar, fruits). The domestic wholesale and consumer prices of 
these commodities are directly influenced by world market prices. Correcting the 
consumer price index for the direct impact of export and import prices gives the 
domestically-generated inflation (see Table 2.9). This domestic inflation is, in 
general, very low. Only in the period 1975-1982 was it somewhat higher. It may be 
surprising that the recent growth boom has, so far, not led to higher inflation. Over 
the final period reported in Table 2.9, the domestic inflation is, in fact, negative. 
This means that the price rises that did occur can be more than explained by the 
impact of changes in international prices. It should be noted that the period average 
of the final period is particularly due to the negative domestic inflation in 1987 and 
1988. In the last two years, domestic inflationary pressures started to emerge.
The low rate of inflation and the direct links between domestic and inter­
national prices enabled Thailand to maintain a very stable exchange rate. There will 
be few developing countries where the nominal exchange rate devalued by only 22 
percent over a 30-year period. This very modest nominal devaluation did not lead to 
a sharp overvaluation of the currency. Table 2.9 shows that the real exchange rate 
index of the baht never fell very far below its 1960 level. Also the other standard 
indicator of macroeconomic stability, the current-account deficit, stayed at a low 
level until the mid-1970s. The average level of the deficit was just enough to 
accommodate the structural inflow of international finance that consisted mainly 
of direct investment and official aid.
The increase in the deficit after 1975 should be seen in the context of the 
changing conditions on international financial markets. The main elements of these 
changes were the high liquidity of the market, owing to OPEC-surpluses, and the 
innovations that occurred, such as syndicated loans and variable interest rate loans. 
The outcome of these changes was that the access of developing countries to inter­
national bank loans suddenly increased sharply (for more detail, see Vos 1991).
The opportunities offered by the world financial markets were seized by 
many developing countries, including Thailand. After 1975 the net inflow of inter­
national finance increased sharply and, thus, the current-account deficit rose 
sharply, as Table 2.9 shows. But the composition of capital inflows also changed 
radically, with bank loans taking a major share (see Chapter 3 for more details).
The reasons behind the sharp increase in capital inflows were, thus, to be 
found more on the supply side than on the domestic demand side. But, of course, the 
inflows had a significant expansionary impact on domestic expenditure. In Chapter 
4, we will analyze these events in detail and show that, in the period 1975-1985, 
the capital inflows had, in particular, an expansionary effect on public sector (i.e., 
government and state enterprises) investment. Table 2.9 shows that this period was 
associated with a relatively high level of budget deficit, a high rate of domestic 
inflation and a rapidly growing debt servicing burden. It could be suggested that the 
inflow of funds created demand pressures and made a tight monetary policy difficult 
to implement, but conclusions on these issues will have to await the detailed analy­
sis in Chapters 5 and 6.
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The balance-of-payments developments of the most recent period also 
deserve attention. Table 2.9 shows that in this period the current-account deficit as a 
percentage of GDP was sharply reduced but that capital inflows, nevertheless, were 
very' high Over all earlier periods, the current-account deficit had been more or less 
equal to the level of capital inflows, with the changes in foreign reserves of the 
financial system taking the (marginal) balance. But over the years 1987-1990, when 
the current-account deficit stood at 4.0 percent of GDP, net capital inflows were 
equivalent to 6.0 percent and the accumulation of international reserves accounted 
for 2.7 percent of GDP. The composition of the capital inflows also differed sharply 
with the earlier periods: now the capital inflows were aimed at the private sector 
and were dominated by private direct and portfolio investment (for details on the 
composition, see Chapter 3). The capital inflow led to a strong increase in private 
investment and an unprecedented acceleration of growth. Macroeconomic stability 
was maintained by three factors.
The first of these was the strong deflationary impact o f the fiscal policy. 
As Table 2.9 shows, the fiscal deficit was turned into a surplus. This mitigated 
domestic demand pressures, which helped to keep inflation and the current-account 
deficit low. Public sector debt was being repaid, which contributed to the decline of 
the debt-service burden.
A second factor was that much of the investment activity was aimed at 
export activities. Export earnings rose sharply, which helped the current account. 
The third contributing factor was the devaluation of the baht in 1984, which led to 
an improvement in the competitiveness of Thai exports (see the real exchange rate 
index in Table 2.9). The improvement is, in fact, even stronger than shown in Table 
2.9, where the real exchange rate is calculated only with respect to the US dollar. 
The devaluation with respect to the dollar in 1984 was followed in 1986 and 1987 
by a strong depreciation of the baht with respect to the yen and the European 
currencies. The effects of this on imports and exports strengthened the current 
account of the balance of payments.
The events of this period will be further analyzed in Chapter 6, where it 
will be shown that the situation is precarious. Data for 1990 show that the current- 
account deficit in that year increased to 8.7 percent of GDP and that inflation rose 
to 6 percent. These figures suggest that the stability of the economy has been 
undermined and that more decisive policy interventions are required to defend it.
The experience of the two periods with high capital inflows is thus diverse 
In the period 1975-1985, capital inflows were aimed at the public sector and were 
accompanied by substantial instability of the economy. The more recent period of 
the late 1980s, with capital flows aimed at the private sector, initially combined 
rapid growth with short-term stability, but the latest data suggest the undermining 
of the stability. These relationships between international finance and domestic 
growth and stability are the central focus of this study, and will be further explored 
in subsequent chapters.
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CONCLUSION
This chapter aimed to present the main dimensions of economic change in 
Thailand over the last two decades. O f all of the issues raised, three deserve to be 
summarized briefly because of their importance to the rest of this study.
1. The rapid growth and changes in the production structure have been 
associated with a formalization of the organization of production and 
a concentration of capital in the modern corporate sector. This 
process has widened the productivity and income gaps between the 
sectors and has contributed to further sectoral segmentation. In 
particular, the agricultural sector has stayed relatively behind in the 
process of rapid progress. Despite the growth and diversification that 
did occur in the sector, it could not keep pace with the rest of the 
economy.
2. The economy has become more integrated with world markets in 
terms of both trade and finance. International capital flows have 
increased strongly. In the period 1975-1985, these flows were mainly 
directed at the public sector and, in the post-1986 period, mainly at 
the private sector. In both cases, these inflows led to significant 
increases in the sectoral investment levels.
3. The capital inflows in both of the periods mentioned are associated 
with increased short-term instability. In the decade 1975-1985, all 
stability indicators (inflation, current-account deficit, fiscal deficit) 
were on the rise. The more recent years have shown surprising 
stability, but the last two years suggest that this balance may be 
precarious: both inflation and the current-account deficit are rising
In the rest o f this study, these three points and, in particular, the interac­
tions among them will be further investigated. In Chapter 3, the composition of the 
capital inflows and their allocation to the economic sectors will be analyzed to in­
vestigate whether foreign capital contributed to the sectoral segmentation of the 
Thai economy. The interaction between capital inflows and institutional investment 
and savings levels is the subject of Chapter 4, while their impact on intersectoral fi­
nancial flows will be analyzed in Chapter 5. Chapter 6 will assess how, and how 
successfully, economic policies have steered these processes.

Chapter 3
Thailand in the World Economy
INTRODUCTION
I n  the previous chapter we noted the growing importance of linkages with the 
world economy through trade and finance. This chapter provides detailed informa­
tion on the nature of Thailand's relationships with the world economy, focusing first 
on the trends in the level and type of foreign capital that the country has obtained 
over the years. Questions that will be raised are: “What were the levels of capital 
inflows?” “What was the composition of the flows?” “How have these funds been 
used?” and “What was the resulting debt burden?”
International linkages through trade and finance are, in themselves, a 
major cause of economic disturbance. In the period under study, international 
commodity prices (for example, of oil) have fluctuated violently and a major world 
debt crisis has occurred, among others. In this chapter we will analyze the impact of 
these external shocks on Thailand's foreign exchange balance.
Relationships with the world economy may be easily assessed through an 
analysis o f the various components of a country's balance of payments. In its most 
aggregate form, the balance-of-payments equation is:
Cur Ac + CapAc + MonAc + E&O = 0 (3.1)
which states that the sum of the current-account balance (CurAc), the capital 
balance (CapAc), the account of monetary movements (MonAc) and the errors and 
omissions (E&O) should be equal to zero. For the purposes of this chapter, the 
current and the capital account may be disaggregated:
CurAc = X + T - M - N F P  (3.2)
and
CapAc = DFI + PFI + NFL + NFS (3.3)
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where:
X exports of goods and services
M imports of goods and services
T net unrequited transfers received from abroad
NFP net payments of factor services to abroad
DFI net inflow of direct foreign investment
PFI net inflow of portfolio investment
NFL net inflow of long-term loans
NFS net inflow of short-term loans.
The various components of the capital account and current account will be 
presented later in this chapter.
PATTERN OF FOREIGN CAPITAL FLOWS
Foreign capital has played an important role in Thailand's economic devel­
opment. Foreign capital has filled the gap when domestic savings were insufficient 
to finance the country's investment activities.
During the period 1970-1974, net capital inflows accounted for a moderate 
8 percent of Thailand's domestic capital formation. This proportion increased to 15 
percent during the period 1975-1979 and to more than 25 percent during the first 
half o f the 1980s. Subsequently, it dropped to about 17 percent in the period 1983- 
1986, when the country adopted a restrictive policy by putting an annual limit of 
US$1 billion on public foreign loans to fend off the danger of a foreign debt crisis. 
Since 1987, substantial foreign capital has come into the country, particularly in the 
forms of direct and portfolio investments.
Table 3.1 shows the net inflows of the various types of funds as a 
percentage of GDP for five periods from 1970. The available balance-of-payments 
statistics allow us to split up the total long-term loan inflow into flows directed at 
the private sector (NFLpr ), state enterprises (NFL5e) and the government (NFLg). 
The table confirms that, from the early to late 1970s and the early 1980s, there was 
a steady and rapid increase in the level of capital inflows from abroad and, after a 
slight decline in the period 1983-1986, there was another burst in the most recent 
years.
In the first period, 1970-1974, international lending had not truly begun. 
The current-account deficit and the capital-account balance were relatively small. 
Capital inflows were dominated by flows aimed at the private sector (DFI, N F L ^). 
Only 18 percent o f all capital inflows were directed to the public sector. In the 
second and third period, this changed dramatically. The size of the total capital 
inflow, and its share in GDP, increased considerably and the public sector's share in 
these inflows rose to over 50 percent.
Table 3.1 also shows that these shifts were caused by the rapid rise in 
inflow of long-term loans. The inflow of long-term loans from international 
financial markets rose from less than one percent o f GDP in the early 1970s to over 
5 percent of GDP in the period 1980-1982. Most o f these loans were taken by the 
public sector, in particular the state enterprises.
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Tabic 3.1 International Capital Flows to Thailand  
(as percentage of GDP)
DFI P H NFL NFLpr NFLse NFLgv NFS CaAc
1970-74 0.81 0.11 0.78 0.43 0.18 0.17 0.20 1.90
1975-79 0.39 0.08 2.29 0.43 1.13 0.72 0.79 3.56
1980-82 0.65 0.08 5.08 1.69 2.39 0.99 0.74 6.54
1983-86 0.74 0.16 2.57 0.46 1.18 0.93 0.51 3.98
1987-90 1.88 1.10 0.33 1.09 -0.46 -0.29 2.67 6.01
(percentage distribution)
1970-74 42.7 5.8 41.1 22.8 9.3 8.9 10.4 100.0
1975-79 11.1 2.3 64.4 12.2 31.9 20.3 22.2 100.0
1980-82 9.9 1.2 77.6 25.9 36.5 15.1 11.3 100.0
1983-86 18.5 4.0 64.7 11.7 29.6 23.4 12.8 100.0
1987-90 31.3 18.3 5.5 18.1 -7.7 -4.9 44.5 100.0
Source: This table is based on the capital account of the balance of payments of Thailand.
The main explanation for this dramatic change can be found on the supply 
side. Traditionally, developing countries had limited access to the market for com­
mercial international loans. But, after the first oil crisis, the international financial 
markets were very liquid with deposits of oil dollars, while the demand for credit 
from the rich countries was limited because of a recession. Against that background, 
lending to developing countries became attractive. Through instruments such as 
consortium loans and variable interest rate loans, the risk of Third World lending 
was reduced (for a full account of changes in the international financial markets, 
see Vos 1991). International financial institutions concentrated their lending on the 
public sector. Two reasons for this bias may be suggested. First, international 
financial markets only deal in large loans, and the capacity to manage and absorb 
such large amounts is concentrated in the public sector. Second, international 
financial institutions demand a government guarantee on loan servicing to try to 
reduce the sovereign risk implied in international loans. In most countries, such a 
guarantee is only provided to public sector agencies.
Figure 3.1 shows that the capital inflows to the public sector began to rise 
in 1975 and, from then on, increased rapidly until 1981. Capital inflows to the 
private sector show more fluctuation and not a clear trend, so that the movement of 
the line of total capital inflows is, over the medium term, dominated by the public 
sector. That was at least the picture until 1987. Since then, the situation has 
drastically changed, with capital flows to the public sector becoming negligible and 
private sector inflows rising very rapidly.
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flows to public sector -Q - flows to private sector - A -  total inflows
Figure 3.1 Foreign C apital Inflows (as percentage of GDP)
Obviously, the trends observed in Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 were only made 
possible through changes on the international financial markets. That the trends did 
occur is the result of the Thai government's decision to make use of the new 
opportunities. The impact of this decision can only be assessed after a detailed 
analy sis of the various elements of the capital inflows.
Direct Foreign Investm ent
Thailand's import substitution policy attracted a significant amount of 
inflows of foreign direct investment (DFI) in the 1960s and early 1970s. In the 
period 1970-1974, DFI accounted for over 40 percent of total foreign capital 
inflows. This share leveled off to a moderate level of around 10 percent, however, 
during the second half of the 1970s and the early 1980s. Not until 1987 did a new 
wave of DFI from Japan and the Asian NICs come into Thailand.
Table 3.2 provides the distribution of total direct investment by country of 
origin. The distribution in the periods between 1970 and 1986 is relatively stable, 
but the sharp changes in the period 1987-1990 underline the special characteristics 
of the recent foreign investment boom. The main aspect of Thailand's recent boom 
is, of course, the enormous increase in the size of the inflow of funds. Over the 
period 1970-1983, the average annual inflow of direct investment funds amounted 
to almost 3 billion baht per year, equivalent to about 4 percent of annual private 
investment in Thailand. In 1988, the net inflow was 27 billion baht, in 1989 44 
billion baht, and in 1990, with an amount of 57 billion baht, it came to nearly 10 
percent of total private investment.
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T abic 3.2 Net Inflows of Direct Foreign Investment in Thailand by 
Investing Country (percentage distribution)
Country/Region 1970-79 1980 82 1983 86 1987-90
North America 35.72 27.03 30.57 11.29
U.S.A. 35.56 27.25 29.71 11.06
Canada 0.16 (0.22) 0.86 0.23
Japan 29.78 22.89 32.87 44.39
Asian NIEs-3 10.32 14.06 11.06 23.36
Hong Kong 9.59 13.88 9.68 11.58
Republic of Korea 0.35 0.07 0.09 0.74
Taiwan 0.38 0.11 1 29 11.05
ASEAN 6.38 7.57 4.00 7.87
Brunei 0.00 - 0.04 0.00
Indonesia 0.10 0.24 0.05 0.07
Malaysia 0.61 1.12 0.74 0.38
Philippines 0.28 0.00 (0.12) 0 .01
Singapore 5.11 6.21 3.28 7.41
Australia 0.46 1.39 0.93 0.21
China 0.00 0.00 0.44 0.34
EC and o ther W .Europe 15.40 19.16 11.73 7.78
Others 1.94 7.90 8.40 4.76
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Source: Bank of Thailand.
A second characteristic of the recent boom is the sharp increase in 
Japanese and Taiwanese shares and the emergence of South Korea as an investor. 
The reasons for this lie within international factors. After the Plaza Agreement of 
1985, the yen began to appreciate, and the currencies of the Asian NIEs also ap­
preciated against the dollar. Combined with these countries' rising labor costs, this 
undermined the international competitiveness of their labor-intensive export indus­
tries. These factors forced investors in the three countries to move their production 
bases abroad. Thailand became one of the preferred destinations and, as a result, 
DFI inflow grew rapidly in 1988 and 1989.
Note that the shares presented in Table 3.2 may give a wrong impression. 
The U.S. share in total DFI is falling, but it is a falling share within a rapidly 
growing total. The average level of DFI inflows from the U.S. was around 800 mil­
lion baht per year in the period 1970-1983. In 1988 the inflow was over 3 billion 
baht and in 1989 was more than 5 billion baht. Also, total inflows from Hong Kong 
and Singapore, for example, increased substantially. The increasing Japanese share 
is somewhat distorted by the realignment of major currencies since 1985. The 
appreciation of the yen implies that a given amount of Japanese investment (valued 
in yen) translates into a higher amount in terms of baht. Despite these reservations, 
the “real” value of Japanese and other Asian investments dramatically increased in 
recent years.
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There were also sonic shifts in sectoral allocation of foreign investments. 
In the period 1970-1986, direct investments had concentrated on the trade, con­
struction, mining and manufacturing sectors (sec Table 3.3). The allocation pattern 
of the last four years shows some significant differences. M ining has almost disap­
peared as a destination for foreign investment. The dominant destinations are now 
the trade, manufacturing and services sectors. Within the manufacturing sector, the 
very large share of the electrical appliances industry is striking. This sector is the 
prototype of an import-dependent, labor intensive, export-oriented activity that 
characterizes much of recent direct investments. The increase in the role of the 
services sector is a result of investment in housing and real estate, reflecting the 
participation of foreigners in the Thai property boom.
Table 3.3 Distribution of Net Inflows of Direct Foreign Investm ent by 
Sector 1970-1990
(percentage)
Sector 1970-79 1980-82 1983 86 1987-90
1. Financial Institutions 13.75 0.14 1.45 6.86
2. Trade 21.46 13.19 22.10 16.91
3. Construction 11.76 19.12 15.84 7.17
4. Mining and Quarrying 11.93 20.83 17.10 1.64
4.1 Oil Exploration 10.40 18.48 15.13 1.43
4.2 Others 1.54 2.35 1.97 0.21
5. Agriculture 0.23 1.59 1.35 1.35
6. Industry 33.15 32.63 31.54 49.48
6.1 Food 3.53 -0.06 3.44 3.73
6.2 Textiles 12.66 2.65 2.09 3.14
6.3 Metal-based and Non-metallic 1.32 2.19 3.26 5.56
6.4 Electrical Appliances
6.5 Machinery and Transport
7.11 11.89 8.00 18.69
Equipment 2.03 3.07 1.91 2.97
6.6 Chemicals 4.00 3.40 5.50 6.22
6.7 Petroleum Products 1.34 7.66 3.22 0.32
6.8 Construction Materials -0.42 0.16 0.24 0.09
6.9 Others 1.59 1.68 3.89 8.76
7. Services 7.71 12.49 10.62 16.07
7.1 Transportation and Travel 5.33 5.55 2.87 1.51
7.2 Housing and Real Estate 0.82 1.10 1.84 7.61
7.3 Hotel and Restaurants 0.60 2.17 1.56 4.68
7.4 Others 0.96 3.67 4.35 2.27
8. Others - - - 0.70
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
Cummulative Total Over the Period 16,631.9 14,624.0 29,218.3 145,221.1
Average Amount Per Year 
(million baht)
1,615.3 4,874.7 7,304.6 36,305.3
Source: Bank ofThailand.
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The upshot of the recent investment boom has been the rapid growth of 
export-oriented industrial activities. In the process, Thailand has become 
increasingly included in the pattern of distribution of labor and trade in Asia, 
dominated by Japan.
Portfolio Investm ents
Foreign portfolio investment (PFI), as regards its contribution to total for­
eign capital inflows, has never been significant (sec Table 3.1). However, when the 
capital market in Thailand became more developed and overall economic growth 
and the rate o f return on investment were attractively high, PFI increased very rap­
idly in 1987, 1988 and 1989. In 1989 there was a net inflow of over 36 billion baht. 
It is estimated that foreign portfolio capital transactions in the Securities Exchange 
of Thailand (SET) accounted for about 100 billion baht in 1989. equivalent to about 
13 percent of all market transactions. In 1990. the net inflows fell back to the still 
very' significant level of 11 billion baht.
The main sources of PFI have been the U.K., the U.S., Hong Kong, 
Singapore and. lately, Japan. A significant proportion of Singapore and Hong Kong 
funds, however, originally come from other countries. Many foreign investors prefer 
to make their PFI in Thailand through Singapore because there is a double taxation 
agreement between Thailand and Singapore. In the case of Hong Kong, several 
U.K. funds are identified as Hong Kong funds when they are invested in Thailand.
The sectors that have attracted significant shares of total PFI are banking, 
finance and securities, construction materials, and commerce— sectors which grew 
relatively fast in recent years and offer relatively high rates of return.
These factors are important in determining the PFI pattern in recent years 
(Jeerasak. 1989, p. 78).
Foreign Loans
On average, during the past two decades, foreign loans contributed most to 
the net foreign capital inflow. The share in total capital inflows was about 40 
percent during the period 1970-1974, but increased sharply thereafter, reaching an 
extreme high of almost 80 percent during the first half of the 1980s (see Table 3 .1).
The foreign loan pattern was dominated by private-sector loans during the 
period 1970-1974, but this quickly changed to a public-sector predominance during 
the years 1975-1986. Only in recent years was the private-sector dominance re­
stored. following the restrictive policy on foreign public loans. Foreign private loans 
as a percentage of GDP have remained relatively steady for two decades, but foreign 
public loans have fluctuated, causing changes in the foreign loan pattern. The share 
of foreign public loans in the total net capital flows rose from 18 percent during the 
1970-1974 period to 52 percent during the next three periods and then dropped to a 
net outflow of funds (i.e., repayments of loans) during the 1987-1989 period (Table
3.1 and Figure 3.1).
Among the inflows to the public sector, official development assistance 
also played a role. Since the early 1970s, however, its role has been less signifi­
cant— once a country becomes more developed, the need for foreign development 
assistance lessens. O f the outstanding public sector debt in the early 1970s, most
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came from official sources: multilateral and bilateral sources accounted for 90 per­
cent of all public and publicly-guaranteed debt in 1970 and 1975, with private 
sources, such as commercial bank loans, bond market issues and suppliers' credit, 
accounting for only 10 percent. But after 1975, funds from private sources began 
to (low and. In 1980, 40 percent of the then-outstanding debt had come from such 
private sources. Capital inflows to the public sector that came on concessional terms 
(i.e.. had an aid component) accounted for 74 percent of the total debt in 1970. By 
1980. that proportion had fallen to 31 and by 1988 to 27 percent. The decline is due 
to two processes: first, the increase in the share of funds obtained from private 
sources and. second, with (he increasing income level in the country, Thailand was 
less qualified for concessional funds from official sources. In addition, the end of 
the U.S. military presence in Thailand after the Vietnam war was accompanied by a 
decline in American aid to Thailand.
The destination of foreign loans within the Thai economy is not always 
easy to trace. As Table 3.1 shows, most loans go to the public sector and, within the 
public sector, to state enterprises. State enterprises in Thailand arc mainly found in 
the public utilities sector.
Table 3.4 reproduces World Bank data on the sectoral allocation of the 
long-term public and publicly-guaranteed debt. It may be assumed that the debt has 
accumulated from the loans made to government and state enterprises, because the 
Thai government does, as a rule, not give a guarantee on private-sector loans. The 
table shows that the debt concentrated on the electricity, gas and water, and trans­
port and communications sectors and. at a much lower level, on agriculture and 
manufacturing.
T able 3.4 Sectoral Distribution of Long-term  Publicly-guaranteed Debt
(in million US dollars)
1970 1975 1980 1985 1988
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 34 37 272 851 1,226
Construction 0 0 0 0 27
Petroleum, Natural Gas 0 0 138 272 0
Electricity, Gas and Water 126 270 1,060 2,863 3,580
Manufacturing 18 46 151 880 889
Mining 0 0 14 3 12
Financial Institutions 0 0 0 0 25
Services 4 9 186 281 341
Transport and Communications 116 233 933 2,090 2,900
Trade 0 0 0 18 41
Public Adm. and Defense 7 2 65 284 386
Bal. of Payments Support 0 0 166 288 478
Debt Reorganization 0 0 0 300 1,576
Other Uses 18 19 1,085 1,807 1,918
Grand Total 323 616 4,070 9,937 13,399
Source: World Bank.
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Non-guaranteed, private sector foreign loans only reached a high level in 
the first few years of the 1980s (see Table 3.1). It is likely that the strong public sec­
tor expansion in these years led to a crowding out of private credit demand on the 
domestic financial markets (see Chapter 5 for further analysis of these processes). In 
response, the private sector took refuge in the international market. In the last few 
years, there was another increase in foreign long-term loans to the private sector 
(and, even more so, o f short-term loans), reflecting the private sector's need for 
funds to finance its investment boom.
No complete information on the sectoral allocation of foreign long-term 
loans to the private sector is available. The data that are available suggest that 
sectoral distribution is very close to that of direct foreign investment (see Table 3.3). 
with the greatest share going to the manufacturing sector and with significant 
amounts going to financial institutions, and the trade and services sectors. Sectors 
such as mining, construction and agriculture received only minor proportions of 
loan inflows.
Short-term  Foreign Loans
During the 1980s, for which meaningful data are available, the share of 
short-term loans increased from over 10 percent of all capital inflows during the 
first half of the decade to over 40 percent in the most recent years. Ch er the same 
period, the public sector tended to rely mostly on long-term loans, so that nearly all 
of the short-term loan inflows were directed to the private sector.
This analysis of trends in the various types of capital inflows in Thailand 
shows the importance of the changes in the international financial markets for the 
development of the Thai economy. The main feature of the 1970s and 1980s was the 
increased flows of international loans to the public sector. The accumulated net 
inflow of funds, which the Thai public sector received from various international 
sources during the public-sector lending boom in the 1975-1985 period, was 
equivalent to 32 percent of total public sector investment. These proportions are 
substantial and strongly suggest that increased access to international funds made 
significant additional resources available to the public sector, which may have 
financed a higher level of public sector investment than otherwise would have been 
undertaken. The relation between foreign capital flows and public sector investment 
is explored further in Chapter 4.
The total net capital inflows to the private sector (including DFI, PFI and 
long-term and short-term loans) were also quite significant. From 1970 to 1990. the 
accumulated net capital inflows received by the private sector were equivalent to 
about 30 percent of private corporate investment. In the last four years (1987-1990), 
this proportion increased to 41 percent. These proportions are somewhat mis­
leading, as not all foreign funds go to finance investments and some are used to 
finance trade and working capital needs. Still, the size of the proportions suggest 
the very significant impact of capital inflows on the Thai economy.
The sectors that particularly benefited from the various forms of capital 
inflows from abroad were, in the public sector, electricity, gas and water and public 
transport and communications and, in the private sector, predominantly manufac­
turing and, to a lesser extent, financial institutions, trade, construction, and serv­
ices. The analysis of the changes in the production structure presented in Chapter 2
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(see. in particular. Table 2.3) shows that most of the sectors that were the main 
receivers o f foreign capital did increase their share in value added. Table 2.6 further 
suggests that these were the sectors with the highest levels of productivity. These 
observations suggest that international finance contributed to the process whereby 
the most productive sectors draw in funds and grow fastest, deepening the segmen­
tation of the economic structure. O f course, it is to be expected that international 
finance is attracted by and directed at the most dynamic sectors of the economy. But 
the question arises whether the government should have intervened to correct these 
trends and maintain a better sectoral balance. This question will be taken up later.
C apital Flight
The account “Errors and Omissions” of the balance of payments is some­
times used as an estimate of capital flight, i.e., unrecorded transfers of funds by the 
private sector to foreign financial markets. Such transfers could be inspired by eco­
nomic or political instability or by unfavorable conditions for domestic investment. 
As Thailand had not at that time had any serious internal and external socio­
economic and political unrest and. given the fact that, in general, economic growth 
had been rapid and the domestic financial market relatively free, one would not 
expect that there would be substantial incentives for such a capital flight. It is noted 
that the entry' “Errors and Omissions” is. at best, only a very indirect, narrow and 
unsatisfactory statistical proxy for capital flight and that more elaborate methods to 
estimate capital flight have been designed. But, to the extent that it has meaning, 
the balance on the “Errors and Omissions” account has been positive in most 
years— suggesting a net inflow rather than outflow of funds. The International 
Banking Statistics collected by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) recorded as 
deposits held by non-bank Thai residents with banks outside Thailand in 1990 an 
amount of US$0.9 billion; this would be less than 4 percent of Thailand's total 
outstanding external debt.
External Debt
Persistent external borrowings to finance a part of investments will accu­
mulate the stock of external debt, resulting in a burden on the country to sendee the 
accumulated external debt. This section examines the extent of Thailand's external 
debt in relation to the size of the economy and its debt service burden.
Although direct investment and portfolio investment do not create a debt, 
they may, sooner or later, draw on foreign exchange reserves to repatriate profits. In 
this section, however, foreign debt includes only the foreign loans to the private and 
public sectors.
Looking at the total debt presented in Table 3.5, the size of foreign debt 
was small until the end of the 1970s. In 1979, there was a big increase in foreign 
borrowing. The size of foreign loans continued to grow rapidly after 1979 until 
1985 (see Figure 3.1). As a result, the debt outstanding increased from 3 billion 
baht in 1978 to 14.7 billion baht in 1985 and 25 billion baht in 1990. In relation to 
the economy, the ratio of debt to GDP rose sharply from a mere 11.8 percent in 
1977 to an all-time high of 39.3 percent in 1985. Over the same period, the ratio of 
debt to exports also increased sharply from 61 percent in 1978 to 147 percent in
Thailand in the World Economy 43
1985, after which it fell back to 82 percent in 1990 because of the rapid growth of 
exports. Over 85 percent of the annual foreign debt outstanding was long-term debt.
T able 3.5 External Debt and Debt Ratios
Total External Debt 
(million IJSS)
Ratio of Debt to
GDP (% )
Ratio of Debt to 
Exports (% )
Year lo n g te rm Short-term Total Ixmg-term Total Ixing-term Total
1970 749.3 n.a. n.a. 10.6 n.a. 15.0 n.a.
1971 793.3 n.a. n.a. 10.8 n.a. 16.3 n.a.
1972 912.6 n.a. n.a. 11.2 n.a. 11.8 n.a.
1973 920.2 n.a. n.a. 8.5 n.a. 12.8 n.a.
1974 1,176.3 n.a. n.a. 8.7 n.a. 38.1 aa.
1975 1,359.6 n.a. n.a. 9.1 n.a. 47.7 n.a.
1976 1,615.5 n.a. n.a. 9.6 n.a. 45.4 n.a.
1977 2,031.0 296.5 2,327.5 10.3 11.8 49.4 56.6
1978 2,719.0 329.5 3,048.5 11.8 13.2 54.7 61.4
1979 3,956.6 453.7 4,410.3 15.5 16.1 61.3 68.3
1980 5,704.1 1,107.2 6,811.3 17.7 21.2 68.6 81.9
1981 7,175.4 1,625.6 8,801.0 20.6 25.3 79.8 97.9
1982 8,317.6 1,811.0 10,128.6 23.3 28.4 90.7 110.5
1983 9,528.3 1,640.2 11,168.5 24.1 28.2 105.9 124.1
1984 10,796.9 2,041.8 12,838.7 26.2 31.2 105.9 125.9
1985 12,775.6 1,922.8 14,698.4 34.2 39.3 127.8 147.0
1986 14,071.4 1,958.0 16,029.4 33.8 38.4 118.0 134.4
1987 15,747.7 1,772.6 17,520.3 32.3 36.0 101.4 112.9
1988 15,378.9 2,530.6 17,909.5 25.8 30.0 71.7 83.5
1989 16,299.7 3,117.2 19,416.9 23.6 28.1 61.9 73.7
1990 18,593.4 6,466.7 25,060.1 22.8 30.7 61.0 82.2
Source: Bank of Thailand.
The rapid accumulation of external debt has led to a rapid increase in 
interest payments. Interest payments on external debt rose from less than one 
percent of GDP during the early 1970s to 3.2 percent in 1982 then levelled off, but 
remained over 2 percent after that. During the 1970s, the majority of interest 
payments on external debt were the responsibility of the private sector. However, the 
situation changed during the 1980s when the public sector accounted for a majority 
of interest payments on external debt. The share of the public sector in external 
interest payments rose from 34 percent in 1970 to 47 percent in 1980 and 71 
percent in 1989. Implications on the government budget are explored in Chapter 5.
The debt service payments (interest charges plus repayments) as a percent­
age of exports also rose sharply from 11 percent in 1977 to 22.7 percent in 1985 
(Table 3.6). This rising debt service ratio alarmed many economists because the 
burden caused a substantial drain on domestic investable resources. In 1985, interest 
payments on foreign debt represented 57 percent of the current-account deficit. Add 
profits and dividends outward remittances to interest payments, and the size was 
about two-thirds o f the current-account deficit. By 1990, the debt service ratio had
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decreased to 9 percent, a result of the government restriction on foreign public loans 
since 1986 and of the rapid growth of exports— the denominator of the debt service 
ratio.
T able 3.6 External Debt Service
Debt Service Payments 
(million IJSS)
Debt Service Ratio 
(Debt service payments as %  of exports)
Vear I,ong-term Short-term Total Long-term Short-term Total
1970 64.4 n.a. n.a. 15.0 n.a. n.a.
1971 197.8 n.a. n.a. 16.3 n.a. n.a.
1972 181.8 n.a. n.a. 11.8 n.a. n.a.
1973 268.0 n.a. n.a. 12.8 n.a. n.a.
1974 255.9 n.a. n.a. 8.3 n.a. n.a.
1975 360.7 n.a. n.a. 12.6 n.a. n.a.
1976 377.8 n.a. n.a. 10.6 n.a. n.a.
1977 443.6 9.4 453.0 10.8 0.2 11.0
1978 823.7 20.5 844.2 16.6 0.4 17.0
1979 944.2 49.9 994.1 14.6 0.8 15.4
1980 1,227.4 68.9 1,296.3 14.8 0.8 15.6
1981 1,328.8 156.4 1,485.2 14.8 1.7 16.5
1982 1,522.7 138.2 1,660.9 16.6 1.5 18.1
1983 1,742.3 98.5 1,840.8 19.4 1.1 20.5
1984 2,032.5 87.3 2,119.8 19.9 0.9 20.8
1985 2,189.0 83.5 2,272.5 21.9 0.8 22.7
1986 2,396.8 65.1 2,461.9 20.1 0.5 20.6
1987 2,586.2 72.5 2,658.7 16.7 0.5 17.2
1988 2,678.3 81.0 2,759.3 12.5 0.4 12.9
1989 2,637.3 162.2 2,792.9 10.0 0.6 10.6
1990 2,558.1 190.7 2,748.8 8.4 0.6 9.0
Source: Bank of Thailand.
EXTERNAL TRADE
Over the past 20 years, sustained real growth has been accompanied by 
persistent trade deficits, averaging about 6 percent of GDP. When non-factor serv­
ices are included, the deficit becomes smaller, because of the growing contribution 
of earnings from tourism. Net factor payments become more important over the 
period. The inflow of workers' remittances, which in the 1980s became substantial, 
is more than balanced by rapidly increasing net payments of investment incomes.
Because the current-account deficit may be one of the reasons for increased 
foreign borrowing, the performance of the balance of goods and services, o f net fac­
tor payments and of net transfers becomes crucial for the ability of the country to 
control debt problems and overall economic performance. This section examines in 
some detail the growth and structural change of external trade.
Equation 3.2, presented earlier in this chapter, defines the current account:
CurAc = X + T - M - NFP (3.2)
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In Tabic 3.7, the variables of this equation are further disaggregated. The 
trends in merchandise trade, services payments and receipts (including tourism), net 
factor payments (including investment income payments and workers' remittances 
receipts) and net private and public transfers arc all expressed as percentage of 
GDP. A brief commentary on each of the entries may be useful.
Table 3.7 Current Account Balance (as percentage of GDP)
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983-86 1987-90
TRADE
Merchandise exports 13.0 17.1 19.7 18.4 26.9
Tourism earnings 1.5 1.5 2.8 3.0 5.1
Other services rec. 3.4 1.6 1.4 1.8 2.5
Total exports of
goods and services 17.9 20.2 23.9 23.3 34.4
Merchandise imports 19.0 23.1 26.9 24.5 34.3
Services payments 1.3 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.5
Total imports of
goods and services 20.3 24.9 28.7 26.4 37.0
Balance goods and services -2.4 -4.7 -4.8 -3.1 -2.6
NET FACTOR PAYMENTS
Net investment income -0.0 -0.6 -2.5 -3.3 -2.6
Workers' remittances -0.1 0.3 1.3 2.0 1.5
Total net factor payments -0.1 -0.4 -1.2 -1.3 -1.3
NET TRANSFERS
Net private transfers 0.6 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.1
Net official transfers 0.4 0.1 0.4 0.3 0.3
Total net tranfers 1.0 0.3 0.6 0.5 0.4
CURRENT ACCOUNT BALANCE -1.5 -4.9 -5.5 -4.0 -4.0
Exports
The longer-term role of exports in the Thai economy may be seen within 
the share of merchandise exports in total GDP. In 1970, the share of merchandise 
exports was 10 percent of GDP; it increased to 20 percent in 1980 and reached 28 
percent in 1990. If trade in non-factor services is included, in 1990, the share of 
goods and service exports was as high as 37 percent.
From Table 3.7, it can be seen that the share of merchandise exports to 
GDP increased sharply in the 1970s, was relatively stable from the late 1970s to the 
mid-1980s, and increased rapidly again after that. In the first half of the 1970s, 
even with the first oil crisis in 1973-1974, the value of merchandise exports grew by 
29 percent per year. This increase in export value was due mainly to the commodity 
boom which increased the price of Thailand's major export items, such as rice, rub­
ber, maize, tin and sugar. The export value declined by about 10 percent in 1975,
46 Chapter 3
but gradually picked up throughout the second half of the 1970s. In the early 1980s, 
Thai merchandise exports slumped again because of the second oil crisis, the 
worldwide economic recession, the depressed commodity prices o f Thailand's major 
exports and, as we will see in Chapter 6, the inappropriate domestic economic poli­
cies. The export value growth rate during the first half of the 1980s was, on the av­
erage, 10.7 percent per year. However, when the Thai economy regained its growth 
momentum after the third quarter of 1986, export values grew by about 30 percent 
annually.
Thailand has gone through a period of rapid growth and stmctural change 
for more than two decades. Not only have exports expanded, but also the export 
composition has changed (see Table 3.8). Manufactured goods play an increasing 
role in Thailand's merchandise exports: its share increased from 10 percent in 1971 
to 32 percent in 1980 and reached 75 percent in 1990. In 1985, manufactured ex­
ports outpaced agricultural exports for the first time. This was not merely a short- 
run phenomenon resulting from a price slump in Thailand's primary commodity 
exports. Since then, manufactured goods have maintained the top spot in Thailand's 
merchandise exports, with an increasing share.
T able 3.8 M erchandise Exports, C lassified by Sector
Year Agriculture Fishing Forestry Mining Manufacturing Others Re-export Total
1977 51.40 4.35 1.16 9.04 30.84 2.10 1.12 100.00
1978 49.19 5.18 0.43 10.87 29.77 2.38 2.18 100.00
1979 47.88 5.58 0.16 10.77 31.40 2.51 1.70 100.00
1980 46.93 4.16 0.05 11.58 32.33 2.85 2.10 100.00
1981 47.77 4.34 0.09 7.73 35.82 1.60 2.64 100.00
1982 45.80 4.78 0.06 6.15 39.57 1.33 2.31 100.00
1983 45.39 5.62 0.07 4.65 41.89 0.91 1.47 100.00
1984 44.68 4.96 0.06 4.33 43.42 0.75 1.80 100,00
1985 37.96 5.48 0.19 5.24 49.45 0.79 0.91 100.00
1986 34.02 6.36 0.27 2.69 55.35 0.76 0.55 100.00
1987 27.77 6.06 0.27 1.95 62.71 0.99 0.25 100.00
1988 26.37 5.16 0.20 1.89 65.35 0.71 0.31 100.00
1989 22.95 5.53 0.14 1.55 68.59 1.02 0.22 100.00
1990 16.96 5.51 0.13 1.26 74.67 1.20 0.28 100.00
Source: Bank of Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
In Chapter 2 (see Table 2.4), it was observed that since the 1970s both the 
natural resource-based and import-dependent industries had increasingly shifted to 
production for export markets. The manufacturing sector has become more export- 
oriented since the share of exports over output increased in many sectors. The 
export-oriented industries with export-output ratios higher than 20 percent in 1985 
were rubber and rubber products, nonferrous metal, electrical machinery and appli­
ances, and food. The industries with export-output ratios between 10 and 20 percent 
were textiles, leather, wood, plastic products, ceramics, iron, and steel (see 
W attananukit and Bhongmakapat 1989, p. 8).
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Japan and the United States were the main outlets for Thailand's exports in 
the 1960s and 1970s, until the United States became the leading market The share 
of Thai exports to the United States was around 13 percent in the 1970s and 
increased to 23 percent in 1990. More recent trade statistics suggest that the share 
of exports to Asian countries, including Japn, is increasing, probably the outcome of 
the attempts to boost intra-rcgional trade. In contrast, the share of Thai exports to 
Japan dropped from 25 percent in 1970 to 15 percent and 16 percent in 1980 and 
1988 respectively, and rose slightly to 17 percent in 1990. These trade figures 
confirm the hypothesis raised earlier about direct foreign investment: a significant 
share of direct foreign investment in recent years came from Asian countries 
(predominantly Japan) to produce for exports that, for a substantial part, go to the 
U.S.
The share of non-factor services exports to GDP was relatively high during 
the Vietnam War era. The share declined after that, during the late 1970s. Since 
then, the share of services exports to GDP has risen rapidly. This rising trend has 
been the result of a growth in tourism. The share of tourism earnings to GDP has 
increased since 1977, from 1.1 percent to 5.6 percent in 1990.
The Thai economy has become more export-oriented, judging from the 
higher exports to GDP ratio. The rising importance of exports is seen in both mer­
chandise and services. For merchandise exports, there was structural change from a 
dependence on primary commodities to manufactured goods with a great variety of 
products, which should help to cushion the economy against the effects o f world 
primary commodity price shocks. The structure of merchandise exports has also 
changed in terms of market orientation: merchandise exports now depend more on 
U.S. and EC markets. The growing protectionism within these two markets, 
however— if the Uruguay round of the GATT negotiations does not lead to positive 
results— could pose a threat to Thailand's merchandise exports.
Imports
The value of merchandise imports increased more than 30-fold, from 27 
billion baht in 1970 to 832 billion baht in 1990. A dramatic increase in 
merchandise import value occurred between 1973 and 1981 because of skyrocketing 
oil prices. As the Thai economy gradually picked up after the second half o f 1986 
and achieved dramatic growth during the 1987-1989 period, import values 
increased from 241 billion baht in 1986 to 832 billion baht in 1990.
As a share of GDP, merchandise imports increased from 18 percent in 
1970 to 29 percent in 1980. After 1981, the share declined to 22 percent in 1986. 
The economic boom after 1986 resulted in a sharp rise in merchandise imports, 
reaching 40 percent of GDP in 1990.
As shown in Table 3.9, the composition of merchandise imports changed 
radically over the years. Oil imports rose rapidly in comparison to non-oil imports 
between 1970 and 1980 because of the two oil crises. However, after 1985, the 
weakening price of oil and the growing reliance on alternative energy sources led to 
a rapid fall in the share of oil imports in GDP.
Thailand's industrialization process during the past few decades has been 
accompanied by an increasing dependence on imports. Although the country has 
developed its manufacturing sector, increased manufactured output has induced a
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corresponding acceleration of imports. The share of imports of final consumer 
goods was already relatively low in the 1970s and has not fallen much since then. It 
seems that, by 1970, the import substitution of consumer goods had been completed.
At the same time, however, the share of intermediate products and raw 
materials increased from 4.5 percent of GDP in 1970 to 7.5 percent in 1985. The 
increase in this share in recent years, up to 14 percent in 1990, is spectacular and 
confirms the import-dependent nature of the current foreign investment-led boom.
The ratio of imports to total demand provides basic information on the 
degree of import dependence of the Thai manufacturing sector. Among the 
industries with high import dependence arc machinery, transport equipment, and 
electrical machinery and appliances. Low import dependence was found in labor- 
intensive or natural resource-based industries, including the food, textile, leather, 
beverage, tobacco, wood product, rubber, ceramic, plastic, and other nonmetal 
industries (see W attananukit and Bhongmakapat 1989, p. 13).
Table 3.9 M erchandise Imports by Type o f Com m odity (as percentage  
of GDP)
Year
C Consumer 
Goods
Intermediate 
Products and 
Raw Materials
Capital
Goods
Vehicles
and
Parts
Fuel
and
Lubricants O thers Total
1970 3.55 4.56 6.36 1.50 1.58 0.78 18.33
1971 2.86 5.06 5.62 1.43 1.77 0.72 17.46
1972 2.91 5.37 5.75 1.30 1.83 0.99 18.15
1973 2.84 6.13 5.77 1.53 2.10 0.62 18.99
1974 2.86 6.58 7.09 1.50 4.50 0.40 22.94
1975 2.79 5.31 7.33 1.50 4.69 0.42 22.03
1976 2.72 5.83 5.60 1.49 4.82 0.57 21.03
1977 2.75 6.67 6.04 1.97 5.18 0.72 23.34
1978 2.65 6.06 6.41 1.55 4.68 0.95 22.31
1979 2.85 7.78 7.14 1.28 5.84 1.26 26.15
1980 2.93 6.88 7.00 1.05 8.92 1.88 28.65
1981 2.40 7.64 7.50 1.26 8.56 1.18 28.51
1982 2.18 6.47 5.88 0.94 7.41 1.10 23.98
1983 2.45 7.30 7.67 1.25 6.27 1.05 26.00
1984 2.33 7.15 7.56 1.22 5.89 1.03 25.19
1985 2.36 7.47 7.43 0.92 5.59 0.99 24.76
1986 2.23 7.70 7.15 0.82 2.95 1.18 22.03
1987 2.70 9.56 8.45 1.21 3.53 1.22 26.67
1988 2.57 11.93 13.53 1.97 2.58 1.47 34.05
1989 3.08 13.09 13.39 2.20 3.26 1.63 36.66
1990 3.69 13.70 15.98 2.71 3.82 0.99 41.17
Source: Bank o f  Thailand, Monthly Bulletin, various issues.
In addition, the share of capital goods also showed an increasing trend, 
from 6.4 percent of GDP in 1970 to 7.4 percent in 1985 and over 16 percent in
1990.
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The two countries on which Thailand’s merchandise imports have most 
depended arc Japan and the U.S. The share of total imports coming from Japan was 
26.5 percent in 1985 and rose to 30.7 percent in 1990. Imports from the U.S. in 
1990 accounted for 10.9 percent of the total, reflecting a rather low share compared 
to imports from Japan. Nevertheless, Japan and the U.S. supplied 35.6 percent of all 
Thai imports in 1980 and 41.6 percent in 1990, indicating the heavy- and uneven 
reliance of the Thai economy, especially the manufacturing sector, on these two 
countries. The trade relationships with these two partners are quite uneven. In 1990, 
31 percent of Thai imports came from Japan and 17 percent of Thai exports went to 
Japan. In the same year, 11 percent of Thai imports came from the U.S. and 23 per­
cent of exports went there. Japanese investments in Thailand explain much of the 
difference. Japanese firms in Thailand, dependent on imported inputs from Japan, 
produce for export to the U.S. Unfortunately, this pattern implies that Thailand is 
caught up in the trade disputes between these two major economic powers.
The imports mostly consisted of capital goods, intermediate goods and raw 
materials required by the manufacturing sector. Because of this heavy reliance on 
imports, the strength of the U.S. dollar in the first half of the 1980s and the strong 
yen in the second half of the 1980s had important implications for Thailand's im­
port values and its balance of trade.
Although service imports have been relatively small compared to mer­
chandise imports, the value has increased steadily, while the ratio of services im­
ports to GDP tended to rise slowly over the two decades.
Net Factor Paym ents
Table 3.7 gives data on the two major items of factor payments: net pay­
ments of investment income and workers' remittances. Net pay ments of interest, and 
transfer o f profits and dividends and other investment income, accounted for a 
minor share of GDP in the 1970s. By the early 1980s, however, the effects of debt 
accumulation became clear: net investment income payments accounted for around 
3 percent of GDP. The restrictive policy on external debt after the mid-1980s 
stopped the rapid growth of the outstanding debt. This, together with the rapid 
growth of GDP, helped to reduce the debl/GDP and the investment-payments/GDP 
ratio. While interest payments as a percentage of GDP may not increase very fast in 
the near future, outward remittances of profits and dividends are expected to 
increase rapidly when the foreign investors who came to Thailand in the last few- 
years start remitting profits and dividends back home. Actually, a rising trend in 
profit remittances has been observed since 1986.
Remittances from workers overseas, particularly those in the Middle East, 
began to grow from 1977 onwards, and became significant in the early 1980s. The 
ratio of remittances to GDP increased up until 1985 and, although absolute amounts 
of remittances received continued to grow slowly after that, receipts as a percentage 
of GDP began to decline, standing at 1.2 percent in 1990.
Net U nrequited Transfers
Unrequited transfers received from and paid to the rest o f the world 
reached a high level in the early 1970s because of payments related to the U.S.
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military presence in Thailand. After the Vietnam war ended, these payments 
quickly fell. Since then, net private and public transfers received by Thailand have 
been a small share in GDP.
E X T E R N A L  S H O C K S
In Chapter 2. it was observed that the Thai economy has already become 
more open to the world's commodity and financial markets. In the preceding 
sections, more detail on the patterns of international financial and commercial 
transactions were provided. Inevitably, an increased openness implies an increased 
vulnerability to disturbances arising from the world economy. In the period under 
study, these disturbances have taken the form of fluctuations in commodity prices 
on the world market (and thus in Thailand’s export and import prices), in the 
growth of world trade (and thus in the demand for Thailand's exports), in interna­
tional interest rates (and thus in the servicing burden on the external debt) and in 
the conditions of international financial markets. In Chapter 1, external conditions 
were used to characterize the nature of the subsequent sub-periods that arc used in 
this study.
In this section, the nature of the external shocks arc examined .and their 
impact on the external balance of Thailand's economy assessed. The next chapter 
analyzes the impact of external conditions on domestic balances (savings and in­
vestment).
Financial shocks mainly concern two aspects: the level of interest rate and 
the conditions on international capital markets. A substantial increase in interest 
rates on international capital markets not only causes the domestic interest rate to 
increase and discourages investment, it also raises the country 's external debt bur­
den. The international interest rate (LIBOR) was quite low until 1977, after which it 
rose, reaching its peak in 1981. Tightening of the international capital market con­
dition— with substantial increases in real interest rates and shorter maturities in 
1979, as well as in the early 1980s after the second oil shock— had a great impact 
on a vulnerable Thai economy. Besides a higher oil price, the country experienced 
substantial domestic imbalances, resulting in a high current account deficit o f 4.7 
billion baht in 1979 (7.6 percent of GDP), a low level of foreign exchange reserves 
and double-digit inflation in 1980 and 1981. The world recession also weakened the 
demand for Thai exports and led to a worsening of commodity prices. Foreign loans 
were attracted to fill the gap and, as a result, Thailand's external debt burden 
worsened and approached high levels in the mid-1980s. Since 1983, international 
interest rates have stabilized somewhat.
Access to international financial markets, for countries like Thailand, have 
improved radically since the mid-1970s. The international debt crisis that began in 
Mexico in 1982 reduced the willingness of international banks to lend to developing 
countries, making governments of such countries acutely aware of the dangers of 
further borrowing. Following that shock, the Thai government attempted to reduce 
the reliance on international loans. The reduction in public-sector borrowing on in­
ternational markets, since the mid-1980s, helped to bring the external debt burden 
down. The external debt service ratio stood at only 9 percent in 1990.
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Since 1986, however, the international financial markets provided another 
“shock” to the Thai economy in the form of the sudden and drastic increase in pri­
vate capital inflows. Shifts in the value of major world currencies, the appreciation 
of the Japanese yen and the depreciation of the American dollar, since 1985, have 
had a deep impact. Because the Thai baht remained closely tied to the dollar, the 
baht depreciated with respect to the yen. The appreciation of the yen is potentially 
harmful to Thailand, because there is a substantial trade deficit with Japan and a 
large part o f the external debt is denominated in yen. Another factor, however, out­
weighed these harmful effects. The appreciation of the yen and of the currencies of 
some of the other Asian NICs made the exports of these countries less competitive 
on the international market, resulting in a strong outward flow of direct investment 
from these countries and bringing simple and labor-intensive export-oriented pro­
duction to Thailand and other ASEAN countries. Trade shocks refer to substantial 
changes in oil prices, commodity prices, and growth of world trade. In the case of 
oil prices, the domestic and external environment at present is quite different from 
what Thailand experienced in 1973-1974 and 1979-1980. Dependence on oil as an 
energy source has been reduced to a relatively low ratio of oil imports to GDP at 3 
percent, compared to almost 9 percent during the second oil crisis.
The oil price is only one of the many import prices. In Figure 3.2, trends in 
the import price index and Thailand's export price index are depicted. The figure 
shows that the sharp increase in oil prices, and in other import prices, around 1973- 
1974 was accompanied by an equally sharp rise in export prices. On balance, the 
two trends neutralized each other. In 1979-1980, there was another spurt in the 
import price index, again led by a rise in oil prices. On this occasion, export prices 
could not keep pace. Since 1986, both import prices and export prices show a rising 
trend. Over the entire period since 1970, Thailand's terms of trade deteriorated as 
the import price index rose more sharply than the export price index. It would 
appear, however, that since the early 1980s the import and export price indices have 
moved in parallel. Diversification of exports has led to an export composition that is 
similar to the composition of imports: in both exports and imports, manufactured 
commodities are predominant. It could thus be expected that Thailand would, in the 
future, suffer less from terms-of-trade shocks than it has in the past.
A growing share of total production is aimed at export markets. This in­
creases the sensitivity to trends in world trade; any slowdown in the world economy, 
particularly within developed countries, will affect the market for Thailand's ex­
ports. Thailand relies heavily on the U.S. and EC markets for its exports— over 40 
percent of total exports in 1990.
External Shocks and Domestic Adjustm ent
The international economic and financial shocks of the last two decades 
have resulted in economic crises in and considerable adjustment problems for most 
developing countries.
This section seeks to measure the nature and extent of the external shocks 
to Thailand and the ways in which they have been absorbed.
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Figure 3.2 Im port and Export Price Index (1970 = 100)
External shocks relate to: (a) availability of foreign finance (i.e., changes 
in access to international financial markets for LDCs and shifts in the supply of 
aid); (b) terms of trade (i.e., changes in export and import prices); (c) debt burden 
(changes in the international interest rate); and (d) world demand for exports 
(growth in the volume of world exports). To study the extent and impact of external 
shocks, a simple disaggregation methodology will be used along the lines of work 
initiated by Balassa (see, for example, Balassa 1981 and Balassa and McCarthy 
1984) and the UNCTAD (Helleiner 1987). Further elaboration of their methodology 
used in this section depends heavily on FitzGerald and Sarmad (1990), where the 
equations described below are derived and applied to a sample of 24 developing 
countries.
The UNCTAD methodology, on which FitzGerald and Sarmad partly base 
their approach, is based on the decomposition of the current-account deficit (CAD) 
in any one year (t) between imports of goods and non-factor services (M), net pay­
ments of factor services to abroad (NFP), exports of goods and non-factor services 
(X) and unrequited transfers received from abroad (T). Rephrasing equation 3.2 to 
express the current-account deficit:
CAD, = M , + NFP, -  X, -  T , (3.4)
Imports and exports are disaggregated between price indices (Pm , Px) and volumes 
(J, E) at constant domestic currency prices.
P m th (3.5)
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X/ = PX,.E, (3.6)
Imports are linked to real domestic absorption (A)— in other words, consumption 
(C) plus investment (I)—by a single coefficient (j):
h  = j/.A f (3.7)
A , = C /+ I /  (3.8)
Export volume (E) is linked to world trade volume (W) by an “overall export coef­
ficient” (x) which, in effect, measures export penetration as the country's share of 
world trade:
E , = x/.W, (3.9)
Finally, factor services to abroad (NFP) are broken down into net interest payments 
to abroad (V/), net investment income payments to abroad (V<y) and net workers' 
remittances from abroad (R). Net interest payments to abroad are defined as the 
product of the current dollar interest rate (r) and the debt stock (in local currency at 
the official exchange rate) from the previous year (F/.y):
NFP/ = V,y + V < //-R , (3.10)
V// = r/.F/.y (3.11)
It should be noted that all coefficients (x, j, r) are, in practice, derived from these 
equations, so that the definitional identities do always add up to the observed 
current-account deficit (CAD).
Substituting Equation 3.5 to Equation 3.11 into Equation 3.4 yields the 
complete decomposition formula:
CAD/ = Pmt jH Q  + I/) + r/.F/ -  y
+ (V rf/-R /) -P * / .x , .W ,-T /  (3.12)
Finally, a base year or period (s) is chosen to calculate the first differences (d) of the 
variables, which then define the separate effects identified in the UNCTAD study:
CAD/ -  (J.yAy)dPw/ -  (x^.W5)dPx/ 
+ (F W )d r/
-  x5.PX5.d(W/)
+ r5.d(F / - / )
+ d ((V < y ,-R ,-T /))
+ js-P/ns-d(A/)
+ (PmsA.v)dj/
-  (Px.vW5)dx/
+ interaction terms
terms-of-trade effect 
interest rate shock 
world trade effect 
debt accumulation burden 
other external variables 
domestic absorption 
import replacement 
export penetration
(3.13)
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Equation 3.13 allocates the observed change in the currcnt-account deficit between 
two years or two periods to the component parts of the account. The first term 
measures the impact of changes in import and export prices, assuming that trade 
volumes would not change between the periods. The second term measures the im ­
pact of changes in international interest rates on an assumed unchanged debt stock. 
The third term measures the impact of fluctuations in world trade, assuming that 
the export prices and export share do not change. These three terms express the real 
external shocks that developing economies experience.
Other variables in the current account also have a significantly exogenous 
character. The "other external variables” mentioned in Equation 3.13 include 
changes in “workers remittances” received and in “current transfers.” The amount 
of w orkers' remittances may depend more on the (exogenous) demand for such labor 
than on any domestic factors (in the case of Thailand, there have been no significant 
changes in remittance rules or incentives over the period under study) and the 
“current transfers” are grants etc., the amount of which is determined by external 
donors.
It may be concluded that changes in export and import prices, interest 
rates, world trade growth, workers' remittances and current transfers are exogenous 
influences on the current account of Thailand.
Equation 3.13 also includes a number of variables that have a closer con­
nection with domestic variables and are. therefore, more of an endogenous nature. 
The term “debt accumulation burden” measures the change in the debt servicing 
burden that occurs due to an increase in debt stock. “Other external variables” also 
includes net investment income payments to abroad which flow from previous direct 
foreign investments. Together, these two terms measure the “external finance serv­
icing burden,” the effect on the current account of earlier inflows of funds.
“Domestic absorption” measures the change in the current account that 
arises from increases in domestic demand (both consumption and investment) with 
unchanged import propensities and unchanged import prices. “Import replacement” 
term measures the impact o f changes in the import propensity, and “export penetra­
tion” measures the effect of changes in Thailand's share of world trade. The absorp­
tion and trade coefficients are influenced not only by external shocks but also by 
policy interventions and the private sector's reaction to them.
The UNCTAD methodology defines the difference between the sum of the 
terms explicitly defined in Equation 3.13 and the observed change in the current 
account deficit as “interaction terms” and makes no further analysis. FitzGerald and 
Sarmad (1990) develop the methodology further by pointing out that these missing 
terms are, in fact, cross products of changes in two or more variables which should 
tend to be zero for small changes in the variables but which, in the presence of rela­
tively large shifts associated with adjustment to external shock, can be as significant 
as the current-account deficit itself. These effects are particularly important when 
identifying shifts in structural coefficients over a number of years, which should 
come about where “adjustment” (as opposed to demand restriction) has taken place.
The difference (Res) between the observed change in the deficit and the 
specified terms as defined in Equation 3.13 is made up of the following three 
“interaction effects” :
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Res = sum of secondary effects of: 
interaction between:
domestic demand and unit imports 
(A/ - A s)(j/.PW/ - j.y.P/M.s) 
displacement and import price 
+ A v(j/ -}s)(Pm t ‘ Pins) 
less interaction between:
world demand and unit exports 
- (W/ - W.y)(x,.px, - x.v.pr s ) 
penetration and export price 
■ (Wy)(x/ - x,y)(pxf - Pxv) 
plus interaction between:
debt stock and interest rate 
+ (r, - rs)(F, - Fs) (3.14)
These five phrases might be expected to have determinate signs, derived from the 
respective demand and supply elasticities.
Table 3.10 gives the result of the described methodology as applied to 
Thailand. The columns decompose the change in the current-account deficit from 
one period to the next. For the period 1970-1974, this could not be done as the data 
for the preceding years were not available. Data for the 1960s are available but in 
1970 a new scries of National Accounts estimates starts, so that the data would not 
be fully comparable. The first period is, therefore, divided into two sub-periods: 
1970-1971 and 1972-1974. The data in the first column decomposes the change in 
the current-account deficit between the two sub-periods. The second column de­
composes the current-account shift from 1970-1974 to 1975-1979. The final period 
runs up to 1989, not 1990, because of data availability problems.
Table 3.10 measures the shocks and adjustments by comparing the levels 
from one period to the next. The table decomposes the increase in the deficit, meas­
ured in millions of baht; thus, a positive value for the variables in Table 3.10 indi­
cates an expansionary impact o f the variable on the deficit and a negative sign 
means that it reduces the deficit. Table 3.11 expresses these values as a percentage 
of the average GDP at the end period of each of the comparisons.
The two tables make it clear that, over the longer term, the movements of 
the current-account deficit are dominated by three long-term processes that were 
already identified in Chapter 2: income growth, export orientation and financial 
integration.
Growth of production and income leads to a rapid rise in domestic spend­
ing on both consumption and investment which, in turn, leads to an increased 
demand for imports. This process is reflected in the large entries in the rows for 
“domestic spending” and interaction effects “demand/unit imports” of Tables 3.10 
and 3.11. The long-term process of rapid growth implies, therefore, a strong upward 
pressure on the current-account deficit.
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T abic 3.10 Decom position of Currcnt-account Deficit
(l>eripd averages b illions o f  baht)
1972/74
compared
to
1970/1971
1975/79
compared
to
1970/74
1980/82
compared
to
1975/79
1983/86
compared
to
1980/82
1987/89
compared
to
1983/86
Observed Deficit increase -3.154 19.492 18.634 -2.691 0.970
External Shocks
TOTAL -5.582 4.707 24.313 6.969 -76.202
Terms of Trade -0.205 14.655 32.254 9.804 -30.444
Interest Rate Shock 0.365 0.635 2.556 -2.753 -1.037
World Trade Change -5.743 -10.583 -10.497 -14.020 -44.720
Other External Variables 
TOTAL -2.026 1.941 4.630 9.189 8.915
Debt Accumulation Burden -0.184 -0.498 1.708 13.023 9.005
Change Direct Inv. Income 0.347 2.665 6.027 7.819 2.465
Change Remittances -0.106 -1.447 -9.244 -10.533 -1.773
Change Unrequited Trans. -2.084 1.220 -3.120 -1.120 -0.781
Domestic Adjustment
TOTAL 5.058 10.267 -2.923 0.423 76.826
Domestic Spending 4.058 15.580 24.007 39.049 70.924
Consumption 3.137 11.382 18.514 29.170 42.918
Investment 0.922 4.198 5.492 9.879 28.006
Trade Ratios 1.000 -5.313 -26.930 -38.626 5.902
Import Replacement 1.196 -0.256 -0.228 -3.547 101.734
Export Penetration -0.196 -5.058 -26.702 -35.079 -95.831
Interaction Effects
TOTAL -0.604 2.578 1.874 -5.333 -8.569
Import Shock 2.363 13.863 14.957 1.520 58.499
Demand / Unit Imports 1.879 14.097 15.101 1.741 42.719
Displacement / Price 0.484 -0.234 -0.144 -0.221 15.780
Export Shock -3.090 -12.161 -19.777 -3.765 -66.571
Demand / Unit Exports -2.991 -9.013 -8.878 -3.088 -37.445
Penetration / Price -0.100 -3.148 -10.899 -0.677 -29.126
Debt Shock 0.124 0.876 6.695 -3.088 -0.497
Stock / Interest 0.124 0.876 6.695 -3.088 -0.497
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T abic 3.11 Decom position of Changes in Currcnt-account Deficit
(period averages as percentage o f  the average G D P o f  the end period)
1972/74 1975/79 1980/82 1983/86 1987/89
compared compared compared compared compared
to to to to to
1970/71 1970/74 1975/79 1980/82 1983/86
O bserved Deficit Increase -1.41 4.64 2.50 -0.27 0.06
External Shocks
TOTAL -2.49 1.12 3.26 -0.70 -5.02
Term s o f  T rade -0.09 3.49 4.32 0.98 -2.01
Interest R ate Shock 0.16 0.15 0.34 -0.28 -0.07
W orld T rade  C hange -2.57 -2.52 -1.41 -1.40 -2.95
O ther External Variables
TOTAL -0.91 0.46 -0.62 0.92 0.59
Debt A ccum ulation Burden -0.08 -0.12 0.23 1.30 0.59
C hange D irect Inv. Income 0.16 0.63 0.81 0.78 0.16
C hange Rem ittances -0.05 -0.34 -1.24 -1.06 -0.12
C hange U nrequited Trans. -0.93 0.29 -0.42 -0.11 -0.05
Domestic Adjustment
TOTAL 2.26 2.44 -0.39 0.04 5.06
D om estic Spending 1.81 3.71 3.22 3.91 4.68
C onsum ption 1.40 2.71 2.48 2.92 2.83
Investm ent 0.41 1.00 0.74 0.99 1.85
T rade  R atios 0.45 -1.26 -3.61 -3.87 0.39
Im port Replacem ent 0.53 -0.06 -0.03 -0.36 6.71
Export Penetration -0.09 -1.20 -3.58 -3.51 -6.32
Interaction Effects
TOTAL -0.27 0.61 0.25 -0.53 -0.56
Im port Shock 1.06 3.30 2.00 0.15 3.86
D em and /  U nit Im ports 0.84 3.36 2.02 0.17 2.82
D isplacem ent /  Price 0.22 -0.06 -0.02 -0.02 1.04
Export Shock -1.38 -2.89 -2.65 -0.38 -4.39
D em and /  U nit Exports -1.34 -2.15 -1.19 -0.31 -2.47
Penetration /  Price -0.04 -0.75 -1.46 -0.07 -1.92
Debt Shock 0.06 0.21 0.90 -0.31 -0.03
Stock / Interest 0.06 0.21 0.90 -0.31 -0.03
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This pressure is compensated for by the second long-term process. As 
Thailand's production capacity expands with economic growth, its export capacity 
also expands. This is reflected in two of the table entries. “World trade” measures 
the increase in exports that occurs when Thailand maintains its share in world 
trade Its fluctuations are determined by volatilities in world exports. “Export pene­
tration,” a very important entry, shows that Thailand has been able to substantially 
increase its share in world trade. This is the result of the outward orientation that 
characterizes Thailand's development strategy.
Thailand's financial integration with the rest of the world is more directly 
reflected on the capital account and the account of monetary movements of the bal­
ance of payments. But the increased debt burden and the growing foreign ownership 
of domestic assets that result from direct and portfolio investments also lead to 
flows of investment income payments which are recorded on the current account. 
“Debt accumulation burden” measures the payments on outstanding debt. “ Interest 
rate change” measures the impact of changes in international interest rates on the 
current debt servicing. “Direct investment income” measures changes in profit and 
dividend payments to abroad. The current payments related to financial factors con­
stitute a grow ing share of total currcnt-account transactions.
On top of the underlying long-term processes come medium- and short­
term fluctuations resulting from international and domestic shocks and policy inter­
ventions.
In the first period, there were sharp increases in both import and export 
prices. As both occurred more or less simultaneously, the net effect on the currcnt- 
account deficit was limited and, in fact, even positive (i.e., it helped to reduce the 
deficit). The rapid growth of world trade during this period also helped. Domestic 
spending expanded, but its growth was contained by the contractionary fiscal and 
monetary' policies implemented in 1974 (for a further analysis of the policy response 
in this period, see Chapter 6).
The main “shock” of the second period was in the access to international 
financial markets, which increased suddenly and substantially. This invited a sharp 
increase in capital inflows, which led to a strong expansion of domestic demand and 
import demand, reflected in Tables 3.10 and 3.11 in the “domestic spending” and 
“demand/unit imports” interaction effect. The terms of trade were rather unfavor­
able during this period. The growth of world trade and the emerging process of 
export penetration could only partially compensate for these factors, and the 
current-account deficit expanded considerably.
In the third period, 1980-1982, the current-account deficit expanded
further, reaching a very high level. Events in this period are dominated by the
adverse terms-of-trade shocks resulting from an increase in oil prices and 
international inflation, which pushed import prices up. Also, the international 
interest rate increased sharply. Growth in the volume of world trade stagnated
during this period, but the export penetration continued strongly. Workers'
remittances became an important factor, helping to improve the current-account 
balance. Domestic demand policies of this period did not help to improve the 
current account. Domestic spending continued to have a strong expansionary effect. 
It is probable that the access to international credit (reflected in the high level of 
capital inflows during this period, see Table 3.1) induced the postponement of more 
appropriate macroeconomic policies (see Chapter 6).
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External conditions during the fourth period were rather favorable: inter­
national prices were stable and the world interest rate declined somewhat, but the 
growth of world trade was still only modest. Table 3.10 shows that there was a 
small decline in the current-account deficit during this period, but the deficit itself 
remained at a relatively high level (see Table 3.7). Debt burden and investment 
income outflows increased substantially, reflecting the delayed effect on the current 
account of the debt accumulated in earlier periods. Given the relatively modest 
changes in the “external” variables, the change in the current-account deficit was 
dominated by domestic variables. Domestic spending continued to increase rapidly, 
but this was more than compensated for by the further growth of export penetration 
The export performance will have been supported by the change in exchange rate 
policy that took place at the end of 1984 (see Chapter 6 for further analysis).
The last period, 1987-1989, is characterized by a very high level of capital 
inflows (see Table 3.1). The increase in capital inflows is much larger than the in­
crease in the current-account deficit, because a substantial rise in official reserves 
took place. The inflow of capital led to substantial domestic shocks. The inflow of 
direct and portfolio investment funds was associated with a sharp rise in private in­
vestment, and the rapid growth of income that was related to this investment boom 
led to a sharp rise in consumption spending as well. But the investment boom seems 
to have had radical structural implications as well. “Import replacement” is strongly 
positive, reflecting a sharp increase in the import dependency ratio. “Export pene­
tration” is also very large, suggesting a further acceleration in the ongoing process 
of export orientation. The import-increasing effects (i.e., “domestic spending” plus 
“import replacement” plus the “import shock” interaction effects) are stronger than 
the export-increasing effects (i.e., “world trade” plus “export penetration” and the 
“export shock” interaction effects). This raises the question whether the recent 
pattern of growth will lead to a sustainable growth path. In 1987-1989, positive 
terms-of-trade changes and the recovery of world trade helped to maintain the 
current-account deficit at a relative low level. But it can be questioned whether, 
when external conditions turn less favorable and the current spurt in foreign direct 
and portfolio investments leads to profit and dividend payments, the current- 
account deficit can be maintained at acceptable levels. A first warning is provided 
by the first estimates for 1990, which show a sharp increase in the deficit to a level 
equivalent to 7.3 percent o f GDP.
C O N C LU SIO N
The analysis of international capital flows to Thailand shows that two main 
periods can be identified in which the flows moved to a substantially higher level. 
The first period, roughly 1975-1985, was dominated by long-term loans to the pub­
lic sector, and the second period, after 1986, by direct and portfolio investment and 
loans to the private corporate sector. These capital inflows represented significant 
proportions of the total resources available to the sectors and were associated with 
increased investment levels (further elaborated upon in Chapter 4).
The period of public sector loan finance led to a rapid accumulation of ex­
ternal public debt. By the early 1980s, there was rising concern about the level of 
the debt and about the debt servicing burden it imposed on the Thai economy.
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The growth of exports has been spectacular. Exports diversified from a 
traditional concentration on agricultural products to a heavy reliance on manufac­
tured goods. However, exports of agricultural commodities and of manufactured 
goods that are basically processed agricultural commodities remain very important. 
Also, imports expanded very rapidly. The composition of imports has been domi­
nated by intermediate and capital goods. Particularly in the last few years, imports 
have risen so fast that, despite the export boom, the current-account deficit reached 
very high levels.
Like other developing countries, Thailand has suffered from instabilities in 
the world economy. The analysis of the shocks that occurred concludes that the 
main shock in the first period, the oil price increase, could be easily handled, as 
Thai export prices were very high and a contractionary fiscal policy further con­
tained the external deficit. In the second period, the inflow of international funds 
created an expansionary atmosphere within the Thai economy, leading to rapid 
growth but also to inflation and external imbalances. The shocks of the third period 
(the second oil shock and world recession) led to a further increase in the current- 
account deficit, suggesting that, in contrast to the first oil crisis, the shock was 
financed by external borrowing rather than absorbed through domestic adjustments. 
These adjustments came during the fourth period, when external conditions were 
rather stable, but when domestic policies attempted to steer the economy away from 
external imbalances. The final period shows the expansionary impact o f interna­
tional capital inflows: growth rates were very high and the contractionary fiscal 
policy helped to maintain stability despite an upsurge in private sector spending.
The five periods show that the growth and stability o f the Thai economy 
has been very sensitive to the shocks that affected international trade and finance. It 
also shows that, in some periods, public policy was quite successful in coping with 
these international shocks. The role of policy in the adjustments that took place will 
be analyzed in more detail in Chapter 6.
Chapter 4
External Finance and 
Accumulation Behavior 
in Thailand
INTRODUCTION
(C h a p te r  3 analyzes the level, composition and sectoral destination o f  interna­
tional capital flows received by the Thai economy. This chapter will analyze how  
these capital flows have affected investment, savings and growth.
There has been an extensive debate in the development econom ics litera­
ture on the relationship between external finance and domestic accumulation. This 
debate centered around the ex-post accounting identity:
I =  S + F (4.1)
according to which investments (I) are financed by and equal to domestic savings 
(S) and foreign savings (F). This identity can be linked to Harrod-Domar type 
growth models, in which output growth depends (through a fixed ICOR) on the 
level o f  investments. Adding behavioral hypotheses can give such identities eco­
nomic meaning.
Initially, the interpretation was that investment and growth in developing  
countries were constrained by the availability o f  domestic savings or foreign sav­
ings. Any increase in F would lead to an increase in I, along the lines o f  Equation
4.1, and to an acceleration o f  growth (see, for example, the “locus classicus” o f the 
two-gap approach in Chenery and Strout 1966).
Griffin (1970) attacked this position. He suggested that an increase in F 
would lead to a fall in S, as part o f  the capital inflow would induce increased con­
sumption. In addition, the foreign funds may be used to finance inefficient projects 
so that the ICOR would rise. On the whole, the increase in the inflow o f  foreign  
funds could lead to a fall in the growth rate rather than an improvement.
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Others have criticized Griflin by showing that, even if part of F is used to 
increase consumption, another part of it finances investment and increases the rate 
o f growth (see Papanek 1972).
The debate has continued: for recent contributions see, for example, Gupta 
and Islam (1983), Mosley (1980), Bowles (1987), and Snyder (1990). The main 
elements in the recent contributions have been to discuss causality (do F lead to low 
S or do low S invite more F?), and to emphasize the interaction between the vari­
ables (simultaneous equation systems to capture the interaction between I, S, and F). 
It would appear from these studies that the conclusions from empirical studies on 
the interaction between I, S and F depend strongly on method (cross-country or time 
series), on the composition of the sample of countries and on the period covered. 
This would suggest that the relationships are more complex than can be captured by 
the analysis at the level of macroeconomic aggregates.
Still, almost all studies have studied the problem at that level; no disaggre­
gation has been attempted. A few studies disaggregated capital inflows into compo­
nent parts: direct investment, aid, commercial loans, etc. (see, for example, Papanck 
1973 and Newlyn 1977). They found that the different components have different 
impacts on investment levels or growth rates. This is to be expected in developing 
countries where capital markets are imperfect and segmented. Such findings would 
suggest a further disaggregation. Different types of capital inflows are aimed at and 
received by different agents in the economy and one would expect that a change in 
the level of any type of capital inflow would affect, in the first instance, the accum u­
lation behavior of the sector at which it is aimed. Aid flows (ODA), for instance, 
would be particularly related to a government’s savings and investment patterns, 
whereas direct investment would be more related to those of the private sector.
This chapter will attempt to make an analysis of the interrelationships 
between external finance and accumulation behavior at such a disaggregated level. 
Four institutional sectors are distinguished (households, private corporations, state 
enterprises and government) and the paper analyzes how their investment and 
savings patterns relate to changes in the foreign exchange balance. It seeks to deter­
mine the interaction between, on the one hand, external finance and, on the other, 
the saving and investment patterns and behavior of the different economic agents in 
Thailand.
The debate on the interaction between external finance and domestic 
accumulation has, implicitly or explicitly, been conducted in the context o f growth 
models. External finance is the exogenous factor which, if  accompanied by an 
appropriate response of the recipient country in terms of quantity and quality of 
investments undertaken, will lead to an acceleration of growth. This may have been 
a suitable view in the 1960s when most financial flows consisted of aid flows.
As Chapter 3 has argued, the 1970s and 1980s have, however, shown a 
significant number of innovations and shocks on the international financial m ar­
kets. Rather than steadily financing the growth process, international finance has 
become a major source of external shocks to which developing countries had to 
adjust. Whether countries could profitably use the new opportunities that these 
external innovations created and could stabilize their economies in the face of 
increasingly unstable world financial markets again depends crucially on the 
accumulation behavior and how it is affected by external shocks. An initial 
disturbance may lead to an excess demand situation. The condition for stabilization
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is that, through adjustment mechanisms, this excess demand generates more 
additional real savings than investments (see, for example, LcfT and Sato 1980; 
Taylor 1981). The adjustment mechanisms can be diverse and include changes in 
real output, in prices or in interest rates and adjustment may be automatic or 
induced and supported by policy interventions. The relative rise in savings would 
close the invcstmcnt-savings gap and would bring the economy back to equilibrium. 
The access to international finance may reduce the effectiveness of the adjustment 
mechanisms and may reduce the urgency of stabilization policy . But the consequent 
accumulation of the debt burden will eventually make the adjustment even more 
demanding as the relative rise of savings would have to generate the funds to close 
the investment-savings gap and  the resources to serv ice the external debt.
The following analysis will, therefore, not exclusively focus on the longer- 
term impact of changes in F on the levels of S and I ratios, but also analyze the 
shorter-term adjustment mechanisms through which the economy reacts to external 
financial shocks.
E X T E R N A L  S H O C K S  AND D O M E S T IC  A C C U M U L A T IO N  B A L A N C E S
To investigate the interaction between external finance and domestic 
accumulation, total savings and investments are broken down into savings and 
investments of households (h), private corporations (c). state enterprises (s) and 
government (g); and total capital inflows are separated according to the receiving 
sector: Fc, Fs and Fg (it may be assumed that households are not direct recipients of 
international capital inflows). Equation 4.1 then becomes:
Fc + Fs + Fg = Ih + Ic + Is + Ig ~ Sh _ Sc -  Ss -  Sg (4 2)
where net capital inflows, investments and savings are split up over the four main 
economic agents and where it is assumed that the household sector does not receive 
any direct capital inflows from abroad.
It should be noted that, in the strict National Accounting sense, the F-vari- 
able in Equation 4.1 is the current-account deficit of the balance of payments. The 
analysis in this and the next chapter, however, will use the capital inflows as meas­
ured by the capital account of the balance of payments, because these estimates 
allow' a split in the inflows to cover the various receiving institutions. The difference 
between capital inflows as measured by the current account and as measured by the 
capital account is reflected in the two other balance-of-payments accounts: the 
account of monetary movements and the errors and omissions account. The differ­
ences can be substantial in some years.
The justification for the breakdown of Equation 4.2 over the four institu­
tions is, first of all, that the relationship of the four sectors to external finance and 
trade is quite different. Household firms and private corporations do produce for the 
domestic market and for export. State enterprises and government produce non­
traded goods and services. Private corporations and state enterprises are strongly 
dependent on imported inputs (both intermediate and capital goods) for their 
production process, whereas the household firms and government are less import 
dependent. Initially, in the 1970s, the public sector had privileged access to external
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finance, because international banks demanded government guarantees on loans 
and the Thai government did not give guarantees for privatc-sector loans. Private 
corporations have access to international finance in the form of direct foreign in­
vestment. long-term loans and short-term loans, including trade credits. It is ex­
pected that these differences in trade exposure and access to funds will be reflected 
in the way in which the various sectors are affected by the external shocks.
The main hypothesis of this analysis is that the accumulation behavior of 
the four main economic agents (households and unincorporated enterprises; private 
corporations; state enterprises and government) arc determined through quite 
different mechanisms. To test this hypothesis, we need appropriately disaggregated 
data. The Appendix to this chapter describes the sources of the data and the defini­
tions of the sectoral variables that will be used in the analysis that follows.
Table 4.1 Sectoral Accum ulation Balances (as percentage of G DP)
Sh Ih (S-I)h Sc Ic (S-I)c s g
1970 8.78 2.93 5.86 7.70 13.74 -6.04 1.73
1971 10.04 2.94 7.10 8.33 13.67 -5.34 1.16
1972 8.87 3.04 5.83 8.51 12.96 -4.46 1.38
1973 12.13 3.34 8.79 8.79 14.01 -5.22 1.94
1974 10.60 4.12 6.48 7.96 15.45 -7.49 4.25
1975 8.60 3.16 5.45 8.50 14.54 -6.04 2.62
1976 9.48 3.34 6.15 8.75 12.78 -4.03 1.30
1977 10.14 3.65 6.49 8.64 14.90 -6.26 2.35
1978 12.59 3.40 9.19 8.27 14.19 -5.92 1.96
1979 10.78 3.20 7.58 8.58 14.77 -6.19 1.85
1980 10.59 2.86 7.73 8.15 13.40 -5.25 1.59
1981 10.64 3.39 7.25 8.40 12.41 -4.00 1.21
1982 11.20 3.53 7.67 7.02 11.81 -4.80 -0.39
1983 10.34 3.85 6.49 8.25 12.06 -3.81 1.19
1984 9.68 4.03 5.65 8.43 12.05 -3.63 0.63
1985 8.86 3.90 4.97 7.63 11.09 -3.46 -0.30
1986 9.07 4.15 4.92 8.05 10.06 -2.01 0.44
1987 9.36 4.86 4.50 8.63 12.87 -4.24 2.33
1988 10.62 5.76 4.86 9.00 17.92 -8.92 5.65
1989 10.23 6.46 3.77 10.05 19.85 -9.80 6.47
1990 9.21 7.24 1.97 10.67 24.16 -13.49 9.31
Source: National Income Accounts of Thailand (NESDB).
Note: For the approach followed to distribute the totals over the sectors, see the Appendix to this
chapter.
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In Table 4.1 the trends in the saving and investment shares in GDP o f the 
four sectors are presented, while Table 4.2 gives data on the trends in the sectoral 
net capital inflows from abroad. The government savings ratio showed a declining  
trend until the early 1980s when fiscal reform was undertaken and, after some in­
itial difficulties, gave results. Those reforms also extended to state enterprises, o f  
which the saving share started to rise after 1981. The share o f  household savings 
shows strong fluctuations over the years, with very high peaks in 1974 and 1978 
and deep falls in 1975 and 1985. In the difficult years o f  the early 1980s, the house­
hold savings ratio declined. The econom ic recovery after 1986 initially led to a rise 
o f the household savings ratio, but in the last two years the ratio declined again, 
despite the rapid growth o f  income. It could be suggested that the double-digit 
growth led to a consumption boom. The corporate savings ratio has been rather 
stable throughout but, in the last few years, the investment boom and the rapid 
econom ic growth led to a rapid growth o f  profits and o f  corporate savings.
Foreign
Ig (S-I)g Ss Is (S-I)s
Total
(S-I)
savings
(CAD)
StaL 
Disc rep.
5.38 -3.65 1.35 1.69 -0.34 -4.18 3.53 2.50
5.46 -4.30 1.15 1.26 -0.11 -2.64 2.29 1.23
4.58 -3.20 1.59 2.13 -0.54 -2.37 0.58 0.75
3.52 -1.58 1.25 1.62 -0.36 1.63 0.49 2.39
2.27 1.97 1.53 1.45 0.07 1.04 0.59 1.71
3.34 -0.72 0.85 1.84 -0.99 -2.30 4.06 2.11
4.45 -3.15 0.88 2.34 -1.46 -2.50 2.50 1.07
4.21 -1.86 0.80 3.16 -2.36 -3.99 5.47 -0.53
3.89 -1.93 1.00 3.76 -2.76 -1.42 4.70 -0.37
3.45 -1.60 0.96 4.14 -3.18 -3.40 7.47 -2.43
4.04 -2.44 0.59 4.86 -4.27 -4.24 6.39 -0.89
3.71 -2.50 0.32 5.24 -4.91 -4.16 7.22 -1.52
3.79 -4.18 1.87 4.30 -2.43 -3.73 2.68 0.73
3.27 -2.08 1.41 4.83 -3.42 -2.82 7.25 -2.50
2.85 -2.22 1.90 5.58 -3.68 -3.88 5.00 -0.72
3.26 -3.57 2.41 5.80 -3.39 -5.45 3.99 0.62
2.80 -2.37 2.43 4.83 -2.40 -1.86 -0.63 1.51
2.48 -0.15 2.40 3.70 -1.30 -1.19 0.55 -0.32
1.91 3.75 2.61 3.25 -0.64 -0.95 2.75 -2.53
2.12 4.35 2.91 3.09 -0.18 -1.85 3.63 -2.30
2.72 6.59 3.01 3.70 -0.70 -5.62 7.33 -0.92
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T able 4.2 C apital Inflows by Receiving Sector (as percentage o f G DP)
Year Kc Ks *8
Total Capital 
Inflows
1970 1.58 0.06 0.04 1.68
1971 0.95 0.04 0.14 1.13
1972 2.00 0.20 -0.06 2.14
1973 0.86 0.17 0.29 1.32
1974 2.79 0.42 0.03 3.24
1975 1.88 0.73 -0.05 2.56
1976 1.46 0.53 0.68 2.67
1977 2.07 1.18 0.21 3.46
1978 0.74 1.06 1.25 3.04
1979 2.34 2 17 1.53 6 04
1980 3.88 2.89 0.94 7.70
1981 2.77 3.43 1.06 7.25
1982 2.11 1.64 0.93 4.68
1983 2.01 1.13 0.67 3.81
1984 4.33 1.08 0.58 6.00
1985 1.93 1 26 1.87 5.07
1986 1.15 0.50 -0.61 1.04
1987 1.32 -0.54 0.91 1.68
1988 4.91 -0.76 0.66 4.82
1989 8.95 0.23 -0.67 8.51
1990 11.75 -0.70 -2.10 8.94
Source: B alance-of-Paym ents Statistics o f  Thailand.
Notes: For the approach followed in the distribution o f  the total capital flows over the receiv ing  sectors,
see the Appendix to this chapter.
T he 'total capital inflows,” as reported in this table, is the total o f  the capital account o f  the 
balance o f  paym ents and thus different from the foreign savings o f  Table  4.1, w hich are defined 
as the current-account deficit o f  the balance o f  payments.
The investment ratios show some different experiences. The share of gov­
ernment investment in GDP had been declining over time to a very low level by 
1988. Since then, there has been a recovery in the government investment ratio, 
which was necessary because the provision of government services (see, for exam ­
ple, infrastructure and education) lagged behind the needs of the growing economy. 
The most dramatic change is the rapid rise of state enterprise investment since the 
mid-1970s to the mid-1980s. As a result, total public-sector investment as a propor­
tion of GDP rose considerably, until a shift in policy reversed that trend around 
1986. As was suggested in Chapter 3, the rise in state enterprise investment was 
probably invited by the increased access to international credit.
Household investment, as defined in this study, covers only residential con­
struction. The share of household investment was fairly stable until the early 1980s. 
The increase in the ratio in the last few years is, however, quite spectacular. The 
downward trend of the household savings ratio and the sharp increase in household
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investment means that the traditional savings surplus of the household sector de­
clined rapidly in recent years.
Investment by private corporations fluctuated in the 1970s and declined in 
the early half of the 1980s. Since 1986, this trend was radically turned around, 
mainly under the impact o f increased foreign investment In Chapter 3, it was 
shown that total capital inflows started to grow rapidly in the mid-1970s and 
remained high until about 1985 (see Table 4.2 and also Table 3.1 and Figure 3.1 of 
Chapter 3). After a slowdown in 1986 and 1987, capital inflows increased again.
The most dramatic increase took place in the capital flows to the state 
enterprises. These increased from virtually zero around 1970 to more than 3 percent 
of GDP in 1981. After 1981, capital inflows declined again and, in the last few 
years, there has actually been a net outflow as debt is being repaid Also, the 
government increased the use of foreign funds in the second half of the 1970s. 
Thailand's private corporations had always experienced a net inflow of foreign 
capital, but also for this sector inflows were at a higher level in the period 1979- 
1984 and, after a dip in 1985-1987, they increased sharply again since 1988.
SE C T O R A L  A C CU M ULATIO N  BALANCES
This section will analyze the movements of the average sectoral savings 
and investment ratios over the medium term. In the next section, time-series analy­
sis will be used to identify sectoral saving and investment behavior, focusing in 
particular on the impact of external shocks on such behavior.
Table 4.3 brings together the period averages (as percentage of GDP) of the 
main elements of the accumulation balance.
It is often asserted that Thailand's main structural macroeconomic problem 
is its low savings ratio. Indeed, compared to the high-growth countries of Asia (for 
example, Singapore and South Korea) the average level of the Thai aggregate 
savings ratio, at around 22 percent, is low. One would, therefore, expect that the 
greater access to international finance, as it occurred in the late 1970s, would relax 
this savings constraint and allow an increase in the level of the investment ratio. 
This is indeed what happened: the aggregate investment ratio increased from the 
first to the second and third periods and declined in the fourth period when access 
to international finance became less easy. It increased again sharply in the last few 
years under the influence of private capital inflows. In this last period, the savings 
ratio increased far above historical levels, mainly due to the sharp rise in public 
sector savings.
Table 4.3 also shows how this aggregate savings-investment gap can be 
disaggregated over the main institutional sectors. The household sector has always a 
savings surplus, but in the 1980s this surplus gradually reduced in size. Private 
corporations show a savings gap, which fell somewhat in the 1980s when the level 
of corporate investments was low, but which in recent years has expanded again 
rapidly despite the increase in the corporate savings ratio.
The government and the state enterprises showed increasing savings gaps 
up until the beginning of the 1980s. In the last two periods an improvement oc­
curred; in recent years, the government even has a savings surplus.
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Table 4.3 Sectoral Accum ulation Balances (as percentage of GDP)
period averages
Period
I
1970/74
Period
II
1975/79
Period
III
1980/82
Period
IV
1983/86
Period
V
1987/90
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
- Sh 10.08 10.32 10.81 9.49 9.38
- Ih 3.27 3.35 3.26 3.98 6.07
- (S - I)h 6.81 6.97 7.55 5.51 3.31
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
- Sc 8.26 8.55 7.86 8.53 10.16
- Ic 13.96 14.24 12.54 1118 17.49
- (S - I)c -5.71 -5.69 -4.68 -2.66 -7.33
- Fc 1.64 1.70 2.92 2.35 6.73
TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR
- Spr 18.34 18.87 18.67 18.02 19.54
- Ipr 17.24 17.59 15.80 15.17 23.56
- (S - I)pr 1.10 1.28 2.87 2.85 -4.02
- Fpr 1.64 1.70 2.92 2.35 6.73
STATE CORPORATIONS
- Ss 1.37 0.90 0.93 2.04 2.73
- Is 1.63 3.05 4.80 5.26 3.44
- (S - I)s -0.26 -2.15 -3.87 -3.22 -0.70
- Fs 0.18 1.13 2.65 0.99 -0.44
GOVERNMENT
- Sg 2.09 2.02 0.80 0.49 5.94
- Ig 4.24 3.87 3.85 3.05 2.31
- (S -I)g -2.15 -1.85 -3.04 -2.56 3.64
- Fg 0.09 0.72 0.98 0.63 -0.30
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR
- Spu 3.47 2.92 1.73 2.52 8.68
- Ipu 5.87 6.92 8.65 8.30 5.74
- (S - I)pu -2.41 -4.00 -6.92 -5.78 2.93
- Fpu 0.27 1.86 3.63 1.62 -0.74
TOTAL
- S 21.81 21.78 20.40 20.54 28.21
- I 23.11 24.50 24.45 23.47 29.30
- (S -I) -1.30 -2.72 -4.05 -2.93 -1.09
- F 1.90 3.56 6.54 3.98 5.99
Source: Tables 4.1 and 4.2.
Note: Conceptually, total investment should be equal to domestic and foreign savings. In this table, that is
not the case. The differences can be explained from two sources. First o f all, the identity between 
investment and domestic and foreign savings defines foreign savings as the current-account deficit 
rather than as the capital account balance that is used in this table. The second point is that, even in 
the National Accounts identity, the statistical reality will often introduce a "statistical discrepancy” 
between the domestic savings-investment balance and foreign savings.
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The savings deficits of the private corporate, state corporate and govern­
ment sectors are, in general, larger than the capital inflows received by each of 
these sectors. This implies that the sectors are also dependent on net domestic 
credit. The patterns of domestic financial intermediation are analyzed in Chapter 5.
The data of Table 4.3 can also be used to investigate the relationship be­
tween external finance and the level of the sectoral savings and investment ratios. 
The concentration in the earlier literature has been on changes in capital inflows 
and their impact, but that seems inappropriate. If the constraint on investment and 
growth is foreign exchange, then any external shock that affects the foreign ex­
change availability must be included in the analysis.
The shocks in the availability of external finance, determined by the 
volatilities of the international capital markets, shocks in the cost of international 
finance (international interest rate) and shocks in the growth of world trade and in 
import and export prices were analyzed in Chapter 3. Such shocks will have an 
immediate effect on the capital inflow of Equation 4.1 and, because Equation 4.1 
is an identity, they must also immediately be reflected in the domestic resource 
balance. The reaction of the various economic agents to these shocks may be quite 
different, since the saving and investment behavior of these four main economic 
agents is determined by different factors. It may, therefore, be hypothesized that 
these agents would react in different ways to external shocks.
The data for the first period (1970-1974) show that the first oil shock had 
less adverse effects than might have been feared. The saving grace was that in 1972 
export prices had moved to very high levels, inducing a sharp increase in the 
household savings ratio (compared to the late 1960s). Household investments 
remained rather stable. Also the private corporate savings ratio increased somewhat 
and corporate investments continued the increasing trend of the 1960s. It would 
appear that in this period the household sector was more affected by the external 
shocks than the private corporate sector. Household savings increased rather 
sharply, whereas the corporate ratios more or less continued trends that had started 
in the 1960s. The outcome of these factors was that the private sector savings sur­
plus remained positive.
Since the 1960s there had been a trend for government savings to decline 
steadily. The external shocks provided an incentive for the strong fiscal action that 
halted this trend. The government investment ratio declined sharply in this period 
and in 1974 there was even a small budget surplus. The state enterprise sector 
seemed hardly to be affected by the shocks in this period, its savings and investment 
ratios remained rather stable. The result was a public sector deficit that was still 
larger than the private sector surplus, leaving a moderate current-account deficit.
The main change that characterized the second period (1975-1979) was the 
opening up of international financial markets to borrowers from developing coun­
tries. Thailand also participated in this process, as is reflected in the rising capital 
inflows. Table 4.3 shows that the government and the state enterprises were the 
main recipients of these additional flows. The accumulation balance of the house­
hold sector was hardly affected by this. That is not surprising given the fact that 
households have no access to international financial markets. As the private corpo­
rate accumulation balance also did not change much, the overall private sector sav­
ings surplus remained stable.
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Big changes occurred, however, in the public sector balances. The increase 
in the capital inflows is associated w ith the increased public sector deficit. The state 
enterprise investment ratio almost doubled, while the state enterprise savings ratio 
fell. The government investment ratio and savings ratio did not change much in this 
period. The public-scctor savings deficit increased substantially and could only be 
partially filled by the private-sector savings surplus. International financial flows to 
the public sector filled the gap. It would thus appear that the shock of this period, 
i.e., the increased access to international finance, led to a response mainly of the 
state enterprise sector. The other three sectors showed little change in the accu­
mulation balances.
Period 111 (1980-1982) again showed sharp increases in import prices (the 
second oil shock) and, this time, the effects were not so strongly cushioned by 
simultaneous increases in export prices as had been the case in period I. In 1979, 
international interest rates increased substantially. Furthermore, world trade 
stagnated in this period.
Household savings remained strong, benefiting from the mild increase in 
export prices that occurred in 1979 and 1980. Household investments remained 
stable, so that the household-sector savings surplus showed a small increase. The 
private corporate sector appeared more affected by the negative external conditions. 
The investment ratio fell sharply, as did the savings ratio, though to a lesser extent. 
The outcome was a significant increase in the overall private-sector savings surplus.
The fiscal reaction to the second oil shock was quite different from what 
happened after the first oil shock. Government savings fell and government invest­
ments were maintained. The fiscal deficit increased sharply. State enterprises con­
tinued to increase the investment ratio, largely financed by external funds. The 
public-sector savings gap increased to almost 7 percent of GDP, far in excess of the 
private sector surplus. The gap was filled by external borrowing.
The multiple external shocks of this period affected all four sectors. The 
household sector seemed least affected; in fact, its savings surplus increased, as 
mild increases in export prices dominated the negative effects of the other external 
shocks. Private corporations reacted to the negative turn of the external environ­
ment as one might have expected: investments were reduced. The patterns in the 
public sector, however, contained elements that were unsustainable in the longer 
run. State enterprise investments, financed by external funds, increased despite the 
higher lending cost. Apparently, the access to funds was more important than the 
cost of the funds. Public sector savings fell to a very low level. Attempts by the gov­
ernment to cushion the domestic effects of the external shocks (for example, by 
subsidizing oil prices to mitigate the inflationary effect of the oil shock) led to a 
significant increase in the fiscal deficit.
Period IV was a period of adjustment. Export and import prices were rela­
tively stable. World trade recovered somewhat and the international interest rate fell 
back to a moderate level. The 1982 Mexican debt crisis made clear, however, that 
access to international finance was going to be more difficult, and that crisis gave a 
warning to other countries of the dangers involved in excessive external borrowing.
How did Thailand react to that challenge? Not so well, according to Table
4.3. Two elements stand out: the continued decline of the government savings ratio 
and the continued increase of the state enterprise investment ratio. It would appear 
that the debt crisis had some effect on the public sector, as the government invest-
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mcnt ralio was reduced somewhat and the state enterprise savings ratio increased 
substantially. The overall public-scctor savings gap, however, remained at a very 
high level, far in excess of the private-scctor savings surplus.
The houschold-sector savings ratio fell considerably and its investment 
ratio increased somewhat. The fall in savings may be related to the poor 
performance of the agricultural sector during this period; the Value Added of the 
sector at current prices in 1986 was lower than it had been in 1983, due to poor 
prices and poor weather. The corporate investment ratio fell further under the 
impact of the uncertain external environment and the growing internal imbalances, 
but the corporate savings ratio recovered somewhat from the very low level of the 
previous period, so that the private-sector savings surplus remained more or less the 
same. The overall private-sector savings surplus fell somewhat.
The external shocks of this period were not so much felt in concrete 
changes in prices, interest rates or world trade growth. They were felt in the general 
uncertainty of the international environment and in the growing awareness that 
debt-financed growth was unsustainable. The private sector was badly affected by 
these factors: its savings ratio and investment ratio declined. A significant indicator 
is that the exports/GDP ratio, which had continuously increased over the earlier 
periods, fell back somewhat in this period (see Table 3.7 of Chapter 3); thus, the 
export growth necessary to reduce the dependence on external finance could not be 
effectuated. The public sector's response to the external changes was mixed. Some 
appropriate adjustments were made (a slight reduction in government investments 
and a significant increase in state enterprise savings), but the overall public-sector 
savings gap remained at a high level, thus continuing the dependence on foreign 
funds. On the whole, it would appear that the public sector response to the external 
challenge was inadequate. But that changed dramatically in the next period.
The most recent period (1987-1990) shows a dramatic turnaround in the 
sectoral accumulation balances in the Thai economy. The capital inflows shifted to­
tally toward private-sector oriented flows. As a consequence, the investment ratio of 
private corporations increased by more than 6 percentage points to a level that was 
never before experienced. The private corporate savings ratio also increased, but to 
a far lesser extent, so that the savings gap widened. The booming economy also 
induced a higher level of household investments. The result was that, for the first 
time in post-war history, the private (i.e., corporate plus household) sector's 
savings-investment balance turned negative.
This shift in the private sector balance was accompanied by, and made 
possible by, an equally dramatic shift in public sector balances. The investment 
ratios o f both government and state enterprises fell significantly, and their savings 
ratios increased, so that the public sector, which had always had a savings deficit, 
now showed a savings surplus.
The impression given by Table 4.3 is that, over the last two decades, there 
has been a close relationship between the level o f sectoral savings and investment 
ratios on the one hand and capital inflows and external conditions on the other. It is 
also clear that the nature of that interaction can only be grasped if  the accumulation 
balances are disaggregated. The gradual decline of the aggregate savings ratio from 
period I to II and III was particularly due to the fall o f the public-sector savings 
ratios. The consolidation of the aggregate ratio in period IV, however, was the
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result of ;i decline in the privatc-scctor savings ratios; public sector savings 
recovered considerably in this period.
The mild fluctuations of the aggregate investment ratio over periods I to IV 
arc the outcome of considerable changes in the composition: the share of the private 
sector declined and that of the public sector and. in particular, of state enterprises 
increased.
The most recent period, period V, turned these patterns upside down The 
sharp rise in the aggregate investment ratio was entirely due to the recovery of pri­
vate investment. The public-scctor investment ratios declined sharply The sharp 
rise of the aggregate savings ratio was due to a recovery of private sector savings 
and a dramatic rise in public sector savings.
In all periods, one can discern a relationship between the trends in the sec­
toral savings and investment ratios and the external capital flows received by the 
sector. The sharp rise in capital inflows in periods 11 and 111 was associated with a 
rise in public sector investments and a decline in the public-scctor savings ratio 
The increase in capital inflows in the most recent period gave rise to a quite differ­
ent pattern: the public-scctor savings deficit was turned into a surplus and private 
sector investments increased substantially.
The last few years have thus shown a radical turnaround in the traditional 
sectoral balances of the Thai economy. Capital inflows shifted toward the private 
sector and shifted from debt-creating to non-dcbt-creating inflows. The private- 
sector savings surplus disappeared and made place for a substantial savings gap 
The public sector deficit that had been large and increasing was, in a relatively 
short time, turned into a savings surplus.
Two main factors may be held responsible for these recent changes. The 
first relates to the changing international environment which opened opportunities 
for Thailand. Changes in the alignment of major currencies, discussed in Chapter 3, 
induced an outflow of export-oriented direct investments from Asian countries to 
Thailand. The second factor is the radical change in public sector policy. In Thai 
development philosophy, the primacy had always been placed with the private 
sector. The increasing share of the public sector in total investment, as occurred in 
the 1975-1986 period, had not fundamentally changed that position. Most public 
sector investments were in the standard public utilities sectors, supporting private 
sector accumulation The drastic cutback of public sector activities that occurred in 
the last few years may be seen as a reconfirmation of the basic philosophy. When 
the growing public sector deficit and the rising debt burden started to endanger pri­
vate sector growth, the reaction was probably somewhat slow in coming, but quite 
effective once it took hold. Not only were the investment ratios of government and 
state enterprises significantly reduced, but also current government spending was 
curtailed. The ratio of current government spending to GDP had been around 16 
percent in the mid-1980s. By 1990 it had fallen back to 12.1 percent.
EX T ER NA L SH O C K S AND SEC TO R A L A C CU M ULATIO N  BE H A V IO R
The analysis in the previous section clearly suggests that the level of sav­
ings and investments fluctuates with the flow of international finance and with 
other external shocks.
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This section attempts a more detailed tinie-scries analysis of the savings 
and investment behavior of the four main institutional sectors, focusing in particular 
on the impact of external finance and trade variables.
Most studies would analyze accumulation behavior at an aggregated level, 
finding explanatory variables for aggregated savings and investments. If any disag­
gregation lakes place, it normally does not go any further than to distinguish public 
and private sectors. The data contained in Tables 4.1 and 4.3. however, show that 
the shares in GDP of savings and investments of the four main economic agents in 
Thailand have followed quite different paths over time. This suggests that the sav­
ing and investment behavior of the various sectors arc influenced by different fac­
tors or arc influenced by similar factors with different intensities.
Savings arc interpreted as the operating surplus of production units. In 
economic theory (for example, in permanent income hypothesis or life-cycle theo­
ries), households arc usually analyzed as consumption units, and household savings 
arc explained from the fact that households want to spread their consumption over 
time in a different way than their income is spread. Investments are in assets 
(physical and financial) that arc basically entitlements to future consumption. In de­
veloping countries, however, many households are not purely consumption units, 
but also production units. The small-scale family-based firm is still the predominant 
form of organization of production. The sectors in which such small-scale units 
dominate (agriculture, trade, services) still contribute a large (albeit declining) 
share of production and, in these and other sectors, large-scale units are only 
gradually replacing family businesses. Numerous household surveys in developing 
countries have shown that the major share of household savings originates from 
self-employed households. The self-employed household sector is, however, far from 
homogeneous. The distribution of income within this group is highly unequal. A 
small number of very rich households, with activities and business interests 
stretching over various sectors, account for most of the household savings. The 
large majority of self-employed households are engaged in small-scale farming and 
have to work hard to earn a meager income (for a further discussion of this, see 
Jansen 1990, Chapter 3).
Household savings and investments are thus as much related to production 
(of the household firm) as to consumption. Also, savings of private corporations and 
of state enterprises can be analyzed as the operating surplus of firms. Savings are 
thus the retained (i.e., not consumed) part of the operating surplus of household 
firms, private and public corporations.
The operating surplus is the difference between output (sales) and cost of 
production. Conditions of production, however, differ substantially between house­
hold firms, private and public corporations.
Household firms typically operate on competitive markets. They produce 
traded or nontraded goods. The output prices of the traded goods (mainly agricul­
ture) follow world market prices. The prices of nontraded goods (mainly domestic 
trade and services) are determined by the state of demand and supply. The main in­
put used by household firms is family labor.
Private corporations operate on more oligopolistic markets and have some 
degree of price-setting power. Price setting is done with the aim of maximizing the 
growth of the corporation; it is an optimization process, balancing the need to gen­
erate investment funds against the damaging effect that high prices may have on
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demand for the firm's goods. The availability and cost of external funds may influ­
ence this optimization process. The operating surplus of corporations is also influ­
enced by developments in the production cost. The main elements of cost arc the 
wage level, the cost of imported intermediate and capital goods and the cost of 
credit.
Public corporations arc also oligopolistic or monopolistic firms, but their 
price-setting behavior is influenced by political considerations. Government savings 
arc fully explained as the outcome of a political process.
In general, investments arc explained from incentives and constraints. The 
incentive to invest is based on expected demand and expected profits. The con­
straints on investment demand come from the cost of investment goods, reflected in 
the cost of imported capital goods and in the real interest rate, and from the avail­
ability of investment funds (own savings, domestic credit and foreign credit).
It is, therefore, a priori likely that external shocks relating to availability of 
finance, to the cost of finance and to the cost of imports and to the price of export 
goods, will have an impact on sectoral savings and investment patterns.
The R egressions Results
Table 4.4 brings together the results o f the regressions for the sav ings and 
the investment equations of the four institutional sectors. All equations were 
estimated using single-equation least square methods and the data refer to the 
period 1970-1990. The variables Sj, I( and Fj are all expressed as proportion of 
GDP. The Appendix to this chapter describes their definitions and calculation. 
Other variables included in the regressions arc the international prices: PX, the rate 
of increase of the unit value of exports; PI, the rate of increase of the unit v alue of 
imports; the real interest rate IR. defined as the nominal interbank rate of interest 
minus the rate of increase of consumer prices; and GY, the growth rate of real GDP. 
There arc no direct estimates of wage levels in Thailand. As a proxy, a wage pres­
sure index (WP) was calculated by taking the deviations of the wage share in 
National Income from its trend level. It is assumed that in years when the actual 
wage share is above its longer-term trend level, the wage cost is relatively high. In a 
number of cases, alternative equations were estimated to study the impact of vari­
ables and to assess the impact of multicollinearity among some of the independent 
variables. In general, Table 4.4 reports only those variables whose coefficients were 
significantly different from zero.
The household sector
The adjustment behavior of the household sector is more important than is 
generally assumed. When households are seen as consumption units, and household 
consumption proportional to household income, the adjustment of household sav­
ings to income shocks is immediate and uninteresting: the household savings ratio 
would be more or less constant. And household savings would be used for invest­
ments in residential construction and the acquisition of financial assets.
In our approach, household savings are interpreted as the retained profits 
o f the household firm. As Table 4.3 shows, the household savings ratio is relatively 
constant over the medium term, but Table 4.1 shows that there are sharp short-run
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fluctuations in the ratio. The household firms operate typically on competitive mar­
kets (flcxprice markets) and their profits are dependent on the output prices and the 
cost o f production.
The output prices of the many household firms in the agricultural sector 
arc determined by world market prices; most crops are exported as well as domesti­
cally consumed and domestic prices for agricultural commodities follow closely the 
trends in the export prices. Hence, we have taken the rate of change of the export 
prices (PX) as an indicator for the output prices of agricultural household firms 
The output prices of nontraded commodities produced by household firms are de­
termined by the state of demand as reflected by the growth rate of real GDP (GY). 
The cost of production comprises the wage cost (WP), the real cost of lending (IR) 
and the rate of change of the prices of imported inputs (PI). The household sector 
does not directly receive any capital inflows from abroad, but the (lagged) total capi­
tal inflow variable (F(t-i)) is included to test for any positive effect of such inflows 
on market demand and on the consumption demand from a greater availability of 
foreign exchange.
The results are reported in Equation 1 of Table 4.4. The demand variables 
(GY and PX), which reflect the output market conditions, have the expected signs 
and are significant. The pressures of (excess) demand have a positive, and thus 
stabilizing, effect on household savings. It could be suggested that the PX variable 
is particularly relevant for the agricultural part of the household sector. The GY 
variable may be more relevant to the nontraded part of the household sector, where 
output prices are more determined by the interaction of demand and supply.
The cost-of-production variables, PI, IR and WP, are not significant. This 
is to be expected as households firms use few purchased inputs. They use simple 
technologies with few imported intermediate or capital goods and low working capi­
tal (and thus credit) needs. The firms depend on own family labor rather than on 
hired workers. Because of the correlation between IR and PX and between WP and 
GY, various regressions were tried, but in all of them the cost variables were insig­
nificant. They are, therefore, not included in the reported equation.
It is sometimes suggested that the real interest rate should have a positive 
impact on household savings as it provides an incentive to postpone consumption. 
No evidence for this effect could be established. In fact, the single correlation coef­
ficient between the household savings ratio and the real interest rate was negative, 
but in none of the equations tested did the real interest rate variable turn out to have 
a significant coefficient.
We have included the capital inflow variable to study its effect on house­
hold savings. The results, as reported in Equation 1 of Table 4.4, are rather unim ­
pressive. However, these results are strongly influenced by the decline of the house­
hold ratio in the last two years, already observed in the discussion of Table 4.1. The 
sudden decline turned around, in particular, the relationships that existed in earlier 
years between the growth rate and the capital inflow variable on the one hand, and 
the savings ratio on the other. Because of the extreme values of these variables in 
the last two years, the regression outcomes are seriously affected by this shift. In 
Equation 2 of Table 4.4 we run the same regression over the period 1970-1988 and 
see that the capital inflow variable now has a strongly positive and significant effect 
on household savings. The impact of the growth rate also becomes stronger and 
more significant. An increase in capital inflows induces an increase in household
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savings. This suggests that there is no substitution effect between capital inflows 
and household savings; in fact, there is a significant complementary relationship. 
One way to explain this interaction is that the domestic demand generated by the 
capital inflows has a positive effect on the income of household firms. This relation­
ship is very important, because it generated domestic savings which would help to 
reduce the dependence on foreign savings.
The findings of Equations 1 and 2 suggest that the relationship between 
external finance and household savings have changed in the last few years. While 
during the 1970s and early 1980s, household savings responded positively to capital 
inflows and, hence, contributed to the stability of the overall economy, the response 
in the last few years has become highly destabilizing.
As Tables 4.1 and 4.3 show, the household sector always has a savings 
surplus. That would seem to undermine the interpretation of the household sector as 
a sector of small unincorporated enterprises. One would expect that the investment 
plans of such firms would suffer from the limited access to credit and would, there­
fore, be constrained by available own savings. In fact, the data suggest that the 
household sector could have invested more from their own resources. Why is that 
so? Two main reasons may be suggested.
Table 4.4 Regression Results Saving and Investm ent Equations
EQ.
NR
DEP.
VAR
ESTIM
METH.
C GY PX Fl(t-l)
Saving equations
1 Sh AR 0.079 0.184 0.04 0.111
(6.828) (1.914) (2.408) (0.911)
2 Sh AR 0.069 0.237 0.046 0.322
(7.116) (2.826) (3.194) (2.590)
3 Sc OLS 0.074 0.095 - 0.174
(21.479) (2.217) (3.237)
4 Ss OLS 0.013 - - -0.292
(13.331) (5.026)
5 Sg AR 0.009 0.086 - 0.338
(0.989) (0.789) (0.721)
EQ DEP. ESTIM C Si(t-l) GY (t-l) Ii(t-l)
NR VAR METH.
Investment equations
6 Ih OLS 0.054 -0.173 0.056 -
(7.789) (2.542) (1.816)
7 Ic OLS 0.142 - 0.283 -
(7.374) (2.064)
8 Is AR 0.011 - - 0.485
(2.959) (3.281)
9 ■g AR 0.01 0.299 -0.13 0.73
(0.628) (2.009) (2.369) (1.684)
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First, household investments, as measured by the National Accounts, only 
cover residential construction and investments in new land. All private investments 
in equipment are assigned to the private corporate sector. Obviously, in this way, 
the investments of household firms are underestimated: farms and non-agricultural 
family businesses do buy machines.
Second, the household sector is quite diverse. The bulk of household sav­
ings will be concentrated with a small group of very rich households, some of which 
will have close personal links to large firms in the corporate sector. They may use 
the surpluses from the household firm to obtain equity in corporations or to obtain 
deposits with related financial institutions rather than for re-investment in the 
household firm. The great majority of poorer households will indeed have their in­
vestment opportunities limited to the level of their own savings (see Jansen 1990, 
Chapter 4).
PI a t WP DUM1 DUM2 R2(ADJ) D.W.
_ _ _ _ . 0.31 1.59
- - - - - 0.52 1.77
- - -0.12
(2.147)
- - 0.69 1.97
“ -0.023
(1.814)
” 0.015
(10.035)
- 0.88 1.96
-0.396
(2.384)
0.033
(4.595)
0.8 1.59
Fi IR Ipu T R2(ADJ) D.W.
0.171 - -0.271 0.001 0.95 2.27
(4.788) (5.839) (7.216)
0.773 -0.019 -0.619 - 0.85 2.1
(5.275) (0.327) (2.626)
0.464 0.064 - - 0.77 1.83
(2.936) (2.236)
0.252 - - - 0.53 1.63
(1.489)
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Household investments, as measured by the variable Ih, include only in­
vestments in new land and residences. The (lagged) growth of the level of income 
(GY(t _i)) may invite household investment. Another stimulus may arise from the 
availability of funds; therefore, lagged household savings (Sfy, iy) are included. 
Residential investments will also be dependent on long-term processes, such as the 
growth of population and urbanization. The impact of these long-term processes is 
captured by a trend variable, T, in the regression. Household investments will be 
constrained by the cost of investment as reflected in the real rate of interest (IR). 
The cost of imported investment goods (PI) is not relevant since few imported in­
puts are used in construction.
The results (see Equation 6 in Table 4.4) suggest that population growth 
and urbanization (captured in T) and the growth of income (GY(, i)) have a positive 
effect on household investments. It is remarkable that the lagged household savings 
ratio, included to test the impact of the profit expectations and the availability of 
funds, has a significant negative coefficient. It certainly suggests that household 
investments are not savings-constraincd, but it is difficult to find a convincing 
explanation for the result. The cost of credit variable had an insignificant negative 
coefficient and is not reported. It should be noted that IR reflects the cost of credit 
from formal financial institutions; it could be suggested that many households may 
be more dependent on the more expensive informal markets.
Two further variables were included in the regression and turned out to 
have significant coefficients. Household firms do not have access to international 
financial markets and one would thus not expect that capital inflows to the private 
sector (Fpr) would have a direct effect on household investment, but various indirect 
effects may be hypothesized. The second variable, the public-scctor (i.e.. govern­
ment plus state enterprises) investment ratio (Ipu), is included to test for crowding- 
in or crowding-out. The crowding-out variable has a significant negative sign: the 
higher the public-sector investment ratio, the lower the household investment ratio
The channels along which the crowding-out takes place can vary A high 
level o f public sector investment can affect the price and availability of construction 
materials. Another channel may be through domestic credit markets. A high level of 
public investments may reduce the availability of credit for the private sector. Even 
if the household sector itself does not receive much credit anyway, an indirect effect 
may be felt. The link that was observed above between the small group of rich 
households and the corporate sector is important here. If private corporations find 
domestic credit limited, they may demand more transfers from related households. 
Such an indirect effect could also explain the positive impact o f Fpr in the Ih re­
gression: when corporations receive more foreign capital inflows (Fpr). they need 
less transfers from the household sector. In such an interpretation, the household 
investment level becomes to some extent a residual item. These financial interac­
tions among the various domestic sectors will be further analyzed in Chapter 5.
The results suggest that on the income and savings side the household sec­
tor directly feels the impact of external shocks, mainly through changes in export 
prices and the demand impulses generated by external capital inflows. Household 
investments are not constrained by the availability of household savings. That does 
not mean that there are many households (probably the great majority) that can 
only invest what they save. It just means that the other, very rich, households that 
account for most of the household savings undertake less real investment within the
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household sector than they could. It is that same small group that accounts for the 
financial flows between the household sector and the other sectors of the economy
The private corporate sector
The private corporate sector is the dominant sector in the Thai economy. It 
is a relatively concentrated sector, with the larger firms being cither part of domes­
tically-owned conglomerates (the “groups” centered around important families), or 
a subsidiary of or joint venture with a multinational, or both.
Corporate savings are the profits of the corporations, i.e.. the retained op­
erating surplus. This surplus is the difference between output (or sales) and the cost 
of production. Total output (or sales) is determined by the output price and the out­
put volume. In contrast to household firms, it can be assumed that corporations op­
erate on fixed price markets. They have price-setting powers and thus some influ­
ence on the level of their profits. As Table 4.1 shows, the corporate savings ratio is 
relatively stable over time. This is to be expected of corporations that have a degree 
of market power and that can set their output prices and profit markups in line with 
their long-term plans for corporate growth and capital structure. If. in the short-run. 
profit levels would depart from that long-run path, immediate adjustment of prices 
would follow.
In setting prices and profits, the corporation takes into consideration the 
strength of the market demand, the threat of competitors and the availability and 
cost of alternative finance. The volume of sales is mainly dependent on demand It 
may be assumed that corporations have, in general, some excess capacity. When 
demand is strong, this capacity is used to expand output and, thus, profits This ef­
fect is captured by the growth rate, GY.
An indication of the expected availability of alternative finance for corpo­
rate investment plans can be found in last year's supply of credit from abroad 
(Fpr(t-i)) anc* tllc cost of the real interest rate (IR). If such funds arc easily available, 
corporations would have less urgent need to generate their own funding sources 
and. therefore. less need to raise prices.
Corporate profits in any particular year may be further influenced by sud­
den changes in production cost, which are only gradually transmitted into output 
prices (the main elements of costs are wages |WP). imported inputs | PI] and interest 
on credit [ IR]).
The results arc reported in Equation 3 of Table 4.4. The corporate savings 
ratio has an important element of stability, as is reflected in the high significance of 
the constant term. One would expect this of corporations that have some market 
power and a long-term strategy relating to market share and capital structure.
The capacity utilization variable, GY, has the expected positive impact. O f 
the cost-of-production variables, WP and PI have the expected sign, but only the co­
efficient of WP is significant. It should be noted that the interest rate variable used, 
the real interbank rate, has a close relationship with international interest rates, 
such as the LIBOR, and can thus be seen as a channel through which international 
financial shocks influence domestic accumulation The real interest rate has two 
impacts. It indicates the cost of alternative investment finance. If these cost are 
high, firms will try to generate more own savings. But interest costs are also an 
element of the cost of current production. When costs are higher, profits and sav­
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ings will be lower. The regressions, which failed to lead to a significant coefficient 
may be taken to suggest that the two effects neutralize each other.
The availability of external finance has no significant substitution effect on 
corporate savings. The lagged inflows of private capital lead to an increase in prof­
its and corporate savings.
It is assumed that the investments of private corporations are not finance- 
constrained. Large corporations are part of conglomerates or groups, owned by 
wealthy families and with direct personal links to domestic and even foreign finan­
cial institutions, or they are subsidiaries of multinationals with access to interna­
tional financial markets. Corporations can thus finance their desired level of in­
vestments from their own savings, from transfers from the household sector, from 
domestic credit or from foreign funds.
Table 4.1 indicates that the corporate investment ratio fluctuated from year 
to year in the 1970s. The period 1979-1986 showed a clear downward trend that 
gave way to a spectacular recovery in recent years.
The level o f desired investment is determined by expected demand 
(represented by the growth rate of domestic real income, GY(t i), and by expected 
profits (represented by the lagged corporate savings (i.e., profit) share, (SC(i i)). 
Investments may be constrained by the availability of external funds for private cor­
porations (Fpr) and by the cost of credit (IR) and imported capital goods (PI). To test 
for crowding in or out of corporate investments by public investments, we have 
included public investment as proportion of GDP, lpu. in the regression.
The results, shown in Equation 7 o f Table 4.4, are interesting and require 
some reconsideration of the assumptions on corporate investment behavior. O f the 
incentive variables, only GY(t^ )  has the expected sign and is significant. Capital 
inflows to the private sector have a strong, significant, positive elTcct on corporate 
investments, and the crowding-out variable has a strong, significant, negative coef­
ficient. The cost of investment variables have the expected signs but arc not signifi­
cant.
The coefficient of the crowding-out variable is negative and highly signifi­
cant. It is, however, not necessarily true that the increase in public investment force­
fully reduces the level of desired private investments that can be realized. It could 
also be that the higher level of public investment reduces the level o f investment 
that the private sector needs or wishes to undertake. A high level of public invest­
ment may reduce the willingness of private corporations to invest, if large public in­
vestments (or the large fiscal deficit which may be associated with the high level of 
public investment) affect the businessmen's expectations for the future. Public in­
vestment may also affect the need for private investment. This may be the case in 
more recent years when infrastructural investments, previously undertaken by the 
public sector, have been increasingly privatized.
Together with the significant impact that the public investment ratio had 
on household investments, this finding leads us to conclude that a sharp negative 
relationship exists between private and public investment ratios. Despite the fact 
that an increasing share of investment could be financed from foreign capital in­
flows— so that the immediate source-of-funds constraint was reduced— the increase 
in the public-sector investment ratio had a contractionary effect on the private- 
sector investment ratio. The channels along which this crowding-out takes place 
will be further analyzed in Chapter 5.
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The behavior of private corporations in the face of external shocks is less 
stabilizing than that of the household sector. The capital inflows to the private cor­
porate sector directly help to finance a higher level of investment, but corporate 
savings react to capital inflows with much less intensity.
State enterprises
Table 4.1 shows the strong upward trend of the investment ratio of state 
enterprises from 1975 to 1985 and the sharp decline thereafter. As in the case of 
private enterprises, desired investments could be explained from expected demand 
and returns and from financing constraints. Obviously, in the case of state enter­
prises, political factors may play an important role in determining the level of in­
vestments. These longer-term underlying factors are captured by including the 
lagged investment ratio, >n the equation.
The results of the investment equation are reported in Equation 8 in Table 
4.4. The most striking outcomes are the strong impact of the lagged investment 
ratio, reflecting the secular trend in the investment ratio, and the positive impact of 
the availability of external capital. The Fs variable has a significant coefficient. The 
demand-related incentive variables, lagged own savings and the lagged growth rate, 
were not significant in the regressions and are not included in Table 4.4. The cost 
variables do not have the expected impact. The real interest rate is significant, but 
has the wrong sign. Apparently, higher interest costs do not discourage investments 
but are just added to the investment cost.
Investments undertaken by state enterprises are also determined by politi­
cal considerations. Within these considerations, the availability of investment funds 
may well play an important role. In particular, increased access to international 
financial markets seems to have invited a sharp increase in state enterprise 
investments.
The savings ratio of state enterprises shows a gradual decline from the 
early 1970s to 1981. In 1982 a sharp increase occurred, followed in subsequent 
years by a more gradual improvement. The jum p in 1982 is clearly the result of a 
political decision to run state enterprises more efficiently and to adjust their output 
prices to reduce losses. The only way to reflect such a policy shift in the regression 
analysis is to include a dummy variable (DUM1: equal to one for the years 1982- 
1990 and to zero for the other years).
The other variables that could explain the variations in state enterprise 
savings are similar to those used in the case of private corporations. Market condi­
tions are captured by the GY variable and, on the cost side, by IR, PI and WP. The 
impact of these variables is uncertain, however. State enterprises are often monopo­
listic firms with considerable potential market power, but these powers are severely 
constrained by political factors. The expected availability of alternative financing 
may reduce own saving efforts (i.e., may strengthen the reluctance to increase prices 
or rates).
Table 4.4 (Equation 4) reports the results. The dummy variable represent­
ing the policy shift is highly significant. The results suggest a strongly negative 
relationship with foreign capital inflows, suggesting significant substitution between 
own savings and foreign funds. There is a significant impact of the interest cost 
variable on the savings ratio. Higher interest cost reduces the operating surplus of
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state enterprises. The other variables did not obtain significant coefficients and arc 
not reported in Equation 4.
It can be concluded that, as with private corporations, state enterprise in­
vestments grow with the availability of foreign credits, but that, unlike private cor­
porations or the household sector, its savings fall with foreign capital inflows.
Government
Government investments cannot be explained like those of the productive 
units of the economy. Policy considerations of a long-term development nature and 
of a short-term demand management nature enter the decisions on the level o f in­
vestment. Table 4.1 suggests that, over the entire period 1970-1990, the government 
investment ratio showed a declining trend with a deep policy-induced dip around 
1974 and some smaller fluctuations during other years. This declining trend may be 
captured by including the lagged investment ratio (lg(t-i)) in the regressions.
As with investments in the other sectors, one could suggest that the level of 
government investment is determined by the demand in the economy (represented 
by growth of production, lagged one year, GY(t ]), by the cost o f investment 
(represented by imported input prices, PI; and interest cost, IR) and by the availabil­
ity of investment resources (own savings, Sg(t.])), and foreign loans received by the 
government (Fg).
The results of the equation are reported in Equation 9 of Table 4.4. The 
lagged government savings ratio and the lagged investment ratio seem to be the 
main explanatory variables. The capital coefficient of the inflow variable has a 
positive sign, but is not really significant. There is a significant negative relation­
ship between the government investment ratio and the lagged growth rate. 
Apparently, demand pressures have no expansionary impact on the level of gov­
ernment investments. One explanation for the significant negative coefficient could 
be the countercyclical fiscal policies of the Thai government. Years of high eco­
nomic growth are followed by a lower government investment ratio to dampen 
potential inflationary pressures and, vice versa, years of recession lead to fiscal 
expansion. The pattern may also be explained by fiscal rigidities: government 
investments are rather stable, so that a higher than average income growth leads to 
a fall in the investment ratio. Lagged government savings do have a positive impact 
on investments, and the inflow of foreign funds is also significant. The cost 
variables have no impact and are not reported.
The government savings ratio had a declining trend in the period 1977 to 
1985 and a sharp upward trend since then. In the years 1974 and 1987-1990, strong 
fiscal policy initiatives led to sharp rises in the savings ratio. As before, these policy 
shifts were captured by a dummy variable (DUM2: equal to one for the years indi­
cated and to zero for the other years).
Government savings are the balance between revenue and current spend­
ing. The revenue base expands with domestic expenditure growth (GY). Current 
expenditures vary with wage cost (WP) and interest cost (IR). The expected avail­
ability of external credit (Fg(t_i)) may reduce the efforts of the government to gen­
erate savings.
Table 4.4 (Equation 5) gives the results. The dummy variable, reflecting 
policy shifts, is significant. The growth rate variable is not significant, and there is
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a strong negative relationship between government savings and wage cost. No dis­
placement effect on government savings from foreign funds could be discerned; in 
fact, the Fg variable has a positive, but insignificant coefficient.
C O N CLUSIO N
The estimated equations provide some further evidence that accumulation 
behavior differs considerably between the four economic agents. It is, therefore, bet­
ter to estimate sectoral patterns and derive estimates of total savings and invest­
ments from the sum of their component parts, rather than to try to explain the ag­
gregated saving and investment function itself.
In the comparison of sectoral patterns, we will concentrate on the impact of 
the foreign exchange variables. A number of observations can be made.
First, there is a positive relationship between capital inflows and the level 
of the investment ratio of the sector that receives the inflow. The effect is strongest 
in the private corporate and state enterprise sectors.
Second, the relationship between capital inflows and the savings ratio is 
more complex. In the private corporate sector, a positive relationship could be 
established between the level of the savings ratio and the foreign capital received by 
the sector. In contrast, a strong substitution effect operates in the state enterprise 
sector; the increased access of the sector to international financial markets is associ­
ated with a decline in its savings ratio. For the household sector, another interaction 
is observed. The household savings ratio increases with the level of total capital 
inflows. It is likely that the positive domestic demand effect that the capital inflows 
exert on the output prices of non-agricultural household firms, and thus on the op­
erating surplus of household firms, dominates any consumption-inducing effect that 
the greater availability of foreign exchange may have. In the last few years, how­
ever, it appears that this complementarity is disappearing. In the government sector, 
there is no significant relationship between capital inflows and the savings ratio. 
The conflicting sectoral patterns strongly support the hypothesis, raised at the be­
ginning of this chapter, that the relationship between savings and capital inflows 
should not be analyzed at the aggregated level, but rather at the disaggregated level, 
where different types of capital inflows are related to the savings behavior of the re­
ceiving sectors.
A third observation would be that, on balance, the effect of capital inflows 
on the Thai economy can be easily destabilizing. Investments rise while savings rise 
less. In the state enterprise sector, savings fall and in the private corporate and 
household sectors they will rise, but on the whole the investment-savings gap wid­
ens, thus extending the dependence on foreign funds. The changing reaction of the 
household sector to capital inflows in recent years reinforces the tendency for the 
savings gap to widen.
Fourth, the regressions suggest that the other external shocks that were in­
cluded in the analysis do not have a strong impact on the accumulation behavior A 
rise in export prices has a positive effect on household savings, but the value of the 
coefficients is not very large and substantial changes in world prices are required to 
have a significant effect on savings.
Chapter 4
The interest rate variable included in the regressions is the real interbank 
interest rate. The variations in this domestic interest rate, however, arc strongly in­
fluenced by such international interest rates as the LIBOR An increase in interna­
tional interest rates would thus lead to a rise in domestic costs of lending, which 
may have an impact on the savings and the investment ratios. The regression 
results, however, do not suggest a strong effect of the real interest rate; only in the 
savings and investment equation of the state enterprises is the variable significant.
Negative external shocks can occur from a worsening of the terms of trade 
(export prices down and/or import prices up) and from an increase in the interna­
tional interest rate. Such shocks would have a destabilizing effect within the Thai 
economy as they would lead to a fall in savings, while investments would respond 
less and, in the case of state enterprises, may even increase. In such an occurrence, 
policy interventions would thus be required to bring the economy back to an equi­
librium.
Fifth, we can use the regression results to obtain an indication of the main 
adjustment mechanisms to external financial shocks. It appears that the increasing 
access to international finance since the mid-1970s released a financial constraint 
on the investments of state enterprises. With the increased inflow of foreign funds, 
the public-sector investment ratio rose and its savings ratio fell. This pattern sug­
gests that the financial constraint of the public sector had an important political 
dimension. The inability or unwillingness to increase taxes or public utility prices 
limited the funds available for investment until the opening up of international 
financial markets provided an alternative.
The adjustment patterns in the private sector are quite different. 
Investments by private corporations are mainly driven by perceived market pros­
pects and the savings ratio follows a stable pattern determined by long-run pricing 
policies. Fluctuations in access to different types of international finance did invite a 
higher level o f investment, but also changed the financing patterns of corporations: 
the increased use of international funds was balanced by a relatively reduced use of 
domestic external funds (such as bank credit) in the first part of the 1980s. In the 
last few years, the inflow of private capital flows invited such a large increase in 
corporate investment that the claims on the domestic credit also increased signifi­
cantly (for further analysis, see the next chapter). In that pattern the household 
sector played, to some extent, the part of a residual category Its savings are strongly 
influenced by exogenous factors and its investments are balanced against the need 
for funds of the other sectors of the economy.
It could thus be argued that one of the main impacts of the external finan­
cial shocks was to change the intersectoral balances and flows of funds in the Thai 
economy. Data provided in Tables 4.1 and 4.3 help to summarize those patterns. 
We will make reference to the periods as defined in Table 4.3.
The share of state enterprise investment in total investment increased rap­
idly from period I until period IV, followed by a fallback in the last period. Three 
general sources of finance for these investments can be distinguished: own savings, 
foreign funds and other sources. These other sources are not made explicit in Table
4.3, but they can be derived as the difference between the sectoral savings-invest- 
ment gap and the capital inflow. Other sources include share capital, domestic 
credit, bond sales, etc. The financing pattern of the state enterprises changed con­
siderably. The contribution of own savings fell sharply up to period III; in periods
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IV and V there was some recovery. This was balanced by reverse changes in the 
contribution made by foreign funds. Also, the share of “other sources” in the financ­
ing o f stale enterprise investment increased.
The share of government in total investment continuously declined over 
the five periods. The share of foreign funds in government investment financing 
increased somewhat in the first three periods, but was never excessively large.
The pattern of the public sector is the sum of the patterns of the state 
enterprises and the government, but the role of the state enterprise sector is 
dominant in setting the overall pattern. The share of the public sector in total 
investment increased from around 25 percent in period I, to around 35 percent in 
periods III and IV, to fall back to around 20 percent in period V. The pattern of 
investment finance changed radically. Foreign funds, which financed only 5 percent 
of public sector investment in period I, accounted for 42 percent o f finance in period 
III. In period IV this share declined, and in period V it had fallen to zero. On the 
other hand, public sector own savings, which could finance about 60 percent of 
investment in period I, financed only 20 percent in period III. This share increased 
again in periods IV and V. The share of “other sources” provided the balance; its 
contribution increased particularly in period IV. It could thus be suggested that in 
periods I, II and III there was a substitution between foreign funds and own savings. 
In period IV the contribution of foreign funds fell sharply and own savings 
increased insufficiently to accommodate. The contribution of “other sources” 
increased sharply in that period. It is thus likely that, particularly in that period, the 
private sector may have felt the effects of crowding-out on the domestic capital 
markets.
The share of the private corporate sector in total investments fell from 
close to 60 percent in period I to 48 percent in period IV and recovered to 60 per­
cent in the final period. The relative contribution of own savings to the financing of 
investment was constant. The share of foreign funds increased from around 12 per­
cent of investment finance in periods I and II to around 20 percent in periods III 
and IV and to 38 percent in period V. The “other sources” of the domestic capital 
market, which had accounted for 30 percent of investment finance in periods I and 
II, fell back in the subsequent periods. In this sector, therefore, the main substitution 
was between foreign funds and the domestic capital market.
The share of the household sector in total investment was relatively con­
stant in periods I, II and III and rose somewhat in period IV and again in period V. 
The household savings ratio was relatively constant and did not increase along with 
household investments in the last two periods. The household sector is a net con­
tributor to the domestic capital market, but its pattern of investment and savings 
ratios mean that the sources made available for domestic financial intermediation 
show a relative decline in periods IV and V.
These findings strongly suggest that the differential reaction of the various 
sectors to external financial shocks not only affect the level of sectoral savings and 
investment ratios, but also affect the size and direction of domestic intersectoral 
flows of funds. In the case of Thailand, it may be suggested that the financial insti­
tutions have been the main channel o f these flows. A next step in this study will 
thus be to expand the simple analysis of international finance and domestic accumu­
lation, as presented in this chapter, into an analysis in which the interaction of these
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variables with domestic monetary and financial variables is included. That task is 
taken up in the next chapter.
Chapter 5
External Finance and Financial 
Intermediation in Thailand
INTRODUCTION
T h e  previous chapter analyzed, at a disaggregated level, the savings and invest­
ment patterns and behavior in the main institutional sectors of the Thai economy 
We tried, in particular, to establish the impact of international finance on these pat­
terns. At the aggregated macroeconomic level, the gap between savings and invest­
ment can only be filled by a capital inflow from abroad. At a disaggregated level, 
however, a further set o f questions arises The savings-investmcnt gap of any of the 
sectors can be filled by a capital inflow from abroad or by domestic financial trans­
fers between the sectors.
These intersectoral processes and, in particular, the role of the financial 
system in them arc the central focus of this chapter. In the MSAFs for 1975 and 
1985, presented in Chapter 2, the intersectoral transfers received detailed attention 
Two main channels for domestic intersectoral financial intermediation were 
identified: direct intersectoral transfers and intermediation through the domestic 
financial system. To this could be added the fiscal system which collects revenue 
from the sectors and allocates expenditures to the sectors. The flow-of-funds block 
o f the MSAFs (rows/columns 13 to 21) described the sources and uses of funds of 
households, corporations, state enterprises and government, separating direct flows 
between these four sectors (in rows/columns 13 to 16) and indirect flows through 
the financial institutions (rows/columns 18 to 21). The fiscal sy stem was presented 
in row 11, describing the distribution of the direct and indirect tax burdens, and 
column 11, specifying the distribution of current government spending and 
government savings The question addressed in this chapter is how these inter­
sectoral flows of funds were affected by the external conditions in general and by 
the inflow o f foreign funds in particular.
In the late 1970s and early 1980s international capital flows to developing 
countries increased rapidly. This flow was associated, in most countries and as we 
have seen in Chapter 4 also in Thailand, with an increase in public investment ra­
tios and a decline in public sector savings ratios and with increases in fiscal deficits
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(see FitzGerald and Sarmad 1990 and Vos 1991). Economic theory suggests various 
channels along which such an increase in public spending may influence private 
investments. The outcome of these processes may be captured by cither one of the 
terms "crowding-in” or “crowding-out,” but the details of the interactions are likely 
to be more complex than these simple labels would suggest.
An increase in public investment may invite private investment because it 
increases aggregate demand. This is the familiar Keynesian multiplicr-accelerator 
interaction. Taylor (1988) argues that public investment may create the conditions 
(by constructing physical and social infrastructure) for profitable private sector in­
vestment. An improved infrastructure may invite private investments.
The “crowding-out” hypothesis in its standard textbook version puts 
emphasis on the fact that the increase in public spending puts a claim on available 
resources. When no idle resources are available, domestic inflation accelerates and 
the real interest rate rises. In countries where interest rates are controlled, the 
effects would be felt in a decreased availability of credit for the private sector (see, 
for example, Dornbusch and Fisher 1987 or Dornbusch 1980). The fact that the 
increase in public spending in the 1970s was financed by an increased inflow of 
foreign finance would, however, alter these theoretical expectations. The inflow of 
funds would increase the level of international reserves of the financial system, so 
that the money market would be relatively liquid. Hence there would be less reason 
to expect a sharp rise in interest rates or a credit rationing.
The increased availability of foreign exchange may also dampen the infla­
tionary pressures. In many developing countries, capacity utilization is mainly de­
termined by the import capacity. When the import capacity rises with the availabil­
ity of foreign exchange, supply bottlenecks may disappear and inflationary pressures 
would be reduced.
But not all supply bottlenecks can be relieved through imports since some 
goods and services cannot be internationally traded. Therefore, the inflow of foreign 
capital and the increase in public spending may still lead to inflation of the prices of 
non-traded goods. In terms of the MSAFs of Chapter 2, one could roughly say that 
the agricultural and manufacturing sectors are predominantly traded goods sectors 
and the construction and public utilities and services sectors are mainly non-traded.
Inflation of the non-traded goods prices would lead to a fall in the relative 
price of traded versus non-traded goods, i.e., an appreciation of the real exchange 
rate and a loss of international competitiveness for the local exporters (see 
Dombusch 1980).
The possible increases in inflation and the interest rate, or the decreased 
availability of credit for the private sector, and the fallen profitability of export pro­
duction could all lead to a decline in private investment. It is, however, also possible 
that the increase in income, generated by public spending, and the income- 
redistribution due to the rise in inflation or in the interest rate, would generate 
additional private savings that could help to finance additional private investment. 
It is suggested that this increase in private savings would be more likely if  capital 
markets were perfect and if the private sector had rational expectations. In that case, 
individuals would properly discount the future burden of the public debt that is 
currently being accumulated. This is the case of “debt neutrality” or “Ricardian 
Equivalence” (see, for example, Buiter and Tobin 1979). The increase in public debt 
that results from the capital inflows will eventually lead to a debt servicing and
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repayment burden that has to be covered from increased domestic taxes. In 
anticipation of that future tax burden, the private sector increases its current savings 
(and investment) to generate the future income stream to pay these taxes.
The debt neutrality hypothesis could even lead to a crowding-in of private 
savings and investment by debt-financed public spending. Whether the actual out­
come of the adjustment will be crowding-in or crowding-out depends largely on two 
factors. The first factor is the access of the private sector to credit. If that access is 
severely reduced, a fall in private sector investment is more likely. The second fac­
tor is whether the trend in private investment and the adjustment o f the private sec­
tor to the changes in the other variables lead to an increase or a decline in private 
sector savings.
These processes can be traced through the flow-of-funds analysis, detail­
ing, of each sector, the sources and uses of funds That is the purpose of the next 
section of this chapter. The question will be raised whether external finance affected 
the patterns of sectoral sources and uses of funds and, if so, how, in which direction, 
and to what extent
SECTORAL ACCUMULATION BALANCES AND INTERSECTORAL 
FLOWS OF FUNDS
The impression given by Chapter 4 (see Table 4.3) is that over the last two 
decades there has been a close relationship between the level o f sectoral savings and 
investment ratios and capital inflows. It is also clear that the nature o f that interac­
tion can only be grasped if  the accumulation balances are disaggregated. The grad­
ual decline o f  the aggregate savings ratio from period I to II and III was particularly 
due to the fall o f the public sector savings ratios. The further fall o f  the aggregate 
ratio in period IV, however, was the result o f  a sharp decline in the private sector 
savings ratios; public sector savings recovered considerably in this period.
The mild fluctuations o f the aggregate investment ratio over periods I to IV 
are the outcome of considerable changes in the composition: the share o f  the private 
sector declined and that o f  the public sector, and in particular o f state enterprises, 
increased.
The most recent period, period V, turned these patterns upside down. The 
sharp rise in the aggregate investment ratio was entirely due to the recovery o f  pri­
vate investment; the public sector investment ratios declined sharply. The sharp rise 
o f the aggregate savings ratio was due to a recovery o f private sector savings and a 
dramatic rise o f  public sector savings.
In all periods, one can discern a relationship between the trends in the sec­
toral savings and investment ratios and the external capital flows received by the 
sector. The sharp rise in capital inflows in periods II and III was associated with a 
rise in public sector investments and a decline in the public sector savings ratio. The 
increase in capital inflows in the most recent period gave rise to a quite different 
pattern: the public sector savings deficit was turned into a surplus and private sector 
investments increased substantially.
The differential reactions o f the various sectors to external financial shocks 
not only affect the level o f  sectoral savings and investment ratios, but also affect the 
size and direction o f domestic intersectoral flows o f funds.
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O f course, in principle, for each sector the sources of funds should equal 
the uses of funds The flow of funds analysis looks at the flows in each year rather 
than at stocks of assets or liabilities at the beginning or end of the year. The sources 
of funds for each of the sectors can be listed as:
own savings;
increase in credit from financial institutions;
change in other domestic liabilities and transfers received; and
foreign liabilities incurred.
And the uses of these funds can be split up over:
own investments;
• acquisition of financial assets with financial institutions; 
acquisition of other domestic financial assets; and 
acquisition of foreign financial assets.
We can write for the sectors of household and unincorporated business (h), 
private corporations (c), central and local government (g), state enterprises (s) and 
for the domestic financial sector (f):
+ FLF/, + OFL/, + WFL/, = I/, + FAF/, + OF A/, + WFA/, (5.1)
Sc + FLFC + OFLc + WFLC = Ic + FAFC + OF Ac + WFAc (5.2)
Sg + FLFg + OFLg + WFLg =  Ig  +  FAFg + OFAg + W FAg (5.3)
S5  + FLF5 + OFLy + WFLV = 15:+  FAF5  + OF A,s + WFA.V ( 5 4 )
S /+  FAF/, + FAFC + FAFg + FAFS + O F L /+  W FL/ 
I /+  FLF/,+ FLFC+ FLFg + FLFS + O F A /+  W F A / (5.5)
SE:
FI;
In these equations:
S; = own savings of sector: i = h, c, g, s and f.
Ij =  own investment of each sector.
FLF, = financial liabilities incurred with financial institutions, i.e.,
funds obtained by the sector from domestic financial 
institutions (e.g. loans from banks).
OFL, = other financial liabilities incurred, i.e., funds obtained by the
sector from domestic non-financial sectors (e.g. share capital 
acquired by corporations or government transfers to state 
enterprises).
WFL, = financial liabilities incurred with the rest of the world (e.g.
foreign loans).
FAF/ = -financial assets acquired with financial institutions (e.g.
deposits or promissory notes).
OF A / = other domestic financial assets acquired (e.g. equity shares).
WFA, = foreign financial assets acquired.
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Equations 5.1 to 5.5 can be directly traced back to the MSAFs of Chapter 2 
(sec Tables 2.1 and 2.2). For instance, the left-hand side of Equation 5.1 includes, at 
a slightly higher level of aggregation, the elements of row 13 of the MSAF, while 
the right-hand side includes the elements of column 13. The same applies to the 
other equations. The MSAFs provide more detail than the equations: for example, 
the FLFh o f Equation 5.1 combines liabilities incurred from commercial banks and 
other financial institutions. The simplifications and aggregations of the present 
equations are necessary to construct consistent time series.
These equations can be simplified by netting out the other financial assets 
and liabilities and the foreign assets and liabilities.
NOFL/ = OFL/ -  OFA/ (5.6)
NW FL/ = WFL, -  WFA, (5.7)
Introducing Equations 5.6 and 5.7 into 5 .1 to 5.5 leads to:
HH: S /, + FLF/, + NOFL/, + NWFL/, = I h + f a f  /, (5.8)
CORP: Sc + FLFC + NO FLc + NW FLC = Ic + F AFC (5.9)
GVT: Sg  + FLFg + NOFLg + NW FLg= Ig + FAFg (5.10)
SE: S.y + FLF.y + N O FLs + NWFLy = l.v + FAFy (5.11)
FI: S /+ F A F /, + FA FC + FAFg + FAF, 
= I /+  FLF/,+ FLFC+ FLFg + FLF.y
„• + NOFL/ + NWFL/-
(5.12)
When the five equations, 5.8 to 5.12. arc added up. the domestic financial 
intermediation variables disappear because the domestic assets acquired by one 
sector (FAF and OFA) are equal to the domestic liabilities (FLF and OFL) incurred 
by another sector. Summing up gives:
S/, + Sc + Sg  + S.y + NWFL/, + NW FLC + NW FLg + NWFL.y 
= 1)7 + Ic + Ig + h  (5.13)
which is the familiar accumulation balance equation, equivalent to Equation 4 .1 of 
Chapter 4.
These equations are, in principle, identities. However, in actual estimation 
of the balance of sources and uses, statistical discrepancies will emerge. The data 
sources available to fill in the equation system 5.8 to 5.12 are the National Accounts 
and the Flow'-of-Funds Accounts. In principle, Thailand's Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
give all the information required, but there are three problems. First, the Accounts 
do not cover the entire period of our analysis. Complete Accounts are available up 
to 1983, and for the years 1984-1990 provisional accounts are available. Second, the 
Flow-of-Funds Accounts are still based on the old National Accounts; the revision 
o f the National Accounts that was published in 1987 showed considerable
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adjustments, particularly in the estimates of savings. The estimates of sectoral 
savings as obtained from the Flow-of-Funds Accounts are, therefore, not fully 
comparable with the estimates of the National Accounts A sim ilar problem is found 
in the estimates of foreign capital flows. The Flow-of-Funds Accounts measure 
changes in assets and in liabilities, whereas Balance-of-Paymcnls estimates measure 
the flows of foreign finance. There can be substantial differences between the two 
concepts. Some of the capital inflows do not create a liability (for example, direct 
foreign investment) and the value of foreign assets or liabilities may change w ithout 
any related capital flow (for example, as a result of exchange rate variations)
To maintain consistency with earlier chapters and with the revised 
National Accounts, wc have taken as benchmarks the savings and investment as 
defined in Chapter 4. based on the National Accounts, and the capital flows, as de­
fined in Chapter 3, based on the capital account of the balance of payments, and we 
have used Flow-of-Funds Accounts and financial statistics to obtain estimates for 
the other variables that would be consistent. The results arc represented in Tables
5.1, 5.2 and 5.3. In the Appendix to this chapter, the construction of these tables is 
explained.
The N ature of the Thai Capital M arket
Tables 5 .1. 5.2 and 5.3 contain, once again, capital (lows that were already 
analyzed in Chapter 3 and the savings and investment estimates discussed in 
Chapter 4. The sourccs-and-uscs of funds picture in the tables is completed by the 
financial intermediation variables. The analysis here will concentrate on these vari­
ables.
“Capital market,” as used in the title of this section, refers to a wide con­
cept. including all channels of direct and indirect financial intermediation. Direct 
financial intermediation refers to transactions between institutional sectors, for ex­
ample. households providing share capital to corporations, corporations providing 
trade credit to households or state enterprises, or government making capital trans­
fers to the stale enterprises (these arc all part of NOFL in Equations 5.8 to 5.12). 
Indirect financial intermediation refers to intersectoral transfers that are channeled 
through financial institutions, and include the official domestic financial system 
(FAF and FLF of Equations 5.8 to 5.12). the informal financial markets, and the 
international financial markets. The transactions conducted on informal financial 
markets will, to a considerable extent, be intra-sectoral transfers, i.e., transfers 
within the household sector, which are not recorded in the intersectoral flows of 
funds. To the extent that they are transfers between sectors, they are included in the 
NOFL-term. The international financial markets are reflected in the NWFL-term of 
the equations, but this term includes direct transfers (foreign investments) as well as 
intermediation through international financial institutions (see the Appendix to this 
chapter).
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T abic 5.1 Public Sector: Sources and Uses of Funds (as percentage of GDP)
period averages
period period period period period
I II III IV V
1970-74 1975-79 1980-82 1983 86 1987-90
CENTRAL AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT
SO URCESO F FUNDS
1 Savings 2.09 2.02 0.80 0 .49 5.94
2 T o tal financial liabilities 2.82 1.85 3.22 2.94 -1.82
2.1 Dom estic liab. through fin. interm ediaries 2.60 2.26 3.86 3.01 -0.24
2.2  N et o ther dom estic liabilities 0.12 -1.13 -1.62 -0.71 -1.28
2.3  N et foreign financial liabilities 0.09 0.72 0.98 0.63 -0.30
T O T A L  SO U R CES 4.91 3.87 4.02 3.43 4.12
USES OF FUNDS
1 Investment 4.24 3 .87 3.85 3.05 2.31
2 Dom estic fin. assets with fin. interm ediaries 0.67 -0.00 0.18 0.38 1.81
T O T A L  USES 4.91 3.87 4.02 3.43 4.12
STATE ENTERPRISES
SOURCES OF FUNDS
1 Savings 1.37 0.90 0.93 2.04 2.73
2 T otal financial liabilities 0.39 2.46 4.12 3.57 1.37
2.1 Dom estic liab. through fin. interm ediaries 0.04 0.22 0.39 -0.00 0.18
2.2  N et o ther dom estic liabilities 0.17 1.10 1.08 2.58 1.63
2.3 N et foreign financial liabilities 0.18 1.13 2.65 0.99 -0.44
TO TA L SO U R CE S 1.76 3.35 5.05 5.60 4.10
USES OF FUNDS
1 Investm ent 1.63 3.05 4 80 5.26 3.44
2 Dom estic fin. assets with fin. interm ediaries 0.13 0.31 0.25 0.34 0.66
T O T A L  USES 1.76 3.35 5.05 5.60 4.10
TOTAL PUBLIC SECTOR
SOURCES O F FUNDS
1 Savings 3.47 2.92 1.73 2.52 8.68
2 Total financial liabilities 3.21 4.30 7.34 6.50 -0.46
2.1 Dom estic liab through fin. interm ediaries 2.64 2.48 4.25 3.01 -0.06
2.2 N et o ther dom estic liabilities 0.30 -0.03 -0.54 1.87 0.35
2.3 N et foreign financial liabilities 0.27 1.86 3.63 1.62 -0.74
T O T A L  SO U R C E S 6.67 7.22 9.07 9.03 8.22
USES OF FUNDS
1 Investm ent 5.87 6.92 8.65 8.31 5.74
2 Dom estic fin. assets w ith fin. interm ediaries 0.80 0.30 0.42 0.72 2.48
T O T A L  USES 6.67 7.22 9.07 9.03 8.22
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T able 5.2 Private Sector: Sources and Uses of Funds (as percentage of G DP)
period averages
period period period period period
I II 111 IV V
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983 86 1987 90
HOUSEHOLD SECTOR
SOURCES OF FUNDS
1 Savings 10.08 10.32 10.81 9 .49 9 .38
2 T o tal financial liabilities -1.29 -0.67 1.47 3.74 10.81
2.1 Dom estic liab. through fin. interm ediaries 1.33 3.68 2.67 3.32 7.53
2.2 Net other dom estic liabilities -2.63 -4.35 -1.20 0.43 3.28
2.3 Net foreign financial liabilities 0.00 0.00 0 .00 0 .00 0 .00
T O T A L  SO U R CES 8.79 9.65 12.28 13.23 20.19
USES OF FUNDS
1 Investment 3.27 3.35 3.26 3.98 6 .07
2 Dom estic fin. assets w ith fin. interm ediaries 5.52 6.30 9.02 9.25 14.12
T O T A L  USES 8.79 9.65 12.28 13.23 20 .19
PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
SOURCES OF FUNDS
1 Savings 8.26 8.55 7.86 7.30 10.16
2 T otal financial liabilities 6.38 6.63 5.44 4.39 9 .78
2.1 D om estic liab. through fin. interm ediaries 3.45 3.90 3.60 4.78 10.65
2.2 N et other dom estic liabilities 1.29 1.03 -1.08 -2.75 -7.62
2.3 Net foreign financial liabilities 1.64 1.70 2.92 2.35 6 .75
T O T A L  SO U R CES 14.63 15.17 13.30 11.69 1 9 9 3
USES OF FUNDS
1 Investm ent 13.96 14.24 12.54 11.21 17.49
2 Dom estic fin. assets with fin. interm ediaries 0.67 0 .94 0 .76 0 .48 2 .44
T O T A L  U SES 14 63 15.17 13.30 11.69 19.93
TOTAL PRIVATE SECTOR
SOURCES OF FUNDS
1 Savings 18.34 18.87 18.67 16.79 19.54
2 Total financial liabilities 5.08 5.96 6.91 8.13 20 .58
2.1 Dom estic liab. through fin. interm ediaries 4.78 7.58 6 .27 8 .10 18.18
2.2  N et o ther dom estic liabilities -1.34 -3.32 -2.27 -2.32 -4 .34
2.3 N et foreign financial liabilities 1.64 1.70 2.92 2 .35 6.75
T O T A L  SO U R CES 23.42 24.83 25.58 24 .92 40.12
USES OF FUNDS
1 Investment 17.24 17.59 15.80 15.19 23 .56
2 Dom estic fin. assets w ith fin. interm ediaries 6.19 7.24 9.78 9 .73 16.56
T O T A L  U SES 23.42 24  83 25.58 24 .92 40 .12
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Table 5.3 Financial Institutions: Sources and Uses of Funds (as percentage  
o f GDP)
period averages
period period period period period
I II III IV V
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983-86 1987-90
SOURCES O F FUNDS
Domestic liabilities 6.98 7.54 10.21 10.45 19.04
Net other domestic sources 1.16 1.12 0.82 1.51 2.38
Net foreign liabilities -0.72 1.40 -0.51 -0.85 -3.30
T O T A L  SO U R CES 7.42 10.06 10.52 11.11 18.12
USES OF FUNDS
Domestic financial assets 7.42 10.06 10.52 11.11 18.12
T O T A L  U SES 7.42 10.06 10.52 11.11 18.12
Direct financial transfers between sectors are generally difficult to trace. A 
main element of these transfers is the acquisition of corporate equity by households. 
These transfers can take various forms: controlling families may directly transfer 
additional funds to corporations, corporations may issue shares on the stock market, 
and corporations may retain profits which will be reflected in an increased value of 
own capital. There is an official registration of corporations for which the 
“authorized capital” is recorded (see Bank of Thailand quarterly). Increases in 
authorized capital occur as new corporations are registered or as already registered 
corporations increase their capital, but it is not known to what extent increases in 
“authorized” capital are indeed translated into increases in “paid-up” capital. The 
registered increase in “authorized” capital in 1975, for instance, was 4.8 billion 
baht, while the MSAF for 1975 records the actual transfer of 3.1 billion baht of 
“paid-up” equity capital from the household sector to the private corporations (see 
cell 14,13 of Table 2.1). For 1985 the registered increase in authorized equity was 
48 billion baht and the MSAF85 records an actual rise in share capital of 25 billion 
baht (see Table 2.2).
The increase in share capital of 25 billion baht in 1985 compares to an in­
crease in outstanding loans of domestic financial institutions to the corporations of 
about 30 billion baht (see MSAF85, Table 2.2). The debt-equity ratio (or gearing 
ratio) of Thai corporations has, on average, been relatively high. Estimates for the 
late 1970s and early 1980s range between 2.5:1 to 4:1 (see Vongvipanond 1980 and 
the World Bank 1983). There are indications that the ratio has been declining in 
recent years. This is to be explained from the boom at SET, which made it more 
feasible and attractive to expand share capital.
SET was established in 1975 but led a rather subdued life until 1986. In re­
cent years, the booming economy and the inflow of foreign portfolio investment (see 
data in Chapter 3) gave a major impetus for the development of the market. The to­
tal market capitalization of private corporate stock was valued at 29 billion baht in 
1982 and at 49 billion in 1985. By 1988, this had increased to 224 billion and, by
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the end of 1989, to 660 billion baht. This rapid increase is the result of an increase 
in the number of listed corporations (from 81 in 1982 to 175 in 1989), a growing 
number of new share issues and a strong growth of the share prices as reflected in 
the SET index (which increased from 135 in 1985 to 879 in 1989).
Financial intermediation through financial institutions has grown very 
rapidly. The broad money supply as percentage of GDP stood, in 1988, at 65. This 
is quite high. O f the about 100 developing countries listed in the World 
Development Report 1990 (World Bank 1990), only six had a higher ratio than 
Thailand. There has been a longstanding process of financialization of savings. 
Figure 5.1 expresses financial savings (i.e., the increase in M2-balanccs and the in­
crease in M3-balances, i.e., M2 plus holdings of promissory notes of finance com­
panies) as a percentage of total savings. The ratio was between 30 and 40 percent 
for most o f the 1970s, but increased significantly in the 1980s.
dM03/S = growth M03/Gross Domestic Savings 
dM02/S = growth M02/Gross Domestic Savings
Figure 5.1 Financialization of Savings
The rapid growth and the comparatively high level of money holdings or 
financial savings can be explained from three factors (see Jansen 1990, Chapter 4 
for a more detailed analysis). The major factor is the rapid growth of incomes that 
occurred. Second, the rapid growth of the financial system, in particular the exten­
sion of the branch network of banks over the whole country, has made access to 
banking services much easier. A third factor is that inflation has always been mod­
est in Thailand, so that people were not adverse to holding money balances. The 
real interest rate on deposits was, in general, positive, although not very high in 
most years
The official financial system is dominated by commercial banks. There are 
15 Thai-owned banks and 14 foreign-owned banks. Thai banks account for about 95 
percent o f all bank assets. The banks were established by business families and
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groups to look after the financial interests of the groups. The major banks still 
maintain close links to founder families and to the corporations of these families in 
the various sectors of the Thai economy (see Phipatscritham and Yoshihara 1983 
and Suehiro 1989). This factor accounts for the close links between the financial 
sector and the dominant elements of the private corporate sector.
The commercial bank system is highly concentrated. The four largest 
banks account for about 65 percent o f all bank assets The other main element of the 
official financial system, the finance and security corporations, are not really 
competitive with the banks. There were, in 1989, 94 finance companies, but the ma­
jor ones of these are affiliated to domestic banks.
The concentration is not only characteristic of the financial system itself, 
but also of its relations with the rest of the economy. As the MSAFs show, the major 
share of banks' resources come from household deposits. But these are not the 
pooled savings of a large number of small savers. The many accounts of small sav­
ers bring in only a small share of total funds. The top one percent of accounts bring 
the banks more than half of all their deposit funds. Most of the resources o f the 
financial institutions are, therefore, obtained from a very small number o f very rich 
households. There is also a strong concentration on the credit side of the banks' 
books. In 1980, 5,590 customers accounted for 58 percent o f total loan value (World 
Bank 1983). The Thai financial system is, thus, part of a closely knit network of 
wealthy business families, corporations and financial institutions in which relations 
of business, finance and kinship interact. The importance of this observation, for the 
study of intersectoral flows, is the fact that there is intense interaction between the 
wealthy top of the household sector, private corporations and financial institutions. 
In terms of financial intermediation, this interaction may exist in transfers of equity 
capital, trade credit, and bank deposits and loans.
The sectoral allocation of commercial bank credit is given in Table 5.4. 
Comparing the 1970s with the 1980s, the striking feature is that the share of the 
agricultural sector increased, despite the rapid decline of the share of the sector in 
total output. This pattern is caused by policy interventions instituted since 1975 im­
posing a mandatory lending by banks to agriculture. To some extent, this trend 
compensates for the observed neglect of the agricultural sector by international 
finance. More in line with the changing composition of output is the increasing 
share of the manufacturing sector in bank credit.
The declining share of foreign trade in the banks' loan portfolio is the best 
indicator of the changing nature of the banking business. As stated, banks emerged 
to serve the financial interests of major trading families. Gradually, however, these 
families, and the banks affiliated with them, have diversified their activities into 
manufacturing. The outcome of these processes is that, in the 1980s, bank credit 
was concentrated on the manufacturing sector (about 25 percent of all credit), on 
international trade and domestic trade finance (together about 35 percent) and on 
construction and real estate (about 10 percent). The allocation of loans of finance 
companies was not much different from that of banks: close to 25 percent for the 
manufacturing sector, 16 percent for construction and real estate, 15 percent for 
international and domestic trade, and close to 20 percent for personal consumption 
(mainly hire purchase).
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Table 5.4 Sectoral Breakdown of Com m ercial Bank Credit
(percentage distribution)
period period period period period
I 11 III IV V
1970-74 1975-79 1980-82 1983-86 1987-90
A griculture 2.12 4.73 6.35 7.45 6.61
M ining 1.13 0.75 0.69 0.60 0.51
M anufacturing 16.48 18.65 20.70 22 .36 25 .05
C onstruction 5.41 4.88 5.19 5.46 4.18
Real estate 5.16 3.35 2.82 3.48 7.90
Im ports 17100 13.26 10.26 7.06 5.18
Exports 10.05 11.99 10.21 8.41 7.65
W holesale and retail trade 23.85 22.06 23.26 23.59 18.63
Public utilities 1.21 1.87 2 .39 1.67 1.72
Banks and o ther financial institutions 4.32 6.11 5.63 6 .16 6.60
Services 5.28 4.07 4.52 5.03 5.68
Personal consum ption 7.95 8.24 7.95 8.74 10.29
O thers 0.04 0.04 - - -
Total 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00 100.00
The allocation of domestic credit can be compared to the allocation of in­
ternational capital inflows that was discussed in Chapter 3, where it was observed 
that a considerable part of foreign capital was received by the public utilities sector 
(electricity, gas and water, and transport and communications), a sector that has 
only a minor position in the loan portfolio of domestic financial institutions. 
Foreign capital inflows received by the private sector went predominantly to the 
manufacturing sector and, to a lesser extent, to financial institutions, domestic 
trade, construction and services. This allocation is quite comparable to the credit 
from domestic financial institutions.
One factor that may have contributed to the rapid growth of the official 
financial system is the gradual replacement of informal financial markets and trans­
actions by the official financial institutions.
The informal or unregulated financial market was certainly important in 
Thailand, as in many other developing countries. It can be separated into an urban 
and a rural segment. There is little information available on the urban segment. The 
Household Savings Survey conducted by the Bank of Thailand in 1980 concluded 
that households in municipal areas obtained 61 percent of their total liabilities from 
official financial institutions and 39 percent from informal sources (Kirakul 1986).
The rural credit market in Thailand has been the subject of more research 
(see Thisyamondol, Arromdee and Long 1965 [hereafter TAL 1965]; Onchan, 
Chalamwong and Aungsumalin 1974 [hereafter OCA 1974]; and Kirakul 1986). 
The Agricultural Economic Research Division (AERD) of the Office of Agricultural 
Economics has also collected data on farmers' loans. From these studies, the follow­
ing stylized facts may be derived.
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Most farm households are indebted, but there appears to have been sharp 
shifts in the origin of credit received by farm households. Breaking down the total 
value of credit by its origin shows:
TAL
(1962/3)
(%)
OCA
(1974)
(%)
AERD
(1980/1)
(%)
AERD
(1986/7)
(%)
Relatives and neighbors 47 49 25 13
Commercial lenders 46 29 21 17
Official financial institutions 5 23 54 70
Total value of loans 100 100 100 100
Commercial lenders include landlords, local stores, crop buyers and 
money-lenders. The various studies are not comparable in terms of coverage and lo­
cation, but the trend over time suggested by the three sources is clear and is also 
confirmed by other studies. The enormous increase in the role of official financial 
institutions, among which the Bank for Agriculture and Agricultural Cooperatives 
(BAAC) is dominant, is confirmed by monetary statistics on the sectoral allocation 
of commercial bank credit (see Table 5 .4). This pattern of change also applies to the 
non-agricultural rural sector. Onchan (1985) presented data on the sources of funds 
of non-farm enterprises. In 1965 such firms depended more on the unregulated 
money market than on the official financial institutions. By 1978 both the smaller 
and the larger non-farm enterprises depended mainly on official sources of credit.
The role of commercial lenders remains very important. In Thailand the 
role of the professional money-lender is comparatively small; the commercial lend­
ers are predominantly traders, rice millers, etc. Quite often these commercial lend­
ers are, in turn, borrowers themselves from the banks.
The relative size of the unregulated money market is difficult to assess. 
TAL (1965) used their estimate of the average indebtedness of the households in 
their sample to calculate a total rural indebtedness in Thailand of 9 billion baht, of 
which 95 percent came from the unregulated market. The size of the urban unregu­
lated money market in that year is unknown. In 1963 total credit extended by offi­
cial financial institutions to the urban and rural private sector also amounted to 
around 9 billion baht, so that the unregulated and the official market segments were 
more or less of the same size. The Bank of Thailand's Household Savings Survey 
reported a total indebtedness of rural and urban households on the informal market 
of 47 billion baht in 1980, equivalent to about 17 percent of the credit extended by 
official financial institutions to the entire private sector.
Taken at face value, these estimates indicate that the unregulated money 
market, when corrected for inflation, is hardly growing. Relating the estimates of 
outstanding rural/agricultural non-official credit to total agricultural GDP gives a 
proportion falling from 36 percent in 1963 to 29 percent in 1970 and 14 percent in 
1980 and 1986. All these figures and proportions are based on very rough estimates, 
but the trend seems to be clear: the unregulated money market is relatively stagnant 
and a rapidly expanding official credit market is taking care of a growing share of 
credit. It is likely that in more recent years this trend has been further extended. 
Some crashes of informal loan schemes have undermined public confidence and the 
access to official institutions has become easier and more attractive.
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The Thai capital market is relatively “open.” There are official controls on 
capital outflows, but these are more to register and monitor than to regulate or re­
strict. The domestic capital market is increasingly integrated with world markets 
and increasingly sensitive to market signals. As was analyzed in Chapter 3, direct 
investments and portfolio investments came to Thailand in recent years when pros­
pects for returns were comparatively attractive. Large public and private corpora­
tions have taken up long-term and short-term loans at international financial m ar­
kets when domestic credit was in short supply or relatively expensive. Also, the 
financial institutions are in contact with international markets to manage the 
foreign exchange reserves (Bank of Thailand) or to borrow reserves to expand the 
domestic credit supply (banks and other financial institutions; see Tables 2.7 and 
2.8 of Chapter 2, which show the increasing level of financial linkages between the 
two MSAFs). As was discussed in Chapter 3, in the mid-1970s access to interna­
tional financial markets increased because of a number of supply-side factors, and 
the performance of the Thai economy since then has been such as to maintain that 
access.
These close interactions force the domestic interest rate to stay close to the 
world's interest rate. On a perfectly open capital market, one would expect the do­
mestic interest rate to be equal to the international rate plus the cost o f forward 
cover of the foreign exchange risk. In Figure 5.2, we compare the Thai interbank 
rate, as the closest proxy of the money market rate, with the three-month LIBOR 
rate. The similarity in the underlying medium-term trends of the two rates supports 
the hypothesis o f the openness of Thai financial markets. The short-term deviations 
between the two rates can be explained from instabilities on the foreign exchange 
markets and from monetary policy interventions. Prior to the devaluations of the 
baht in 1980 and 1984, expectations of the coming devaluation forced the domestic 
rate in 1980 and 1983 significantly ahead of international interest rates. The rela­
tively low domestic interest rates in 1981, 1982, 1984, 1986 and 1987 and the rela­
tively high rates in 1985, 1988 and 1989 may have been due to a respectively easy 
and tight monetary policy in those years. These policy aspects will be discussed in 
more detail in Chapter 6.
Sources and Uses of Funds
In Table 5.1, the sources and uses of funds of the public sector are pre­
sented as percentages of GDP. Averages for the five periods are given, so as to focus 
on medium-term trends rather than on short-term fluctuations.
The growing dependence of the public sector on foreign finance, as estab­
lished in Chapter 4, is also shown here. Foreign capital inflows contributed an in ­
creasing share of total sources for the sector; the level of inflows increased from pe­
riod I to II and from II to III. In period III the level o f inflows was particularly high. 
It fell drastically in period IV and even turned negative (i.e., a net repayment of 
debt) in the final years. Combined with these capital inflows was an increase in the 
public investment ratio and a fall in the public savings ratio. The cutback in capital 
inflows in period IV and the disappearance of the inflows in period V were ac­
companied by a fall in the public investment ratio and an increase in the savings 
ratio. These trends suggest that public sector foreign capital inflows encouraged 
public investments and discouraged public savings.
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Figure 5.2 Dom estic and International Interest Rates
The gap between public savings and investments over the first four periods, 
however, was much larger than the foreign loans received. To fill the growing gap, 
the demand for domestic funds increased rapidly. In the period 1980-1982, almost 
half of all funds of the public sector came from the domestic financial system. In the 
next period, this claim on domestic financial resources declined somewhat, but still 
remained high. It was only in the last period that it reduced drastically and, in fact, 
turned negative.
The data in Table 5.1 allow us to disaggregate the public sector picture 
over the government and the state enterprise sectors. It is clear that the main share 
of capital inflows was directed at the state enterprise sector. Also, the increase in the 
public sector investment ratio is entirely due to the trend in the state enterprise 
investment ratio; the government investment ratio shows, in fact, a declining trend 
over the entire five periods. The increase in the state enterprise investment ratio 
continued into the fourth period, when the capital inflows had been substantially re­
duced. The state enterprise savings ratio was quite low in periods II and III, recover­
ing somewhat in period IV.
The result o f these patterns was that the savings-investment gap o f the sec­
tor was very wide throughout periods II, III and IV. In the first two of these periods, 
more than half of that gap was financed by foreign loans. In period IV the contribu­
tion of foreign funds was reduced and domestic sources had to fill the gap. The state 
enterprise sector has never drawn very heavily on the domestic financial system; the
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domestic liabilities through the financial intermediaries have always been quite 
modest. The main domestic source of funds has been the “net other domestic li­
abilities,” which in this case consisted mainly of government transfers. The level of 
these transfers was particularly high in period IV, when the investment ratio was 
still very high and the savings ratio, although improved in comparison to the earlier 
period, was not high enough to compensate for the decline in capital inflows.
The years 1987-1990 show a drastic break with the earlier periods. State 
enterprise investments fell drastically and the savings ratio improved further, so that 
the dependence on foreign funds totally disappeared and the dependence 011 “other 
domestic liabilities” (i.e., government transfers) significantly diminished.
The pattern in the government sector was quite different. Although most of 
the public sector's foreign loans ended up with the state enterprises, the government 
sector also experienced an increase in capital inflows in period II and III. This, 
however, did not invite an increase in the government investment ratio. In fact, that 
ratio more or less continuously declined over the two decades studied here. There 
occurred a severe fall in the government savings ratio, particularly in periods III 
and IV. The fall in the savings ratio exceeded the decline in the investment ratio 
and the savings gap was quite substantial in periods III and IV.
The government sector's savings gap was largely filled with funds from the 
domestic financial system. Government liabilities with financial institutions in­
creased sharply in period III and remained very high in the next period. The “net 
other domestic liabilities” of the government were negative, showing an acquisition 
of assets rather than an accumulation of liabilities. In view of what has been ob­
served regarding the state enterprise sector, it can be suggested that a substantial 
part of these outflows were capital transfers to state enterprises. Associated with the 
capital transfers, there may also have been current transfers from the government to 
the state enterprises to help them cover operating losses. The need for such transfers 
may have reduced the government's ability to generate savings.
As in the case of state enterprises, the final period showed a dramatic turn­
around. The government investment ratio continued to fall, but the savings ratio in­
creased so sharply that the dependence on foreign and domestic funds totally disap­
peared.
It may be concluded that the years 1975-1982 can be called the public sec­
tor's “foreign-loan boom period.” In those years the public sector investment ratio 
increased. This increase was financed from capital inflows and also from an in­
creased claim on domestic financial resources. This aggregate picture was the result 
o f the state enterprise sector doing most of the foreign borrowing and accounting for 
most of the investment growth, and the government sector doing most of the do­
mestic borrowing.
In the adjustment period, 1983-1986, capital inflows were cut, but invest­
ment remained high and the improvement in the savings ratio was not sufficient to 
compensate for the loss of foreign funds. The result was a high claim on domestic 
financial resources. Only in the last period did the public sector boom come to a 
definite and spectacular end. In those years public sector investment, o f both gov­
ernment and state enterprises, fell substantially and the savings ratios improved 
dramatically. The result was that the public sector showed a savings surplus.
In Table 5.2, the sources and uses of funds of the private sector are given. 
Foreign capital inflows to the private sector started to increase only in periods III
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and IV. In contrast with the public sector pattern, the rise in capital inflows to the 
private sector was not associated with an increased investment ratio. In fact, the 
private investment ratio was very low in those years. The private sector savings ra­
tio was quite stable over the five periods, with the exception of period IV, when it 
was very low. The outcome of these savings and investment patterns was that the 
private sector savings surplus was very high in period III, just when the public sec­
tor's savings deficit was at its highest. The private savings surplus declined some­
what in period IV, but remained at a substantial level.
It is assumed that all capital inflows into the private sector are received by 
corporations. Although private capital inflows were higher in periods III and IV 
than they had been in earlier periods, the corporate investment ratio was lower and 
the corporate savings ratio fell somewhat. Looking at the other sources of funds, it 
is observed that the domestic financial liabilities which corporations incurred with 
financial institutions were relatively constant over the periods, so that the main 
compensation for the increase in foreign capital inflows in periods III and IV was in 
the fall in “other domestic liabilities” of the corporations. These net other liabilities 
were positive in periods I and II, meaning an inflow of resources (for example, in 
the form of share capital), but in periods III and IV they turned negative, indicating 
that firms obtained assets rather than incurred liabilities. It is clear that periods III 
and IV were very difficult years for private corporations.
The last period shows a sharply different pattern. Foreign capital inflows 
increased further and reached a very high level. Not only the level of private capital 
inflows, but also its composition, changed drastically in these years with direct and 
portfolio investments taking the major share. In this period the increase in capital 
inflows was indeed associated with a sharp recovery of the corporate investment ra­
tio. Also, the corporate savings ratio improved, in contrast to the public sector's ex­
perience where the capital inflow boom had been associated with a fall in the sav­
ings ratios. The provisional flow-of-fund data for this final period suggest that the 
investment boom led to a sharp increase in the demand of private corporations for 
domestic credit. The data also show that corporations used a significant part of their 
resources to obtain “other financial assets,” which is somewhat difficult to under­
stand and may be due to the provisional nature of the data.
The averages of the household sector savings and investment ratio were 
relatively stable over the first four periods and increased rapidly in the final period. 
The savings surplus of the household sector hovered around 7 percent o f GDP in 
periods I, II and III. but declined in period IV and even more so in period V when 
the investment ratios started to increase and savings ratios stayed behind. Still, even 
in those periods, a substantial savings surplus remained. The households used the 
surplus to obtain financial assets with financial institutions (deposits and promis­
sory notes) and other domestic financial assets (shares, trade credit, etc.), probably 
mainly with the private corporate sector. In period III the acquisition of “other do­
mestic financial assets” dropped significantly and in periods IV and V there was 
even a net incurrence of “other financial liabilities” by households. Again, these 
trends are difficult to interpret and may be, as was observed in relation to the “other 
financial liabilities” of the private corporate sector, due to the provisional nature of 
the data. The household sector increased its financial assets with domestic financial 
institutions.
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Table 5.3 gives a summary of the sources and uses of funds of the financial 
institutions that is consistent with the data given in Tables 5.1 and 5.2. It can be ob­
served that the Thai financial system has not, on average, been a main channel 
through which foreign capital entered the country. Only in period II was there a 
substantial build-up of external liabilities to finance the expansion o f domestic 
credit in excess of the growth of financial savings. In all other periods, the growth 
of domestic financial savings exceeded the expansion of credit, allowing an 
accumulation of foreign reserves by financial institutions.
It should be noted, however, that the medium-term averages given in Table 
5.3 hide substantial year-to-year fluctuations in the net external position of the 
financial system. This was already shown in Table 2.8 in Chapter 2, which captured 
the considerable short-term fluctuations in the foreign financial assets and, even 
more, in the foreign financial liabilities of the Thai monetary system (i.e., the 
central bank and commercial banks). These short-term fluctuations suggest that the 
financial institutions use the foreign financial markets to balance their books. It has 
been suggested by other studies that the Thai financial system tends to follow the 
demand for credit. Fluctuations in the net external position of the banks seem to 
support that view. When credit demand is high, banks borrow abroad to supplement 
their loan capacity.
Tables 5.1 and 5.2, together with Table 5.3, suggest that financial institu­
tions obtain most o f their funds (around 80%) from the household sector and use the 
funds to give credit to the household sector (around 25%), the private corporate 
sector (around 40%) and the government (around 35%). State enterprises receive 
little credit from domestic banks. In the last period, however, this picture changed 
dramatically. The public sector's claim on domestic credit disappeared, so that all 
domestic financial resources could be allocated to support the private sector boom.
CROWDING-OUT OR CROWDING-IN?
It is interesting to study how the private sector reacted to the public sector 
loan boom. Initially, in period II, when the public sector's capital inflows were still 
modest, the private sector seemed to have benefited from the impulse these inflows 
and the related public investments generated. The private investment and savings 
ratios slightly increased in this period. But in the next periods, III and IV, the inter­
action was less positive. In period III the sharp increase in the public sector capital 
inflow and the related rise in public sector investment and fall in public sector sav­
ings were associated with a sharp fall in the private sector's investment ratio, while 
the private savings ratio remained more or less constant. In period IV, capital in­
flows to the public sector fell significantly, but the public investment ratio remained 
very high and the savings ratio improved only moderately. In this period the private 
investment ratio declined further.
In Figure 5.3, the trends of the public and private sector investment ratios 
are plotted. It is clear that in the early 1970s and in the 1980s the direction of 
change in the two ratios were almost always in opposite directions. Only in the late 
1970s was there less of a trade-off between the two ratios, which agrees with what 
was just observed about period II. The analysis allows us to say somewhat more 
about the channels along which such crowding-out would occur. The process is 
rather complex.
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Figure 5.3 Public and Private Sector Investm ent Ratios
In the first section of this chapter, we briefly summarized the literature 
which suggests that an increase in public sector investments may affect private in­
vestments in a number of ways. An increase in public spending may lead to an ac­
celeration of inflation, to higher interest rates or to stricter credit rationing, or to an 
appreciation of the real exchange rate. All these factors may make private invest­
ment plans less attractive or more difficult to realize. But crowding-in is also pos­
sible when private savings can be made to rise fast enough.
In Table 5.5, we have brought together some relevant economic indicators 
that can be used to trace the patterns of interaction between public spending and the 
private sector accumulation balance. The increase in capital inflows that occurred in 
period II and even more in period III led indeed to a rise in the level o f the overall 
investment ratio; the increase in the investment ratio was entirely due to an increase 
in public investment.
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T able 5.5 Adjustm ent Indicators, Thailand
period I period II period III period IV period V
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983 86 1987-90
N et capital inflows (as %  G D P) 1.9 3.6 6.5 4.0 6.0
Investm ent (as %  G D P) 23.1 24.5 24.5 23.5 29.3
Private investm ent (as % G D P) 17.2 17.6 15.8 15.2 23.6
Private savings (as %  G D P) 18.3 18.9 18.7 16.8 19.5
G row th ra te  real G D P (% per year) 5.8 8.0 5.1 5.7 11.2
Im plicit IC O R 4.0 3.1 4.8 4.1 2.6
D om estic inflation (%  per year) 1.4 3.7 6.9 2 .0 -0.2
Real exchange rate index (1970=  100) 97.4 91.4 89.2 97.4 94.5
R eal interest ra te  (% ) -1.9 4.4 6.1 10.1 5.4
Total governm ent debt (as %  G D P) 22.4 21.9 32.4 46.0 37 .9
External governm ent debt (as %  G D P) 4.2 6.4 14.7 22.3 18.9
Dom estic credit expansion (as %  G D P) 8.5 10.0 10.1 10.1 17.0
D CE, pub lic  sector (as %  G D P) 2.6 2.5 4.3 3.1 0.0
D C E, private sector (as %  G D P) 5.9 7.5 5.9 7.0 17.0
N otes: Dom estic inflation: increase in consum er prices m inus increase in import prices (w eighted  witli
im port quote) and m inus increase o f  export prices (weighted with export quote).
R eal exchange rate: nom inal exchange rate (baht per 1 US dollar) corrected for dom estic 
inflation (C PI) and  foreign inflation (U SA  W PI) and for change in effective im port duties (see 
D om busch and Helm ers 1988, p.393).
Real interest rate: nom inal interbank rate corrected for inflation (G D P  deflator).
D om estic credit expansion (D C E): growth in assets o f  financial system ; taken  from  Financial 
Survey o f  B ank o f  T hailand  (B O T , quarterly). Figures m ay  differ m arginally  from  those in 
T ables 5.1 and 5.2
Table 5.5 shows that the increase in public expenditures was associated 
with an acceleration of domestic inflation, first rather mildly in period II, but then 
more strongly in period III. Domestic inflation is measured as the increase in con­
sumer prices corrected for the impact o f international price changes. The real inter­
est rate (i.e., the nominal interbank rate minus the GDP deflator) also increased in 
both periods, and the real exchange rate appreciated. It should, however, be noted 
that a more detailed analysis shows that the main appreciation of the real exchange 
rate since 1970 occurred in the years 1973/74, i.e., before the loan boom period 
started. Since 1974, the degree of overvaluation of the baht remained more or less 
constant until 1984. We, thus, cannot say that the capital inflows caused the ap­
preciation, although it could be suggested that the access to international finance 
made the postponement of the exchange rate adjustment more feasible.
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There are also, however, significant differences between the adjustment 
patterns of the two periods. In period II the public sector investment ratio increased, 
but the private sector investment ratio also increased, albeit only marginally. In pe­
riod III the further increase of the public sector ratio was combined with a sharp 
decline in the private investment ratio. The government debt ratio rose substantially 
in the third period and the claims of the public sector on credits from the domestic 
financial institutions also expanded. The regressions of Chapter 4 suggested that, 
particularly, the high level of public investment reduced private corporate invest­
ment demand in this period, but increases in domestic inflation and in the real in­
terest rate that occurred in this period, and the sharp increase in the public sector's 
demand for domestic credit, also may well have crowded out private sector invest­
ments.
The indicators for period IV show the adjustment policy efforts. The real 
exchange rate index increased after the 1984 devaluation and the real interest rate 
increased to very high levels. The public sector savings gap was somewhat reduced 
but, since the inflow of foreign loans to the public sector fell sharply, the domestic 
public sector borrowing requirement expanded (see Table 5.1). It is, in that light, 
surprising that the share of the public sector in the domestic credit expansion was 
reduced. The public sector relied more on “other domestic liabilities” in this period. 
This trend enabled financial institutions to increase credit for the private sector, but 
this did not lead to an increase in private investment. It appears from Table 5.2 that 
the increase in credit merely compensated for the sharp fall in private savings.
The final period can be compared to periods II and III in the sense that, 
once again, capital inflows increased. But this time the composition of the flows 
was totally different. In period III capital inflows destined for the public sector ac­
counted for 56 percent of total inflows. In period IV that proportion was still 41 
percent, but in the last period more than 100 percent of the inflows were received by 
the private sector (more than 100 percent because the public sector, in fact, repaid 
debt rather than received new funds).
The increase in capital inflows was again associated with an increase in the 
investment ratio, but this time it was private investment that expanded; the public 
sector investment ratio declined sharply. The figures in Table 5.5 suggest that the 
reaction patterns were quite different in this period. The real interest rate fell 
sharply and the domestic credit creation expanded significantly. This apparent lib­
eralization of monetaiy policies was due to the high liquidity of the financial m ar­
kets that were flooded with the financial inflows (see, in Table 5.3, the rapid accu­
mulation o f foreign assets of financial institutions). The liquidity of the financial 
markets and the softening of monetary policies did not, however, result in an accel­
eration of inflation. In fact, the rate of domestic inflation was remarkably low for a 
country going through an investment boom. This was probably due to the extremely 
contractionary fiscal policies. With public investment falling and public savings 
rising, the public sector borrowing requirement turned negative.
In an inverse way, the final period provides strong support for the crowd­
ing-out hypothesis. The sharp fall in the public spending ratio was accompanied by 
a sharp rise in the private investment ratio. It should be recognized, however, that 
the relationships are more complex. It is not just the reduction in public spending 
that created the “space” for private investment.
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We referred to this period in Chapter 3. In Chapter 6, the policy reforms in 
these years will be analyzed in more detail. Three aspects are interlinking:
• The international currency realignments of the major world currencies 
in 1985 and the trade tensions between Japan and the United States led 
to an increase in direct foreign investment by Japan and the Asian 
NICs.
• The devaluation of the baht in 1984 and the depreciation of the baht 
vis-a-vis the yen since 1985 helped to make Thailand a main 
destination for these direct investments
• The change in public sector policies around that time meant that the 
increase in private investment that was associated with the inflow of 
foreign investment funds could be absorbed without immediate 
macroeconomic problems.
These factors together explain the recent years of rapid growth and low in­
flation. The current situation presents two macroeconomic problems. The first is 
that public investments may have been reduced to levels that are too low. There are 
indications that the supply of basic infrastructure and public services cannot keep 
pace with the expanding private sector. This would call for an increase in public 
sector investments.
The second problem is more fundamental since it is of a longer duration. It 
was observed in Chapter 4 that Thailand's savings ratio has always been com para­
tively low. In the last few years the private sector savings ratio recovered to a level 
slightly above the level it had in periods I, II and III, but this increase did not match 
the much stronger rise of the private sector investment ratio. The private sector 
savings gap, and with it the current-account deficit, rose to very high levels.
There is no indication that the private sector savings ratio is sensitive to 
the level o f the public sector debt burden. The private sector savings ratio and the 
ratio of government debt to GDP moved, over the period 1978-1989, clearly in 
opposite directions. The debt-neutrality hypothesis apparently does not hold in 
Thailand.
In summary, we can say that the interaction between public sector activity 
and the private sector is very' complex.
First, an increase in public investment may affect the need for private in­
vestment. Investment by government and state enterprises may be to take over ac­
tivities that used to be provided for by the private sector. O f course, this process can 
also be reversed. Particularly in the most recent years, there have been attempts at 
privatization, with the private sector assuming responsibility for activities previ­
ously conducted by the public sector.
Second, an increase in public investment may affect the desire for private 
investment when the growing role of the state dampens or increases private profit 
expectations. If the growth of public investment is associated with a rising domestic 
and external debt burden and an appreciation of the real exchange rate, or when 
financing demands of the state push up interest rates, the private sector's investment 
demand may weaken. Alternatively, the demand and supply conditions created by 
public investments may create profitable investment opportunities for the private 
sector.
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Third, a rise in public investment may affect the investment ability of the 
private sector. Public investment can forcefully reduce private investment when it 
places priority claims on scarce factors, such as foreign exchange, construction ca­
pacity, skilled personnel or domestic financial resources.
It is quite difficult to assess which of these factors hold true for Thailand. 
The first factor, the need for private investment, may be not so relevant for the pe­
riod of the public sector loan boom. Public investments in these years were largely 
confined to traditional public sector concerns, such as physical and social infrastruc­
ture and public utilities, activities that are supportive of rather than competitive 
with private sector activities. But the reverse case may be more relevant: the redress 
of the public sector in recent years has opened many opportunities for the private 
sector in activities that used to be dominated by the public sector.
In assessing the impact of public sector investment on the private sector's 
investment demand, one should realize that the level of desired investment is also 
dependent on other factors. Particularly in period III, when private investment 
dropped significantly, the external factors were quite ominous. The world economy 
in those years was shocked by a rise in oil prices and interest rates, and the growth 
of world trade stagnated, altogether resulting in a poor growth performance for 
Thailand during that period. One would expect such events to have a negative im ­
pact on private investment demand in an open economy like Thailand. In period IV, 
however, the world economy recovered somewhat, and one would have expected 
that this would have stimulated the private sector's investment demand. But, in fact, 
private investment fell deeper in those years. It is quite likely that in this period the 
deep macroeconomic imbalances of the Thai economy negatively affected the expec­
tations of the private sector. There was a large public sector deficit, a rising external 
debt burden and an overvalued currency. The real interest rate was high, partly due 
to the high public sector demand for domestic finance, partly to support the over­
valued baht.
There is relatively little evidence that the private sector could not realize 
the level of desired investment. There was no foreign exchange rationing and no 
apparent shortages on the construction or labor markets. Also, on the financial 
markets, the evidence of a forceful crowding-out of private-sector credit demand is 
not very convincing. As Table 5.2 shows, liabilities incurred by the private sector 
with domestic financial institutions, as a percentage of GDP, declined in period III, 
but recovered in the subsequent period. The “net other domestic liabilities” has a 
negative sign, indicating the acquisition of assets outside the private sector. If we 
concentrate on the patterns of the private corporate sector, we observe that the credit 
obtained from domestic financial institutions has been rather constant over the peri­
ods. The changes occurred in the foreign loans and in the “net other domestic liabil­
ities.” On the latter item, Table 5.2 shows that, while this ensured an inflow of re­
sources in periods I and II, in period III and IV corporations, on the whole, obtained 
assets rather than incurred liabilities. There is no indication that this shift was 
forced The main source for “other domestic liabilities” for the corporate sector is 
the household sector. Indeed, the acquisition of “other domestic assets” by house­
holds dropped significantly in periods III and IV, but not for lack of funds, because 
in those periods the household sector substantially increased its holdings of finan­
cial assets with financial institutions. As the links between the corporate and house­
hold sectors are direct and on a personal level, it could be suggested that, had corpo­
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rations wanted to invest more, they would have been able to obtain more resources 
from the household sector in the form of direct transfers, for example, in the form of 
share capital.
It can be concluded that the crowding-out that occurred in periods III and 
IV was caused more by the effects on the desire of the private sector to invest than 
on its ability to invest. O f course, period V also can be seen as a case of strong 
“crowding-out,” but in the reverse direction. Public sector policy led to a significant 
reduction of public sector investment and to an increase in savings. The public- 
sector savings deficit had been replaced by a surplus. The boost for private 
investment came, however, from another source. A strong increase in direct foreign 
investment, supported by a substantial currency depreciation, led to a rapid rise in 
private investments. The improvement in the public sector balance may have 
supported the confidence of private investors, and it certainly made possible the 
rapid expansion of private investment without too great a tension on domestic 
financial and real markets.
THE FISCAL SYSTEM
Earlier in this chapter, we presented the sources and uses of funds for each 
of the sectors. For the government sector, we wrote:
Sg + FLFg + NOFLg + NWFLg = Ig + FAFg (5.10)
Government savings are the difference between revenues (T) and current 
expenditures (Cg):
Sg  = T -  Cg (5.14)
so that we can rewrite Equation 5.10 as:
T - C g - I g  =  F A F g-F L F g-N O F L g-N W F L g (5.15)
where the left-hand side represents the total government budget and the right-hand 
side the composition of deficit financing. The deficit financing part has been ana­
lyzed in a previous section, but the budget part deserves more attention here.
The government budget is a channel through which burdens and resources 
are allocated over the various institutions and sectors of the economy and the ques­
tion should be raised whether, under the impact of external finance and external 
shocks, the allocation patterns have changed. A first observation is that, compared 
to other developing countries, Thailand's ratio of total government expenditures to 
GDP is low. The World Bank data give for 1985 an average expenditure ratio of 
27.5 percent for the group of middle-income developing countries to which 
Thailand belongs. Thailand's expenditure ratio was 19.7 percent in that year. It also 
appears that the growth of the ratio in the period from the early 1970s to the mid- 
1980s in Thailand was less rapid than elsewhere. This confirms the point made in 
Chapter 2 about the predominance given to the private sector and the relatively 
modest role for the state in Thailand's development strategy.
The comparison of the MSAFs for 1975 and 1985 (see Tables 2.1 and 2.2 
of Chapter 2) gave an indication of the shifts in government revenue. The various
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receipts of the government are recorded on row 11 of the MSAF. The indirect tax 
burden shifted between the two MSAFs away from agricultural commodities to in­
dustrial goods. The direct tax burden on the household and private corporate sectors 
increased between these two years, although the burden on the household sector in­
creased more.
The data in Table 5.6 are based on budget data and cover a longer period 
than the two MSAFs. They are not directly comparable to the figures in the MSAFs 
(the MSAF figures combine tax burdens with net transfers paid or received by sec­
tors). But they confirm the impression obtained from the comparison of the MSAFs: 
the overall tax/GDP ratio and its main components, the income (or direct) tax ratio 
and the indirect tax ratio, increased over the two decades from 1970 to 1990.
The income tax on both personal and corporate incomes increased. The in­
crease is due to a number of factors, including, first of all, the growth of the tax 
base. The “modern” corporate sector is rapidly expanding. This was observed in 
Chapter 2 as one of the major structural changes in the Thai economy. With this 
growth is associated the growth of more tractable, and therefore more taxable, profit 
and labor incomes. Also, tax administration has improved over the years. There are 
no indications that there have been major tax rate reforms, although with the pro­
gressive rate structure and the growth of nominal incomes more of taxable income 
falls in the higher tax brackets.
Despite the growth of income tax revenues, the Thai tax system is still 
dominated by indirect taxes. In comparison to the tax structure of other middle- 
income developing countries or of other Asian countries, the Thai system has a 
larger share for domestic indirect and a smaller share for direct taxes, while the 
share of taxes on international trade is comparable to the average for these other 
countries (see World Bank 1988, pp. 83 and 84).
Within the category of indirect taxes there were significant shifts. The im ­
port duties/GDP ratio stagnated and the export duties/GDP ratio declined, while the 
ratio of domestic indirect taxes increased. Taxes can also be related to their various 
tax bases. The ratio of income tax to national income increased steadily. O f the in­
direct taxes, the ratio of import duties revenue to total merchandise imports fell in 
the 1970s, but stabilized in the 1980s. The ratio of export duties to merchandise ex­
ports, which was dominated by the taxes on rice exports, declined rapidly and al­
most disappeared in 1986 when the rice tax was abolished.
The import duties/imports and the export duties/exports ratios also give an 
indication of changes in trade policy. The fall in the import duty ratio may be seen 
as an import liberalization during the 1970s. Import tariffs are always ambiguous: 
they are an instrument of revenue collection, but also of market protection. If they 
perform their second function well, they loose their first function. It could thus be 
that the fall o f the revenue ratio in the 1970s was the result of increased market pro­
tection rather than a reflection of import liberalization. However, as was observed in 
Chapter 3 (see Table 3.9), by the early 1970s the share of final consumer goods in 
total imports was already minor. The fall in the import duty ratio is then the result 
of the decline in the average import tariff. In the 1980s, however, that process had 
come to an end. This strongly suggests that import tariffs and import liberalization 
have not played a major role in the adjustment strategy of the 1980s. This will be 
further discussed in Chapter 6.
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T able 5.6 National G overnment Actual Revenue, C lassified by M ajor Sources
period I 
1970-74
period 11
1975-79
period III 
1980 82
period IV 
1983-86
period V 
1987-90
Taxation: 11.63 12.13 13.17 14.14 16.67
Income taxes: 1.56 2.22 2.85 3.24 3.80
Personal 0.86 0.99 1.25 1.77 1.70
Corporation 0.70 1.23 1.60 1.47 2.07
Indirect taxes: 9.97 9.91 10.33 10.89 12.87
Import duties: 3.30 2.95 2.77 3.00 3.91
of which:
Mineral fuel and lubricants 0.20 0.18 0.28 0.11 0.06
Chemicals 0.47 0.56 0.56 0.57 0.68
Machinery 1.14 1.19 0.94 1.18 1.95
Manufactured goods 0.94 0.64 0.54 0.44 0.70
Export duties: 0.67 0.44 0.37 0.16 0.05
Rice:
Premium 0.37 0.02 0.00 0.00 0.00
Duties 0.12 0.12 0.00 0.00 0.00
Rubber duties 0.00 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.05
Other export duties 0.18 0.26 0.15 0.07 0.00
Business taxes 2.47 2.74 2.79 2.85 3.60
Selective sales taxes 2.24 2.58 3.31 3.74 4.06
Fiscal monopolies 0.52 0.49 0.31 0.28 0.28
Royalties 0.26 0.42 0.47 0.27 0.16
Licenses and fees 0.23 0.13 0.13 0.35 0.34
Other taxes 0.29 0.17 0.18 0.24 0.48
Sales and charges 0.32 0.31 0.22 0.24 0.26
Contribution from government
enterprises and dividends 0.43 0.44 0.41 0.47 0.51
Misc. revenue and income 0.44 0.40 0.66 0.73 0.50
TOTAL REVENUE 12.82 13.28 14.46 15.59 17.94
The ratio o f domestic indirect taxes to total private consumption signifi­
cantly increased over the years, particularly the selective sales taxes, a tax on the 
more luxury consumption items, which increased sharply.
The total government expenditure to GDP ratio increased, along with the 
revenue ratio, from period to period as Table 5.7 shows. In the final period, how­
ever, a sharp reversal is observed. It is, however, also interesting to study the short­
term fluctuations in the ratio that are not captured by the period averages of Table 
5.7. Figure 5.4 draws the total expenditure and total revenue ratio from year to year. 
The revenue ratio shows a considerable degree of short-term stability, but the ex­
penditure ratio strongly fluctuates from year to year. A further disaggregation, not 
included in Figure 5.4, would show that these shifts are mainly due to variations in 
capital expenditures. It can be suggested that these fluctuations reflect policy inter­
ventions.
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T abic 5.7 National G overnm ent Actual Expenditure by Econom ic and 
Functional C lassifications
(as percentage o f GPP)
1970 74 1975-79 1980-82 1983 86 1987 90
Total expenditures 15.80 15.96 18.36 18.86 15.35
Economic classification:
Current 11.56 12.09 14.51 15.82 13.03
Capital 4.24 3.87 3.85 3.05 2.32
M ajor functional classification:
Economic services 3.85 3.69 3.44 2.94 2.36
Social services 4.40 4.90 5.39 5.64 4.64
Defense 3.03 3.03 3.65 3.80 2.92
General admin, and services 2.27 2.09 2.49 2.52 2.04
Unallocable items 2.26 2.21 3.40 3.97 3.40
under which:
Interest domestic debt 1.14 1.18 1.37 2.19
Interest external debt 0.15 0.15 0.43 0.58
Total interest payments 1.29 1.33 1.80 2.77
Figure 5.4 G overnm ent Expenditure and Revenue Ratios 
(as percentage o f GDP)
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The high fiscal deficit of the early 1970s led to a restrictive fiscal policy. 
This contractionary policy was strengthened when Thailand was hit by the first oil 
shock in 1974 and led then, in fact, to a budget surplus. Government expenditure 
recovered up to 1976, after which a consolidation of the expenditure ratio can be 
observed. In the years 1980-1982 there was again an expansionary phase in the fis­
cal policy stance, which continued, at a somewhat lower rate, up to 1985. After 
1985, the expenditure ratio collapsed.
These trends suggest that fiscal policy is executed through expenditure 
policies. The revenue ratio is rather stable and, over time, gradually increasing. But 
substantial short-term variations are effectuated in the government expenditure ra­
tio. The policy background to these changes and their effect on the macroeconomic 
performance will be discussed in Chapter 6.
In Table 5.8, total government expenditure and its main components, cur­
rent expenditure (inclusive and exclusive of interest payments on government debt) 
and capital expenditure, are presented in constant prices and per head of population. 
The real government expenditure per head of population is an indication of the 
change in the real government services made available to the people and to the 
economy. It is striking that the real capital expenditure per head in 1989 was at a 
lower level than in 1970 or 1980. The amount fell very rapidly in the period 1971 - 
1974 under the impact of the contractionary fiscal policy in those years. The years 
1975-1980 showed a recovery and, since the mid-1980s, a sharp fall occurred that 
seems to have come to a halt in 1989 and was sharply reversed in 1990 The real 
current expenditure per capita grew more consistently over the period 1970-1985, if 
one ignores the dip around 1974. Since 1985 there has been a stagnation in the real 
current expenditures and, if interest payments on government debt are excluded, 
one observes a decline in the other real per capita current expenditure since 1985. 
Since the country had a budget surplus in recent years, one cannot conclude that the 
interest payments on the government debt accumulated in earlier periods is 
crowding out other current and capital expenditures.
These figures on real levels of government spending illustrate that the pol­
icy shift that occurred in recent years has been very severe. As Chapter 6 will argue, 
the sharp cuts in government spending have helped to alleviate the macroeconomic 
problems that otherwise could have resulted from the private investment boom of 
recent years. In a longer-term perspective, however, the question arises whether the 
provision of government services is adequate for the rapidly expanding economy. In 
this respect it is useful to look at the functional breakdown of government spending 
in Table 5.7. This table shows an increase in the ratio of social services spending to 
GDP (mainly education and health) over the first four periods, followed by a decline 
in the ratio in the final period
The ratio of spending on economic services (infrastructure, etc.) has, on 
the other hand, continuously declined over the five periods. Against that back­
ground, and in view of the rapid growth of economic activities, it is not surprising 
to hear the many complaints about the' inadequacies of Thailand's transport and 
communications network.
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T abic 5.8 Real Governm ent Spending per Head of Population
Total C urrent Current Capital
Expend. Expend. Excl. Interest Expend.
in constant prices (GDP deflator) (million baht)
1970 25135 17204 15579 7931
1971 27466 19015 17020 8450
1972 27057 19704 17475 7353
1973 25607 19491 17111 6116
1974 22721 18630 16292 4090
1975 28065 21771 19041 6294
1976 34155 25026 22462 9129
1977 36754 27302 24564 9452
1978 38979 29428 26145 9550
1979 41214 32327 28753 8887
1980 49302 38460 34228 10842
1981 49845 39317 34100 10528
1982 56501 45305 39443 11196
1983 57962 47648 40952 10314
1984 63319 53677 45054 9642
1985 69022 57604 46827 11418
1986 68393 58107 45895 10286
1987 67634 57706 44801 9928
1988 66497 57690 45099 8807
1989 74317 63719 10598
1990 81306 66414 14891
in constant prices per head of population (baht)
1970 691 473 428 218
1971 733 507 454 225
1972 701 511 453 191
1973 645 491 431 154
1974 557 457 400 100
1975 670 520 455 150
1976 795 583 523 212
1977 835 620 558 215
1978 864 653 580 212
1979 893 701 623 193
1980 1060 827 736 233
1981 1050 828 718 222
1982 1165 934 813 231
1983 1172 963 828 209
1984 1256 1065 894 191
1985 1336 1115 906 221
1986 1299 1104 872 195
1987 1262 1077 836 185
1988 1219 1058 827 161
1989 1340 1149 191
1990 1442 1178 264
116 Chapter 5
CO NCLUSIO N
This chapter has focused on the impact of international finance on the do­
mestic intersectoral financial relationships. The main channel for the intersectoral 
flows of funds is the domestic financial system.
The Thai financial system has grown very rapidly in the period under 
study: the stock market, the commercial banks and the non-bank financial institu­
tions have played an increasingly significant role in providing funds to the public 
and private sectors. The sectoral allocation of the funds, obtained from the domestic 
financial sy stem in the public sector, is quite different from the allocation of foreign 
funds studied in Chapter 3. Most of the foreign funds went to state enterprises, 
while most of the domestic funds went to the general government. In the private 
sector, the allocation of the funds from the two sources is quite similar, with the 
exception that, unlike international funds, domestic funds were to an increasing 
extent directed at the agricultural sector This was the outcome of mandatory 
policies as well as of the rapid expansion of the financial system to the rural areas, 
where it gradually is replacing the informal credit markets.
An important long-term structural shift that can be observed is the in­
creased integration of the Thai financial markets with the international markets. 
Institutional changes at international markets in the 1970s increased the access of 
developing countries like Thailand, but in the 1980s and certainly in recent years, 
there has been a further integration of the two markets. The link between the Thai 
financial markets and the international markets is not so much intermediated 
through the Thai financial institutions. It appears that direct links between public 
and private corporations and the international markets dominate. Where necessary 
or attractive, Thai firms can take short-term or long-term loans on foreign markets. 
As a result, the flow of international finance is increasingly influenced by factors 
such as interest-rate differentials, exchange rate expectations and short-term mone­
tary policies. It should be noted, however, that the long-term trend of foreign capital 
flows continue to be determined by the more fundamental factors, such as, in recent 
years, the realignment of major international currencies and changing patterns of 
international trade. The increased integration of the financial markets poses serious 
problems for monetary policy which sees the effectiveness of many of its instru­
ments undermined by the international linkages. This aspect will be further ana­
lyzed in Chapter 6.
The analysis o f the sectoral investment-savings gaps and their financing 
shows an interesting impact of foreign capital flows. In the period 1975-1985, when 
capital inflows to the public sector were high, the public sector investment ratio in­
creased rapidly and the savings ratio declined. In fact, in this period the public sec­
tor investment-savings gap widened more by the foreign capital inflow, so that there 
was an additional demand for domestic funds. It is suggested that in some years, as 
a result of this, there was a crowding-out of private investment. This crowding-out 
probably did not arise so much from a rationing of credit for the private sector, as 
from the impact of the public-sector spending boom on private-sector investment 
demand. The public-sector deficits led to increases in the rate of inflation and the 
real interest rate and to a loss of confidence of the private sector in the stability of 
the economy. This had a negative effect on the private-sector investment demand. 
In the most recent period, the capital inflows led to a rapid rise of private sector
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investment and, although private savings also increased somewhat, the private 
sector invcstment-savings gap widened considerably beyond the level of the capital 
inflows from abroad. As in the earlier period, there was thus again an increased 
demand for domestic credit. The financial system could satisfy that demand because 
the sharp turnabout in fiscal policy had removed the public sector's demand for 
credit and because the rapid increase in incomes and the high interest rates led to a 
rapid increase in deposits. But the last year, 1990, suggests that there is an 
underlying problem: the large private-sector savings gap exceeds the public-sector 
savings surplus and is threatening macroeconomic stability.
Changes in the fiscal balances in the last few years have been dramatic. 
Over the entire period, the tax ratio has been increasing rather steadily, but within 
this overall tax burden significant shifts occurred. Taxes on international trade and 
on agriculture were relatively reduced. The tax burden on private corporations has 
always been comparatively low. The main increase was in the indirect taxation on 
household consumption.
With the tax ratio gradually increasing, the main fiscal problem in the past 
had been that expenditures were increasing faster. This process was halted in the 
mid-1980s. The government investment ratio had been declining throughout the 
two decades under study and, in fact, government investments in real terms have 
stagnated since 1980. But, around 1985, the increasing trend of the current expendi­
ture ratio was also turned around into a decline. This quite exceptional fiscal per­
formance has helped Thailand to weather the ongoing private-sector investment 
boom without major macroeconomic problems, but it raises the important question 
whether the level and quality of government services are up to the needs of the rap­
idly expanding private sector.

Chapter 6
Policy Regimes in Thailand
INTRODUCTION
I n  its broadest formulation, the tasks of economic policy are to stimulate economic 
development and defend macroeconomic stability. The external shocks of the last 
two decades have made the execution of these tasks more difficult.
In the case of Thailand, as observed in Chapter 2, the initiative for eco­
nomic development rests with the private sector. The duty of the state is to stimulate 
the private sector (for example, through investment incentives) and to provide a 
good environment for private sector development (for example, infrastructure and 
macroeconomic stability).
Judging by conventional criteria, the performance of economic policy in 
Thailand has been very good. Over the entire period 1970-1990, the average growth 
rate was 7.3 percent a year. Even in very difficult years, the growth rate was well 
ahead of population growth. The average inflation rate over the two decades was 7.2 
percent a year. This figure was strongly influenced by the impact of the two oil 
crises o f the 1970s. After 1981, the average rate of inflation was only 3.5 percent.
These performance indicators, economic growth and inflation, are better 
than for most developing countries. Thailand's current-account deficit is less out­
standing. Over the two past decades the current-account deficit was, on average, 
equal to 3.7 percent of GDP.
The growth boom of the last few years has made Thailand one of the few 
developing countries that emerged successfully and convincingly from its period of 
structural adjustment. In these years growth was rapid, while inflation was kept at 
modest levels. But, again, the current-account deficit w'as substantial.
The relatively large current-account deficits reflect the domestic resource 
gap, with investments consistently outrunning domestic savings. Clearly, the in­
creased availability of foreign savings in the period under study had a direct impact 
on these macroeconomic balances, as was studied in detail in Chapter 4.
The main tasks of macroeconomic policy under these conditions were then 
to (1) manage the domestic investment-savings gap, the trade balance, and the ex­
ternal debt burden in such a w'ay that the long-term growth prospects were not en-
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dangercd. and (2) defend the short-term macroeconomic stability so as to maintain 
private sector confidence.
The sections in this chapter analyze how these objectives were achieved in 
the various sub-periods.
In the subsequent sections, the five periods of external shocks defined in 
Chapter 1 are used, and the policy packages designed to deal with those shocks are 
analyzed. In the final section, it will be assessed whether information on the policy 
regimes can be derived from these policy packages.
For this purpose, economic policy may be, rather conventionally, broken 
down into (a) fiscal and public sector policies, (b) monetary and financial policies, 
(c) price policies, and (d) trade policies.
Each of the five periods had its own problems and its own immediate con­
cerns for growth and stability. But the outcomes of policies should also be judged on 
longer-term implications. The basic question is whether adjustment leads to a pat­
tern of growth that is feasible in terms of internal and external macroeconomic 
equilibrium and viable in terms of social and political conditions.
Table 6.1 presents a summary over the 1970-1990 period of major external 
and domestic shocks, and government policy reactions, as well as the responses of 
other interest groups, namely the domestic private sector, foreign investors, bilateral 
and multilateral organizations, and foreign commercial banks.
In the subsequent review of policies, the direction and intensity of changes 
in policy will be analyzed.
PER IO D  I (1970-1974)
This period can be labeled as the period of international price shocks: first 
export prices and then import prices, namely the oil price, increased. In addition, 
international interest rates also rose.
Thailand absorbed the immediate impacts of the 1973/74 international 
price and interest rate shocks and of the resulting international economic upheaval 
with no significant disruption of its growth momentum, which averaged 5.8 percent 
per annum during this period. The initial balance-of-payments effect of the oil price 
increase was cushioned by three major factors: (1) the export commodity price boom 
in 1972/73, (2) the inflow of Vietnam War-related U.S. military assistance, which 
averaged 1.6 percent o f GDP during the early part o f the 1970s, and (3) the small 
external debt in the early 1970s, which made external financing of the widening 
resource gap less alarming to both the Thai government and lenders. The extem al- 
debt-GDP ratio during the 1970-1974 period averaged less than 10 percent and the 
debt service ratio was only 12.8 percent. This last factor also moderated the 
international interest rate increase (see Table 3 .6).
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T able 6.1 M ajor Econom ic Shocks and Policy R esponses in Thailand  
1970-1990
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983 86 1987-90
External - High world - Cheap foreign -Oil price -High interest -Low world
Shock interest rates credit (until shock rate (until interest rates
- Commodity 1987) - Worldwide 1984) - Higher world
price boom - Deteriorating (DCs) - Debt crisis commodity
- Oil price shock terms of trade recession (from mid- prices
- Highly 
uncertain and
- High inflation
- High and
1982)
- Drastic
- Trade 
protectionist
volatile volatile world decline in measures
exchange rate interest rates capital flows steadily
system - Commodity 
price decrease
- U.S. dollar 
appreciation
- Debt crisis 
(from mid- 
1982)
(loans)
particularly to 
LDCs
- Protectionism 
intensified
- Steeply rising 
U.S. dollar in 
1983-84
increased
- Currency 
realignment 
(appreciation): 
Japan, South 
Korea and 
Taiwan
- Economic 
structural 
adjustment in 
Japan, South 
Korea and 
Taiwan
Domestic - Student - Suppression of - Unsuccessful - Unsuccessful - Severe
Shock uprising student coup d'etat in coup d'etat in drought in
demonstrators 1981 1985 1987
- Political - Drought in - Collapse of a
instability 1982 medium-size
(frequent commercial
changes in bank in 1984
government)
- Collapse of a
major finance
company
Monetary - Tight due to - Relatively -Tight - Restrictive - Relaxed
Policy inflationary
pressures
- Raised discount 
rate from 8 to 
10%
tight (1983-84)
- 18% credit 
growth guide­
line and severe 
credit squeeze 
by commercial 
banks
- Tight due to 
inflationary 
pressure in 
1990
(Continued on page 122)
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Tabic 6.1 (Continued)
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983-86 1987-90
Fiscal - Intially - Expansionary, - Restrictive; - Tight due to - Intially
Policy expansionary. particularly for reducing budget deficit contractionary
tight in later public expenditure expansion (in
years due to investment and raising locally 1990)
inflationary (foreign revenue
pressure borrowing (ineffective) - Tax reform
increased) under World
Bank's
Structural
Adjustment
Loans
- Foreign 
borrowing
Trade and
Industry
Policy
- Semi-flexible 
exchange rate 
system pegged 
to U.S. dollar
- Export 
promotion
- Continued 
import 
substitution
- Devaluation 
against U.S 
dollar in Nov. 
1981
(ineffective 
due to U.S. 
dollar
appreciation)
- Devaluation - More liberal:
against U.S. reducing tax
dollar (Apr- rate and
Nov. 1984) regulations
- Basket of - Real effective
currencies exchange rate
(flexible) depreciated
exchange rate until 1987;
system stable during
adopted in 1988-90
1982
- Abolitiion of
import
surcharges
- Tariff rate
increase in
1985 (in order
to raise
government
revenue)
- Rice premium
abolished in
1986
Price Policy - Price controls 
(passive) on a 
fairly large 
number of 
“basic needs” 
consumer 
products
- Oil price 
intervention to 
soften the 
impact of price 
increase 
(inactive)
- Price controls - Price controls 
(passive) (until (passive)
1985) - Oil price 
intervention to 
soften the 
impact of 
price increase 
(upward 
adjustment)
- Price supports 
on paddy and 
sugar
- Oil price 
intervention 
(continuation)
- Oil price 
intervention, 
but shift from 
fixed to 
floating system
(Continued on page 123)
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T able 6.1 (Continued)
1970-74 1975-79 1980 82 1983 86 1987 90
Combined - Moderate - High growth - High inflation - Moderate to - High growth
Effects growth - Increasing - Negative low inflation - High
- High inflation current interest rates - High debt investment
- Negative account deficit - Tourism burden - Very large
interest rate (CAD) boom - Recession capital inflows
- Shift to non- - Workers’ (1985-86) (FDI and FPI)
traditional remittances - Large fiscal - High exports
exports became deficit (particularly
- Creation of important - Export value manufactured
numerous state - Worsening shrank for the products)
enterprises competitive first time in - Increasing
- High fiscal position 1983 CAD
deficit - Increasing - low - Increasing
- Sharp increase CAD investment inflation
in capital climate in - Fiscal surplus
inflows 1985
-High
unemployment
- Bad debt 
(bankruptcy) 
increased
- High real 
interest rates
Private - Favorable with - Favorable - Slowdown in - Slowdown in - Favorable
Responses high investment with high 
investment
investment investment
- Some 
uneasiness 
about
devaluation
investment
boom
- Increase in 
speculative 
demand
Foreign - Cautious - Favorable - Favorable - Relatively - FDI and FPI
Investors during 1970- with high stagnant boom
Responses 72, favorable 
with high 
investment 
during 1973-74
investment capital inflows (particularly 
export- 
oriented FDI)
Bilateral and - Cautious - Substantial - Increase in aid - Favorable - Favorable
Multilateral
Responses
and/or
favorable
increase in 
loan inflow
(WB's SAL 
and IMF 
stand-by 
credits)
- Diminishing 
WB activity in 
Thailand
Foreign - Cautious - Rapid and - Restricted - Relatively - Favorable
Commercial and/or massive lending to favorable
Banks favorable inflows of LDCs (in (although
Responses commercial
loans
(particularly 
for defense and 
for liquidity 
needs of the 
state
1982) restricted 
lending to 
other LDCs)
enterprises)
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The oil price increase did, however, have an immediate impact on 
domestic prices. Inflation went from 0.3 and 5.1 percent in 1971 and 1972, 
respectively, up to 15.4 and 24.4 percent in 1973 and 1974, respectively. It was 
then, however, quickly brought down to 4.9 percent in 1975 in response to a tight 
fiscal policy. The government spending ratio was brought down from 17.7 percent 
in 1971 to 13.0 percent in 1974, while the government revenue ratio was relatively 
stable, resulting first in a smaller fiscal deficit and then a small surplus in 1974. 
While the public sector savings gap was reduced, that of the private sector turned 
from positive to negative in 1974, but was still small at one percent of GDP. By 
1974, the current-account deficit was only 0.6 percent of GDP (sec Tables 2.9, 4.1 
and 4.3).
As the international interest rate rose in this period, domestic loan and de­
posit rates also rose, up from 10.75 and 6.0 percent in 1972, respectively, to 11.75 
percent and 8.0 percent, respectively, in 1974. Given the high inflation rates, the 
real interest rate in 1973 and 1974 became negative. This, however, did not cause 
any alarm on the domestic savings gap, since the gap itself was relatively small.
As mentioned, there was no serious problem regarding the country's 
balance of payments and current account balance. The real effective exchange rate 
appreciated about 12 percent in 1974.
PERIO D II (1975-1979)
Because of the country's prudent monetary policy and tight fiscal policy, 
Thailand's domestic and external balance was restored by 1976, when the domestic 
inflation rate was 4.1 percent, the current-account deficit ratio was 2.5 percent, and 
the savings gaps for both the public and private sectors were relatively small. The 
real growth rate rebounded from 4.8 percent in 1975 to 9.4 percent in 1976. This 
gave both the government and the private sector in the second half of the 1970s a 
false sense that the economv was back on a healthy growth track (see Tables 2.9 and
4.1).
The policy problem of this period was the sharp rise in the current-account 
deficit. Public sector policy was clearly expansionary in this period. The public in­
vestment ratio increased, and the fiscal deficit and the PSBR rose. On top of this, 
domestic oil prices were not adjusted in response to the increased international 
prices, leading to declining surpluses of the energy-intensive public enterprises. 
Domestic financial transfers to the public sector were stable, since most of the in­
creases in public spending were financed from foreign loans. Monetary policies ap­
parently attempted to compensate for the public sector expansion. While domestic 
credit to the public sector expanded, that to the private sector declined. The nominal 
interest rate rose and, although the real interest rate fell, the gap between the world 
and domestic interest rates encouraged foreign borrowing by the private sector. 
Price policies were not used to contain domestic spending. It is remarkable that the 
state enterprise savings ratio declined. It could be suggested that access to interna­
tional credit did lead to some laxity in the efforts to increase state enterprise prices 
so as to defend or recover profits.
Trade policy also was rather unhelpful. The effective import duty declined, 
making imported goods cheaper. As no change took place in the nominal exchange
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rate, the real exchange rate appreciated, providing yet another incentive to increase 
import demand and against exports.
The outcome of the policy package was that stability was endangered: in­
flation accelerated and the current-account deficit was very high. The large public- 
sector investment activities apparently invited some private investments: the private 
sector investment ratio increased slightly (see Tables 2.9 and 4.1).
In many respects, the experience of this period confirms the conventional 
story about loan booms. The public sector expanded, public-sector saving efforts 
declined, imports were liberalized. In the case of Thailand, monetary policy was 
used to contain private sector spending so as to prevent excessive instability.
PERIOD III (1980-1982)
The main shocks in this period were the sharp increase in oil prices and in­
ternational interest rates that took place in 1979/80. Despite these shocks, the level 
of capital inflows from abroad further increased rapidly to 6.5 percent of GDP. As 
in the second period, the capital inflows were dominated by foreign loans, particu­
larly long-term loans from international financial markets, which were directed 
mostly towards the public sector, in particular state enterprises (see Chapter 3 and 
Table 3.1). The immediate impacts of these shocks on the Thai economy were the 
high inflation rate and current-account deficit (see Table 2.9 and Chapter 3). In 
1980 and 1981, the inflation rates were 19.8 and 12.7 percent, respectively, while 
the current-account deficit was 6.4 and 7.6 percent of GDP, respectively. This high 
ratio of current-account deficit in the Thai government's calculation, as well as in 
calculations by the World Bank, could not be sustained in the long run, and could 
have ended up in a serious external debt crisis, as the government budget deficit was 
also rapidly rising to 3.9 percent of GDP in 1980-1982. The world economy at the 
time was in recession, with high interest rates and high inflation. The revival of the 
Thai economy, therefore, could not rely on the recovery' of the world economy.
In response, the government embarked on macroeconomic, adjustments to 
solve the problems by employing the following policies.
In response to the worldwide increase in interest rates and the low liquidity 
in the domestic financial market in 1979 and 1980, the government raised the ceil­
ing of loan and deposit interest rates at commercial banks by 3 percent in early
1980.
As for the persistently increasing current-account deficit, the government 
decided to have the baht devalued against the U.S. dollar by 8.7 percent in July
1981, following a smaller devaluation of 1.07 percent in April of the same year. The 
move, however, was emotionally criticized in both the Parliament and the mass 
media and the uproar did not die down until the departure of the Finance Minister. 
The experience reflected the essential importance of effective public relations in 
handling controversial policy measures. Actually, the July devaluation was pres­
sured by the panic purchase of dollars in anticipation of a further downward ad­
justm ent of the baht after the April devaluation. The rates of forward coverage rose 
to unprecedented levels and the country's foreign exchange reserve would be de­
pleted in a matter of days (see Uathavikul, Patmasiriwat and Kamheangpatiyooth 
1987, p.42). However, the effect of the devaluation was largely offset by the appre­
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ciation of the U S dollar (to which the baht was fixed) against other major curren­
cies. In fact, the real effective exchange rate of the baht appreciated during the pe­
riod 1980-1982, resulting in a considerable worsening of the country's competitive­
ness in the world market and pressures on its current account and balance of pay­
ments. This shows that Thailand was still leaving the baht securely tied to the U.S. 
dollar. As a result, the value of its currency was being determined, not by the 
strength of its own economy, but by the movement of the U.S. currency.
There was the intention at that time to use the devaluation as a first step in 
unpegging the baht from the U.S. dollar, leading to some form of flexible rates. 
Unfortunately, there was a continuing fear in the market that the baht would be de­
valued further, and it was found necessary to announce a swap program to assure a 
nervous business community that the new rate would be defended and maintained. 
This de facto  confirmation of the fixed exchange rate regime was meant to be a 
strictly temporary experience but, as in the case of most such expedients, it became 
permanent (Uathavikul et al. 1987, p. 43).
There were unsuccessful attempts to curb public spending as public sector 
investment to GDP ratio continued to increase and current government spending 
was rising and the tax ratio increased only mildly. As a result, the fiscal deficit be­
came wider.
During this period, industrial and trade policies were left largely un­
touched. Although there was a major attempt at reducing the dispersion of tariff 
rates in 1982, most of the changes were immediately reversed due to concerns over 
the public reaction to higher tariffs on many items. In the meantime, however, ad­
justm ents to the domestic prices of energy and some public services were made. 
Domestic oil prices were progressively raised to bring them more or less in line with 
international prices; electricity prices were increased by 17 percent in October 1980 
and 16 percent in January 1981 and bus and train fares increased in January 1981. 
This was designed to correct serious price distortions and encourage energy conser­
vation, as well as to strengthen the public sector's financial position.
The policy mix was successful in some respects: the domestic inflation rate 
dropped rapidly from 19.8 percent in 1980 to 5.2 percent in 1982, and the current- 
account deficit declined to only 2.8 percent of GDP in 1982 (see Chapter 2 and 
Table 2.9).
Given the adverse effects during 1979-1981 as a result of the second oil 
shock, especially the rising current-account deficits, falling international reserves, 
and increasing government budget deficit and government debt, there was an in­
creasing pressure on the Thai government to formulate a structural adjustment pro­
gram and contact the World Bank for structural adjustment loans (SALs). Since the 
structural adjustment program aimed at medium- and long-term adjustments, it 
could create some adverse effects in the short run. The proposed policy packages 
under SAL I aimed at gradually reducing the current-account deficit through im ­
proved incentives, increased efficiency, and reduced fiscal imbalances. The planned 
measures or actions for SAL I included those in the sectors of agriculture, industry 
and energy and in the policy areas of fiscal policy and institutional development.
The new measures within the agricultural sector, besides further reductions 
in the overall burden of rice taxation, were the deregulation of livestock marketing 
and a fertilizer marketing study. Among the new measures to promote export in the 
industrial sector were broad-based improvements in the organization and operations
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of the Customs Department, establishment of export processing zones and more 
bonded warehouses, general tariff reform, and ad hoc arrangements for large-scale 
project evaluation. Specific tax policy measures called for the restructuring of per­
sonal and corporate income taxes (see Sahasakul, Thongpakde and Kraisoraphong 
1989, pp. 22-23).
The SAL did help to create an international commitment among Thai of­
ficials and politicians. Many sensible measures in SAL that were unpopular among 
politicians were implemented in the following period because of this international 
commitment (see Sahasakul et al. 1989, p. 47).
The policy response to the second oil shock was quite different from the re­
sponse to the first shock. In period I, there was a sharp contractionary public sector 
policy leading to a fiscal surplus in 1974. In period III, the easy access to interna­
tional loans seemed to have made such a policy less urgent
PE R IO D  IV (1983-1986)
After the 1982 international debt crisis, developing countries had to reas­
sess their policies in the context of a world recession. Thailand was no exception. In 
this period, foreign capital inflows fell drastically from the preceding period to less 
than 4 percent of GDP. Almost all of the decline in foreign capital inflows was 
attributable to a sharp drop in foreign loans, particularly those made to the private 
sector and state enterprises (see Table 3.1).
As seen in the last section, the Thai government had originally hoped to 
rely on exports to alleviate the current-account deficit and provide the main driving 
force in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. However, the worsened world 
economy and the increased protectionist tendencies expected in 1983 made such 
hopes unachievable. The Thai government, therefore, shifted its focus to public 
sector management when it requested the second structural adjustment loan (SAL 
II) from the World Bank in 1983. The proposed measures in SAL II relied more on 
the use of prudent fiscal and monetary policies, as well as on public policy and 
structural adjustment measures, to keep the external deficit at a sustainable level 
without seriously harming growth in income and employment.
It is generally believed that huge government budget deficits and public- 
sector foreign borrowings can cause substantial current-account deficits. Therefore, 
any measure that can reduce government expenditure and/or raise government 
revenue, resulting in a smaller government deficit, as well as the reduction of public 
sector borrowing from abroad, can reduce the current-account deficit (see Sahasakul 
et al. 1989, p. 24). This is consistent with findings in Chapter 4— that the main 
policy impact on savings should be public sector policies which influence public 
sector savings directly, as policy variables will have limited effect on private 
savings. In addition, public investment decisions themselves are the best way to in­
fluence the overall macro balances, since the public sector investment ratio has a 
significant negative effect on private sector investment, an indication of the crowd­
ing-out effect (see Chapter 4).
Besides the measures for public sector management, other new measures 
proposed in SAL II concerned the feasibility of export credit and guarantee schemes
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in the industrial sector, a reduction in the fuel price differential, energy conserva­
tion, a land bank study, and water resource development and management.
Early in this period, public sector investments, particularly those by state 
enterprises, expanded despite the international problems. Public utilities price re­
forms led to higher state enterprise savings, and government revenue also continued 
to grow. As a result, the public sector savings gap ratio and the fiscal deficit as 
percentage of GDP fell somewhat, but the level remained very high (see Tables 2.9 
and 4.3). The increasing public debt-service burden was also worrisome. The 
foreign debt-service ratio was over 20 percent o f total export earnings after 1982 
(see Table 3.6). The high domestic interest rate also raised the public sector's 
burden on domestic debt. Altogether, the government had to use more than 16 
percent of its total expenditure for debt-servicing, on average about 5 percentage 
points higher than it was during the latter part o f the 1970s.
To solve these problems, the government tried to limit public spending and 
borrowing in 1984. It also set a ceiling on public foreign borrowing at US$1 billion 
per year in 1985, resulting in a fall in foreign borrowing by the public sector. The 
cap on public-sector foreign borrowing was timely, since the country's foreign debt 
reached an alarm ing level in 1985, at 39 percent of GDP and 147 percent o f ex­
ports, with a debt-service ratio of 23 percent (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6). The amount 
of the cap was realistically set according to the needs of the public sector. It was an 
effective measure to control state enterprise's foreign borrowing, as well as foreign 
loans for military procurement and, consequently, the foreign debt to GDP ratio and 
debt-service ratio gradually declined (see Tables 3.5 and 3.6).
Higher tax rates and the high interest rate consequently slowed private 
investment and employment. As there was a fall in foreign borrowing by the public 
sector, domestic financial transfers to the public sector had to increase sharply to fill 
the public-sector borrowing requirement. During this high deficit period, the 
government's greater reliance on borrowing from the domestic financial markets 
sector contributed to the country's macroeconomic stability, but at the cost of a 
reduction in private investment and economic growth.
The monetary policy was, on the whole, contractionary Despite the lower 
interest rate in the international financial market after 1982, the government still 
maintained the high interest rate policy, hoping that it would attract foreign capital 
inflows. As a consequence, the domestic interest rate was significantly higher than 
the international rate, which stimulated the private sector to borrow abroad.
The temporary recovery of private business in 1983 led commercial banks 
to expand credit to the private sector at an extremely high growth rate o f 36 percent. 
At the same time, the current-account deficit sharply worsened and reached 7.2 per­
cent o f GDP. For political reasons, however, monetary authorities refused to address 
a major cause of the imbalances, i.e., an exchange rate which was overvalued. To 
reduce the widening current-account deficit, the Bank o f Thailand instead requested 
an 18-percent credit expansion limit by commercial banks, effective during the first 
eight months of 1984. As it turned out, this “request” proved to be superfluous 
because commercial banks were already cutting back drastically on their lending as 
they began to see the dangers of overlending during the euphoric period o f 1983 
(Uathavikul et al pp. 44-45). This redundant measure was later dropped in favor of 
other policy measures, namely devaluation.
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The impacts of the credit limit, high interest rate, and the problems in the 
unorganized financial market, as well as the adverse external economic 
environment, were felt by local business communities for many years after that, and 
may explain the low level of private investment.
W ith the steeply rising dollar, the macroeconomic situation was rapidly un­
tenable. The widening current-account deficit and the sharp decline in international 
reserves in 1984 to less than two months of imports led the Bank of Thailand to 
devalue the baht by 14.8 percent against the U.S. dollar in November 1984. The 
IMF was instrumental in encouraging the Bank of Thailand to devalue its currency 
(see Sahasakul et al. 1989, p. 6). The international encouragement and commitment 
did help the government to overcome political obstacles and implement policy. The 
Bank of Thailand also switched the country's exchange rate system from pegging to 
the U.S. dollar to pegging to a basket of currencies. Under this new system, the 
weighting scheme was based on the relative importance of the countries as 
Thailand's trading partners. The weighting scheme was used for about one year. 
After the G-7 meeting in September 1985 and the currency realignment, the U.S. 
dollar was depreciated rapidly. Thailand decided to adjust the weighting scheme by 
giving higher weight to the U.S. dollar, from 50-55 percent to 80-85 percent. As a 
result, while the baht devaluation against the dollar in 1984 was only 14.8 percent, 
the dollar depreciation vis-a-vis other major currencies meant that the baht was 
eventually depreciated by about 30 percent to these major currencies. The 1984 baht 
devaluation did contribute to a depreciation of the real effective exchange rate 
between 1984 and 1986. This substantial devaluation of the baht put an end to an 
era of overvaluation. Coupled with the Plaza Agreement on currency realignment, 
the depreciation of the real exchange rate of the baht contributed to the export boom 
in the following period.
The policy package of this period showed again a rather strange mix of ex­
pansionary and contractionary elements. The public sector policy was, on the whole, 
somewhat confused. Attempts to curb spending (for example, government invest­
ment) were combined with expansionary elements (for example, an increase in gov­
ernment current spending ratio). The tax ratio showed some increase. State enter­
prise investment remained high, but its savings performance improved. Monetary 
policy was more consistently contractionary, but here the effectiveness was under­
mined by the fact that domestic loan rates far exceeded the international rate, thus 
inviting the private sector to borrow abroad. The excessive current-account deficit of 
1983, together with the growing reluctance to increase external indebtedness, led to 
the devaluation in 1984. The success of this approach was limited. Private sector 
investment was crowded-out by the high level of public sector deficits and by the 
contractionary monetary policy. The private-sector savings ratio was rather poor in 
these years (see Table 4.3). The growth rate of real exports increased from the very 
poor level o f 1983, but was not yet convincingly better than in the earlier years, 
when the exchange rate was overvalued. The exports to GDP ratio was lower in this 
period than in the years before. The growth rate of real imports declined sharply, 
however, with the fall in economic growth and the devaluation of the baht, and the 
current-account deficit ratio fell (see Table 3.7).
In addition, the world commodity price was unfavorable. As far as the cur­
rent-account deficit is concerned, the worldwide recession in 1982-1984, as well as 
the unfavorable world commodity price in the early 1980s, slowed down Thai ex­
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ports and imports. This resulted in a slowdown of government revenue and a sub­
stantial decline in government savings. Given the slow decrease in government in­
vestment as a percentage of GDP, the government budget deficit became larger (see 
Tables 2.9 and 4.3). The World Bank's structural adjustment loans did help to re­
lieve the short-term budget deficit problem in the early 1980s.
In conclusion, the various measures, both the SAL measures and those 
taken independent of the SAL programs, did help to keep the country's external im ­
balance situation from getting out of hand, and placed the Thai economy in a posi­
tion to benefit from opportunities provided by changes in the world economic envi­
ronment starting in 1986. This period can, with the benefit of hindsight, be de­
scribed as one of fundamental changes in the policy regime. In two areas of policy, 
it showed radical changes in perspective. The fiscal policy position turned, since 
1984, consistently to a contractionary stance and, after 1984, the real exchange rate 
index of the baht shows that the period of overvaluation had ended. By the end of 
1986, the Thai economy was more or less in or approaching balance in the 
following aspects.
•  The government budget deficit was reduced to 3.12 percent o f GDP 
and declining.
•  The private sector savings-investment surplus had increased, due to 
the low level o f private investment and the public sector savings- 
investment gap was narrowing.
•  The current-account deficit was substantially reduced to 0.6 percent of 
GDP.
•  The country's international reserves were improved to 3.2 months of 
imports.
•  The external debt-GDP ratio was 38.4 percent o f GDP, and the debt- 
service ratio was 20.6 percent, and declining.
•  The inflation rate was relatively low at 1.8 percent.
•  The country's real effective exchange rate was depreciated.
PER IO D  V  (1987-1990)
During this period there was a boom in foreign capital inflows. However, 
this was different from the external capital flows in the past. Now the main share o f  
capital inflows was the private sector in origin and in destination. Foreign direct in­
vestment and portfolio investment accounted for about half o f  the total capital in­
flows (see Chapter 3 and Table 3.1)
The policy package in this period was strikingly different from that o f  ear­
lier years.
Public sector policy was unequivocally contractionary. Government in­
vestment and current spending ratios and the state enterprise investment ratio fell, 
w hile tax revenue increased. The reduction in the public sector investment ratio re­
flected the government's policy to put more emphasis on the private sector within  
the econom ic development process. The fiscal deficit and public-sector savings gap
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or borrowing requirement turned into a surplus in 1988 and thereafter The turn 
was drastic when compared to the large deficits during the period 1983-1986. 
Domestic financial transfers to the public sector rapidly declined and, in fact, the 
public sector started to repay its domestic and external debt (see Tables 4 1, 4.3 and
5.1).
With a view to encouraging the inflow of foreign exchange, the govern­
ment approved an income tax exemption on foreign loan interest paid from 
Thailand covering the period from March 1989 to February 1990.
The nominal and effective rates of protection in 1987 were higher than 
those in 1981 and 1985. The structure of effective protection was still biased toward 
the manufacturing sector. In 1990, however, the government reduced the import 
duly rate on machinery from 40 percent to 5 percent. This was a first step in the 
tariff reform o f the government's program of market liberalization which is em­
phasized in the Seventh National Economic and Social Development Plan. Under 
the program, a further reduction of tariffs across the board is planned.
Monetary policy during most of this period was expansionary. Credit to the 
private sector grew very rapidly. Attempts to curb credit expansion were hampered 
by the large capital inflows which created high liquidity on the domestic money 
market. To fight the creeping inflation and rapidly widening current-account defi­
cit, the authorities raised the ceiling rate on savings deposit at commercial banks 
twice in 1990, from 7.25 to 9.0 and then to 12.0 percent in March and November, 
respectively. The ceiling rates on time deposits were abolished. The ceiling loan rate 
was also adjusted from 15 to 16.5 percent and later to 19 percent. Similarly, the 
interest rates of finance companies and credit financiers were adjusted along the 
lines o f  commercial banks.
Besides the interest rate structure adjustment, the Bank of Thailand also 
issued bonds to absorb excess liquidity and reduced the maximum amount of 
overdrafts to combat inflation. In addition, the Bank of Thailand supervised 
commercial banks' credit extensions with more emphasis on priority sectors.
The exchange policy was defensive during this period. After the devalu­
ation in 1984, the baht had depreciated further along with the U.S. dollar in 1985, 
increasing the competitive edge of Thai exporters. The nominal and real effective 
exchange rates were allowed to depreciate further in 1987 and remained relatively 
stable in 1988 and 1989.
Foreign exchange transactions were also liberalized. In May 1990, the 
country accepted the obligations of Article VIII of the IMF's Articles of Agreement. 
In addition, commercial banks were allowed a greater scope in approving foreign 
exchange transactions without seeking approval from the Bank of Thailand. A 
further liberalization measure was taken, particularly on capital account 
transactions, in April 1991. Further liberalization is planned in the next few years. 
Under this financial liberalization trend, questions have been raised as to whether 
the country's monetary policy would still be effective, and whether the country 
would be able to absorb external shocks effectively. The answers seem to rely 
mainly on the strength of the Thai economy itself, on whether it can create a well- 
proved absorptive capacity.
The results of Thailand's macroeconomic management in this latest period 
were remarkable. Sharp increases in the private sector investment and savings ratios 
were associated with unprecedented growth rates. Double-digit growth figures were
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accompanied by modest, though increasing, domestic inflation rates. Despite a very 
high export growth rate, it was still lower than the exceedingly high import growth 
rate caused by the economic boom. As a result, the current-account deficit was sub­
stantial in 1988 and widened thereafter. A large share of the deficit was, however, 
financed by non-debt creating capital inflows, resulting in a declining foreign debt- 
GDP ratio. The lower interest rate in international markets also helped to reduce the 
debt-service burden of the country (see Tables 3.5-3.7, 3.9 and 4.1).
From the preceding discussion, we can sec that the policy shift in this 
period was radical. The rather weak attempts at public sector control observed in the 
earlier period were now replaced by a forceful and comprehensive retrenchment of 
the public sector. This, together with the reluctantly or cautiously expansionary 
monetary' policy position, created the conditions for the private sector's expansion to 
take place without serious inflationary consequences. The cautious wage policy, the 
decline in import duties and the relatively stable baht further helped to dampen 
inflationary impulses.
However, the sharp reduction in public sector capital expenditure created a 
vacuum in infrastructure investment which could not quickly be filled by the private 
sector, partly because of limitations in private access to large financial resources for 
infrastructure projects in comparison to the Thai government's very good credit rat­
ing. A cumbersome and time-consuming negotiation, particularly when the gov­
ernment and/or a minister in charge is changed, also contributes to the slow reac­
tion. As a result, infrastructure has not been adequate for the unexpected increase in 
demand over the recent boom years. The constraints need to be eliminated for a sus­
tainable growth in the longer run. and the government has to play a greater, more 
effective role. Given the government's current fiscal surplus, the task is possible and 
should not create any serious inflationary pressure or crowding-out effect. The 
question concerns the extent to which the government will participate.
PO LIC Y  REG IM ES
The preceding sections have analyzed five periods in which Thai policy 
makers had to face serious challenges, often caused by external factors related to 
international trade and finance. In the first period, the international oil price 
increase did not create any serious immediate impact on Thailand's internal and 
external balances, other than domestic inflation. The main reason is that the effects 
of the shock were cushioned by some factors, and domestic inflation was quickly 
brought under control by restrictive fiscal and monetary policies. In the second 
period, increased access to international financial markets led to a rapid expansion 
of public sector investments. In the third and the fourth periods, policy makers had 
to accommodate adverse external shocks. In the last period, the main feature was 
large private sector capital inflows and investment.
Over these periods, the nature of policy interventions changed consider­
ably. In the two periods in the 1970s, fiscal and public sector policies dominated. 
After the severe shocks of the first oil crisis, public sector spending was reduced as 
a defense against the shock. Later in the 1970s, public sector expenditure growth, 
financed increasingly by external finance, became the main determinant of the pol­
icy regime.
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The first two sub-periods of the 1980s provided further external shocks 
Public sector policies were not so effective in these periods: the tax ratio and the 
state enterprises' savings ratio did rise somewhat, but there was less success with the 
control of expenditures. Given the relatively poor performance of the fiscal and 
public sector policies, the full adjustment burden fell on other policy instruments. 
Cautious monetary policies resulted in high interest rates, but, as the analysis in 
Chapter 4 has shown, interest rates have little impact on the level of domestic 
spending. They do help, however, in a attracting the inflows of foreign capital nec­
essary to finance the domestic resource gap
In addition to monetary policy, the 1980s witnessed a more active use of 
the exchange rate as a policy instrument: the devaluations in 1981 and 1984
The final period presents a radically different policy regime, dominated by 
a forceful retrenchment of the public sector. From 1986 onwards, real government 
expenditures stagnated (see Table 5.8 of Chapter 5), while the revenue ratio rapidly 
increased. The state enterprise investment ratio declined, while its savings ratio 
rose. The outcome is the emergence of a substantial public sector savings surplus.
Despite the contractionary public sector policy, the current-account deficit 
rose to very high levels. Monetary authorities tried to cool down the economy 
through a high interest rate policy but the outcome was perverse. The high interest 
rates did little to reduce private investment, but they were instrumental in attracting 
large capital inflows, adding to the liquidity of the financial system
What is the assessment of these policies and the policy changes? A number 
of points emerge. Can enough regularities in the policy packages and in the way 
they were implemented be identified to speak of “policy regimes”? A number of 
observations can be made:
1. To analyze policy packages one should not stick to the usual concept 
of fiscal policy, but rather look at public sector policy. Thailand's 
public sector is composed of government and state enterprises. State 
enterprises are predominantly located in the public utilities and public 
transport sectors. Their pricing (and thus profits and savings) 
decisions and investment plans are subject to control by political 
bodies. The aggregate demand effect and any crowding-in or 
crowding-out of private investment should be measured for the public 
sector as a whole.
The preceding analysis has revealed some of the problems in the 
implementation of public sector policy. In period I, public sector 
polices were sharply contractionary. With hindsight, it could be 
suggested that policies were excessively contractionary' and contributed 
to the low economic growth rates of 1974 and 1975 (see Jansen 1991, 
Chapter 5). In period II, the expansionary public sector stand was the 
necessary result of the increased external loans flowing into the 
country. But in periods III and IV a more contractionary' position 
would have better fitted the needs of the circumstances. There are also 
indications that the authorities in those years tried to control the public 
sector balance, but simply failed in the face of economic and political 
realities. On the other hand, the experience of period V shows that a 
sharp contraction of the public sector deficit is possible. This would 
seem to suggest that the economic and political cost of handling the
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public sector policy instruments are substantial, so that extreme action 
is only undertaken in extreme circumstances.
2. Monetary policy seems more often to be in line with the requirements 
of the period. The effectiveness of monetary policy is seriously affected 
by changes in the international financial markets and the changing 
relationship between the Thai financial system and these markets. In a 
probably somewhat exaggerated way, it could be suggested that Thai 
monetary policy is only possible when international interest rates are 
very high. With low international rates, domestic credit controls can 
be bypassed by firms that can also borrow abroad. Domestic interest 
rate policy also becomes difficult: the combination of high domestic 
and low international interest rates induces firms to borrow abroad and 
invites a capital inflow into the country that would further increase the 
liquidity of the financial markets. To some extent that is the situation 
in which monetary authorities find themselves in the most recent 
period. The liberalization of capital movements that was started in 
1990 will further strengthen these interactions.
The monetary system is the main avenue along which the private- 
to-public sector transfer is enforced: the general public in Thailand 
does not hold many government bonds; the main domestic financing 
of the PSBR is done by financial institutions, which have then, of 
course, less funds left for the private sector. In that way, total 
aggregate demand can be held within limits that are compatible with 
stability'. The discussion of crowding-out in Chapter 5 raised doubts 
about whether such monetary policy measures were very effective. It 
was argued that, in periods III and IV, public sector imbalances may 
have reduced the private sector's desire to invest, rather than its ability 
to finance investments.
3. The years 1984-1985 show a fundamental change in trade policy. 
Until then, the nominal exchange rate of the baht vis-a-vis the U.S. 
dollar had been remarkably stable. It had become the sy mbol of the 
economic stability of the country and, therefore, politically difficult to 
change. The 1981 and 1984 devaluations also led to considerable 
political upheaval and the eventual resignation of the responsible 
Finance Ministers. The stable and overvalued baht helped to combat 
inflation and taxed the traditional exports and also helped to keep the 
local prices of exported goods low. There is, for example, a direct 
relationship between the export price of rice and the domestic market 
price. The overvalued baht (and also, until 1986, the rice export 
premium) helped to keep domestic rice prices relatively low. New 
manufactured exports were compensated by the fact that the 
overvalued baht made imported inputs relatively cheap. The steady 
decline in the effective import duty ratio in the period 1970 to 1981 
further helped to cheapen imported inputs. An increased use of export 
incentives further helped to compensate for the overvalued exchange 
rate. The serious balance-of-payment problems of the early 1980s
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provided the immediate impetus for the sharp devaluation of 1984. 
But, behind these immediate concerns, one can discern a longer-term 
and more structural factor as well By the mid-1980s, Thailand's 
export pattern had fundamentally changed: the share of traditional 
primary-commodity exports was rapidly falling, and manufactured 
goods came up to about half of the total merchandise exports. These 
manufactured goods are exported to very competitive markets and the 
devaluation was necessary to strengthen their profitability.
Since 1984, the baht has been tied to a basket of currencies rather 
than to the U.S. dollar. The composition of the basket is not known 
and that gives monetary authorities some discretion in exchange rate 
policy. This has removed the political pressure that used to exist over 
the exchange rate. Also, since 1984, the baht has tended to follow the 
U.S. dollar, which makes sense, as the United States is the main 
destination of Thai manufactured exports.
4. Price policies and trade policies have not been used very consistently. 
Wage policies are difficult to measure. The rapid increase in the 
nominal and real minimum wage rate that was observed in the 1970s 
is not necessarily meaningful. The legal minimum wage in the 1970s 
may have been below the actual market rate. It is also generally 
observed that the legal minimum rate is poorly enforced, so that no 
relationship need exist between the legal rate and the actual market 
rate. Labor market policies in Thailand have certainly never been 
supportive of labor. There are also indications that public sector 
salaries have stayed behind private sector incomes. But these have 
been features of the long-term labor policy rather than of the role of 
wage policies in the adjustment efforts.
Agricultural price policies have been rather passive and never 
excessively exploitative. Most o f the major primary commodities are 
exported as well as used domestically. The world market prices are 
allowed to directly influence domestic prices: only in a few cases (rice, 
sugar) did taxes and premiums try to dampen the domestic impact of 
high world market prices.
The prices of the energy-intensive state enterprises (petroleum, 
electricity, public transport) have always been politically sensitive. 
After the oil price increases of 1973 and 1979, losses were subsidized 
and public transport is still not able to cover its own cost. Public sector 
reform policies are complicated by these political pressures. Still, an 
important aspect of the adjustment policies in the 1980s has been to 
rationalize public sector prices in order to improve public sector 
finances.
5. In a longer-term perspective one could see the entire period 1978-1988 
as one in which Thai policy makers had to adjust to shocks and 
changes in the world economy. Crucial to the success of adjustment is 
whether domestic savings and net exports can be increased. Up to 
1986 there was a decline in the private sector savings ratio. The
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recovery in the final period was caused by a sharp rise in the private 
corporate savings ratio.
Also the share of the traded-goods sector in GDP declined 
somewhat over the period 1978-1986. The trend of this share is the net 
result of the opposing trends of the two main traded sectors. The share 
of the manufacturing sector increased in the years 1978-1981, stag­
nated in the period 1982-1985, and grew rapidly since then The 
growth rate of real exports has been satisfactory throughout: the 
average growth rate per year was 9.7 percent over the period 1978- 
1986 (against 4.7% for real imports) and 19.7 percent in the years 
1987-1990 (27% for imports).
It could be concluded that, over the years of adjustment, it proved 
more difficult to increase domestic savings than to increase foreign 
exchange earnings. Trade policies have not figured prominently in 
Thailand's adjustment efforts. The tariff structure that was is place in 
1970 was largely maintained Tariffs on individual commodities were 
adjusted, but the average level of protection against imports did not 
change much over the two decades. They were, however, increasingly 
compensated by export promotion measures, such as credit facilities 
and investment incentives for export industries.
6. The social dimensions of adjustment are only partially captured by our 
analysis. Indicators like wage levels, agricultural terms of trade, 
government welfare spending and employment growth do not suggest 
that adjustment has been at the expense of lower-income groups. This 
is only partially the outcome of discretionary government policies: 
traditionally, the Thai government has not been very active in areas of 
wage and pricing policies and there is no excessive government 
commitment to social welfare provision. Trends in these areas can 
better be explained from the longer-term position of the Thai 
government. There has been no active wage policy, but trade union 
activities have been discouraged, partly for political reasons and partly 
to prevent conditions wherein wage demands could initiate or 
propagate an inflationary process. Agricultural prices have been 
allowed to fluctuate with world market trends. In the 1960s and 1970s, 
export taxes on rice and sugar were only used to dampen the effect of 
very high world market prices on domestic prices, not as a major 
source of government income. Prices of other commodities were left 
free. This policy has ensured local producers o f a reasonable return 
and has certainly contributed to the rapid diversification in agriculture 
in Thailand.
There is no strong social welfare tradition in Thailand. The 
government subsidizes standard activities in areas of education, health, 
and urban housing, but there are no extensive welfare programs aimed 
at the poor and other disadvantaged groups within the society. It could 
be suggested that most welfare spending is aimed at middle-income 
rather than low-income groups. It may, therefore, not be surprising 
that welfare spending levels were maintained.
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7. The picture that arises from these points is that in Thailand there is a 
strong concern over the stability of the economy, as measured in 
particular by the inflation rate and the exchange rate. The main 
macroeconomic policy instruments used for adjustment have been 
fiscal and public sector policy and exchange rate policy. Trade policy 
and trade liberalization and price policies were not actively applied 
Monetary policy tried to contain excess demand through high interest 
rates.
In 1990, it has to be concluded that the success of adjustment in 
Thailand has been considerable. Even throughout the adjustment 
period (say 1978-1986), the average growth rate was 5.9 percent a year 
and the growth rate of real exports 9.7 percent, despite the fact that 
many policy indicators pointed in the wrong direction (for example, 
the public sector expansion and the overvalued exchange rate).
Generally in developing countries, a situation of excess demand would lead 
to a current-account deficit and an accumulation of external debt on the one hand 
and to inflation and a loss of competitiveness on international markets on the other. 
These problems then subsequently define the aims of adjustment policies. The case 
o f Thailand, however, shows some special features.
The excess demand led to a current-account deficit,, but also invited a sub­
stantial supply response. Output growth in agriculture and particularly in manufac­
turing has been very responsive and rapid. The cautious monetary policy did not fi­
nance the public sector deficit by printing money, but rather by domestic and for­
eign borrowing The result was a high interest rate, but a low rate of inflation. The 
moderate level of inflation helped to keep the real exchange rate at a reasonable 
level and the competitiveness of exports was further enhanced by special incentives. 
These factors together may explain the good growth performance of exports.
Despite the rapid growth of exports, there was the imminent danger of a 
debt crisis around 1985, when various debt indicators were at their peak. But the 
danger was recognized and effective public sector adjustment was then quickly un­
dertaken.
Three further reasons may be suggested for the comparative success of 
Thai adjustment:
• There were unhelpful policy elements, but they were never so strong as 
to fully undermine private sector adjustment.
•  The central concern with stability (inflation, exchange rate) created 
confidence in domestic and foreign private-sector investors.
• The expansion of the public sector investment (partly financed by 
external finance) was relatively well used. Infrastructural investments 
by the government and public utilities investments by state enterprises 
helped to create conditions for private sector expansion. Thailand has 
relatively little experience with typical “white elephant” projects.

Chapter 7
Conclusions and Policy 
Recommendations
SU M M A R Y  OF FINDING S
T h i s  study provides an assessment of the role of external finance in the process of 
growth and structural change in Thailand. In the two decades under study, Thailand 
experienced two periods in which external financial flows played a central role. In 
the first period, roughly between 1975 and 1985, foreign loans were directed al the 
public sector and, in the second period after 1986, capital inflows were dominated 
by direct and portfolio investments in the private sector.
One o f the key arguments of this study is that the origins of both these 
booms in foreign capital inflows have to be sought on the international supply side 
of funds. In the 1970s excess liquidity and institutional change at international fi­
nancial markets rather suddenly increased the access of developing countries to 
commercial loans. In the late 1980s the main reason for the increase in direct for­
eign investment was the realignments of the major currencies and the increasing 
cost o f production in Japan and the main Asian NIEs.
The main purpose of this study has been to analyze how these changes in 
international finance have affected economic development and economic stability. 
The methodological approach has taken as its point of departure the macroeconomic 
accumulation balance:
F = I - S
which directly links external finance to the domestic investment-savings balance. 
This study has focused on the interaction between international financial flows and 
the savings and investment patterns of the main institutional agents in society that 
receive the funds. To go beyond the conventional approaches of this subject, the 
agents are disaggregated into four different groups, namely households and unin­
corporated businesses, private (financial and non-financial) corporations, public en­
terprises, and the government sector.
The structural differences in the spending behavior among the four institu­
tions provide a complex environment to assess the adjustment process and evaluate
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the effectiveness of structural adjustment policies and debt management in 
Thailand. The capability of the economy to respond to shifts in the availability of 
different sources of external finance has been shown to depend on the diverging 
savings and investment behavior of the major institutional agents.
As the central focus is on the accumulation behavior of the various eco­
nomic agents, Chapter 2 provided a description of the role and position of the 
agents in Thailand's economic structure and the major changes in it. Three main 
dimensions of economic change over the period 1970-1990 were observed. The first 
relates to the rapid growth of the modern corporate sector and the relative stagna­
tion of the role of the self-employed household businesses. This process has widened 
the productivity and income gaps between the sectors and has contributed to further 
sectoral segmentation. In particular, the productivity and incomes in the agricul­
tural sector stayed relatively behind.
A second observation is that the Thai economy has become more integrated 
with world markets in terms of both trade and of finance. International capital flows 
have increased strongly and, in the process, the Thai financial system has become 
increasingly integrated with international financial markets, making it more diffi­
cult for monetary' authorities to directly control the monetary aggregates The very 
rapid growth of the trade ratios, to very high levels by the end of the two decades, 
further underlined the increasingly open nature of the Thai economy.
The third point is that, although short-term macroeconomic instability 
never reached excessive levels, the capital inflows were associated with increased 
instability. Both periods of capital inflows were associated with increased short-term 
instability. In the decade 1975-1985, all stability indicators (inflation, current-ac­
count deficit, fiscal deficit) were on the rise. The more recent period has shown sur­
prising stability, but the last two years suggest that this balance may be precarious: 
both inflation and the current-account deficit are rising.
Chapter 3 analyzed in detail Thailand's commercial and financial relation­
ships with the rest of the world. International finance came to Thailand in two 
waves. The first period, roughly 1975-1985, was dominated by long-term loans to 
the public sector, and the second period, after 1986, by direct and portfolio 
investment and loans to the private corporate sector. The capital inflows from 
abroad were mainly directed at the public utilities in the public sector, and at 
manufacturing in the private sector. The period of public sector loans led, by the 
early 1980s, to rising concerns about the level of the debt and the debt servicing 
burden it imposed on the Thai economy.
The growth of exports has been spectacular. Exports diversified rapidly. 
Traditionally, agricultural products had been the base of Thai exports. They contin­
ued to perform strongly, with a diversification of export crops and an increase in 
products that were exported in processed forms. But the dominant feature o f Thai 
exports has become the rapid growth of manufactured exports. Also, imports ex­
panded very rapidly. The composition of imports has been dominated by interm edi­
ate and capital goods. Particularly in the last few years the imports have risen very 
fast, so that, despite the export boom, the current-account deficit has reached very 
high levels.
The inflow of external finance directly increases the resources available to 
the receiving sector. The analysis of the sectoral accumulation balances in Chapter 
4 clearly shows that the investment levels o f sectors that received foreign finance
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substantially increased. This can only lead to a sustainable path of economic growth 
if  the increase in investments will subsequently result in an increase in domestic 
savings. Chapter 4 concentrated on that question through the analysis o f the savings 
and investment behavior of the principal institutional agents.
Chapter 4 concluded that the accumulation behavior differs considerably 
between the four economic agents. It is, therefore, better to estimate the sectoral pat­
terns and derive estimates of total savings and investments from the sum of their 
component parts, rather than try to explain the aggregated savings and investment 
function itself.
The analysis confirmed that there is a direct and positive relationship be­
tween capital inflows and the level of the investment ratio of the sector that receives 
the inflow, particularly so for private corporations and state enterprises. It is also 
concluded that the impact of capital inflows can be easily destabilizing. Investments 
rise, while savings rise less. In the state enterprise sector, savings even fall with 
higher capital inflows, and in the household and private corporate sectors savings 
will rise, but for the whole economy, the investment-savings gap widens, thus ex­
tending the dependence on foreign funds.
Chapter 5 extends the analysis o f Chapter 4 by looking at the domestic in­
tersectoral financial relationships using Flow-of-Funds statistics. The analysis of fi­
nancial intermediation and portfolio behavior identifies public and private sector 
demands for and claims on domestic and foreign financial assets. The main finding 
o f Chapters 4 and 5 was that the inflow of foreign funds to a sector tends to increase 
the investment-savings gap of that sector by more than the size of the external 
funds. In the period 1975-1985, when capital inflows concentrated on the public 
sector, the public sector investment ratio increased rapidly while its savings ratio 
declined. The public sector investment-savings gap widened by more than the for­
eign capital inflows, leading to an additional demand for domestic funds.
A similar pattern can be observed in the most recent period, when the capi­
tal inflows led to a rapid rise of private sector investment and, although private 
savings also increased somewhat, the private sector investment-savings gap 
widened considerably, beyond the level of the capital inflows. As in the earlier 
period, there was again an increased demand for domestic credit. The financial 
system could satisfy that demand because of the surplus of the public sector and the 
large capital inflows from abroad.
The changes in the fiscal balances in the last few years have been dramatic. 
Over the entire period the tax ratio has been increasing rather slowly but steadily. 
The main fiscal problem in the past had been that expenditures were increasing 
faster. This process was reversed in the mid-1980s. The government investment ra­
tio had been declining throughout the two decades under study and, in fact, gov­
ernm ent investments in real terms had stagnated since 1980. Around 1985, the ris­
ing trend of the current expenditure ratio was also turned around into a decline. 
This resulted in a budget surplus from 1988 onwards which helped Thailand to 
weather the ongoing private sector investment boom without major macroeconomic 
instability.
Chapter 6 described and analyzed how economic policy dealt with the 
challenges presented by the external factors. The public sector loan boom of 1975- 
1985 was accompanied by an expansionary public sector policy, while cautious 
monetary policies were used to defend macroeconomic stability. However, this pol­
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icy regime was not sustainable. In the first place, the public-sector savings ratio 
remained low, so that the public-sector external debt and the debt-servicing burden 
kept on growing to dangerous levels. Second, the public sector claims on domestic 
credit also increased, which, in combination with the cautious monetary policy, led 
to high real interest rates. These macroeconomic imbalances undermined the confi­
dence of the private sector; private investment and economic growth declined. The 
third factor which made the external debt-financing unsustainable was the external 
economic shocks of the early 1980s. The increase in international interest rates, the 
second oil shock, the world recession of the early 1980s and the debt crisis in 1982 
all contributed to an increase in the real debt burden.
The policy shifts that were then implemented were radical. The rather 
weak attempts at public sector control that could be seen in the earlier period were 
now replaced by a forceful and comprehensive retrenchment of the public sector. 
This, together with the reluctantly or cautiously expansionary monetary policy posi­
tion, created the conditions for the private sector investment boom to take place 
without serious inflationary consequences. The cautious wage policy, the decline in 
import duties and the relatively stable baht further help to dampen inflationary im ­
pulses.
It is interesting to trace Thailand's attempts at structural adjustment over 
the years. Initially, in the early 1980s, tight monetary policy and currency devalu­
ations were the main instruments used to reduce macroeconomic imbalances. When 
these policies failed to have sufficient impact, more adequate action was taken 
around 1985/86. A cap was imposed on further public sector external borrowing 
and public sector expenditures were radically curtailed. By a fortunate coincidence, 
the deflationary effects of this contractionary public sector policy were neutralized 
by the sudden increase in direct foreign investment in 1987.
This experience certainly confirms the crucial importance o f public sector 
financial reforms to the success o f adjustment policies. Large public sector deficits 
put a heavy burden on domestic financial markets and undermine the private sec­
tor's confidence in the economy. These factors work against the increase in the pri­
vate sector production of traded goods that is necessary to relieve the external debt 
burden. It is only when these fundamental balances have been restored that currency 
realignments can exert their incentive effects on export production and direct for­
eign investment.
P O L IC Y  R EC O M M E N D A T IO N S
As mentioned, the performance o f economic policies in the past, judged by 
their present outcomes, has been exceptionally good. That does not, however, imply 
that there are no serious problems facing economic policy-makers today.
The recent changes in the types of capital inflows may have had positive 
effects on the growth and efficiency of the economy, but they have, so far, not led to 
an aggregate savings-investment balance that would make the pattern of growth 
sustainable in the long run. In particular, the high level of investment and growth 
has not solved the long-standing problem of the relatively low private savings ratio 
in Thailand. There are even some indications that the large inflows of direct and 
portfolio investments have contributed to speculative drives on the stock market and
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in land and rcal-estate prices that have stimulated private consumption rather than 
savings.
The failure of private savings to increase has also meant that, despite the 
rapid growth of exports, the current-account deficit has been larger in the last few 
years than ever before. The foreign and domestic private investment in the recent 
period has concentrated on production for export markets and a phenomenal in­
crease in exports can be noted. But these investments have also concentrated on sec­
tors with high import dependency and with low linkages to the rest o f the economy. 
The growth in domestic income that the investments have generated has further 
contributed to import demands.
Thailand's increased dependence on foreign capital and the increase in the 
share of production aimed at export markets has made the economy more vulnerable 
to fluctuations of the world markets and to international trade policies. So far, that 
has been to Thailand's benefit. Its competitive advantage has meant that it could ex­
pand exports very rapidly even in years when world trade was growing only slowly. 
But, in the future, competition from other low-wage-cost countries (for example, 
China or Vietnam) may undermine that performance.
The sustainability of the present model of development may be undermined 
by the following three main problems, namely the sectoral imbalance in the econ­
omy, the public-private sector balance, and the problems of macroeconomic m an­
agement.
1. The sectoral imbalance in the economy. As Chapter 2 noted, there is a 
growing gap in growth of production and productivity, as well as 
incomes, along different modes of classification. The gaps exist 
between modern corporations and small household production units, 
between industry and agriculture, between Bangkok and the rest of the 
country, and between rural and urban areas. This pattern is related to 
the allocation of investment resources, and the increased reliance on 
foreign finance has certainly further contributed to it. The growing 
income gaps can generate social and political problems in the future. 
Economically, they imply that domestic demand for industrial goods 
remains low, due to the relatively low incomes of the majority of the 
population.
2. The public-private sector balance. As indicated in Chapters 4 and 5, 
capital inflows affected sectoral investment levels and, thus, also the 
public-private sector balance of total investment. It was also suggested 
that in the early 1980s there may have been some indirect crowding- 
out of private investment. The situation in recent years had been 
different. The country experienced a boom in private investment with 
retrenchment of public investment. However, the recent private invest­
ment boom and the retrenchment of public investment have raised the 
question whether there is sufficient public investment to provide the 
adequate infrastructure support of the rapidly expanding private sector. 
The privatization of public services is facing some difficulties as 
private agents find it difficult to borrow the funds required for these 
large projects. W hat is the proper balance between public and private 
investment and how can it be attained?
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3. The problems of macroeconomic management. The foreign capital in­
flows also cause some destabilization. Macroeconomic imbalances are, 
in particular, reflected in the widening domestic savings gap (mainly 
private sector) and in the inability of growth of export earnings to keep 
pace with the explosive growth of import demand. The contractionary 
public sector policy has helped to prevent excessive inflationary 
impulses. The structural changes and the policy shifts have made the 
task of monetary policy very difficult. The repayment of domestic 
public debt and the inflow of capital from abroad has led to a high 
liquidity of the financial system and to a very high level of 
international reserves. The liberalization of international financial 
transactions has led to a further integration of the domestic financial 
system with the international markets and has reduced the 
effectiveness of monetary policy instruments.
These three problems raise important questions for macroeconomic policy 
and management, on which the following policy recommendations are formulated.
1. To reduce the sectoral imbalances in the economy would require a 
reallocation of investment. It could be suggested that the government should take 
the lead in this process, both through the allocation of its own investments and 
through the incentives it provides to stimulate and steer private investment. Such 
programs should aim to stimulate the investments in agriculture and, in general, in 
the up-country provinces. An effective program to support small-scale businesses 
would be highly useful in this respect.
An important public sector policy would be to provide supporting infra­
structure and education. These policies would aim to make the backward sector 
more productive and competitive.
Most direct foreign investments in large projects seek Board o f Investment 
promotion. This allows the government to steer the investments to target sectors and 
regions.
2. To find the correct balance between the public and private sectors is a 
delicate task. The analysis in this study suggested that, in the early 1980s, the high 
level o f public sector spending, and in particular its domestic financing require­
ments, was excessive and reduced the private sector's role in the economy. In recent 
years, it has been suggested that the curtailment of the public sector has gone too 
far. At present, private investors complain about the lack of adequate infrastructure 
and about the shortage of educated manpower. In addition, the fiscal stringency has 
meant that public sector salaries have stayed behind, so that the public sector finds 
it difficult to retain its qualified manpower. There can be no doubt that the 
efficiency in the public sector could be further increased, but it is also clear that the 
level o f public sector spending will have to increase substantially for it to be able to 
keep on supporting private sector growth. The present fiscal surplus would appear 
to create an opportunity for non-inflationary expansion of public sector spending. 
On the other hand, the public sector surplus is necessary to balance the private 
sector savings gap, and any reduction of the public sector surplus, without a 
simultaneous improvement of the private sector balance, will lead to a further 
expansion of the current-account deficit.
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Given that excessive borrowing is to be avoided, domestic private savings 
thus need to be strengthened. This study, as well as the general literature on private 
savings in developing countries, does not lead to the identification of concrete pol­
icy instruments that will help to increase private savings. The findings in Chapter 4 
suggested that the household and private corporate savings ratios have been mainly 
influenced by changes in income. This indicates that economic policies which result 
in a steady increase in private sector, particularly household sector, income are the 
key to mobilize domestic savings. It has been suggested that the speculative booms 
in recent years on the stock market and in land prices have taken private savings 
away from more beneficial uses. Regulations that would prevent such speculative 
busts and bangs would be in the general interest.
3. In contrast to earlier periods, the current-account deficit in recent 
years has not been due to public sector deficits but to sharp increases in private 
sector investment. Although much of the investment, particularly foreign 
investment, has been concentrated in export-oriented industries, it tends to have 
relatively high import content and fewer linkages to domestic economy. Foreign 
capital inflows have also increased domestic incomes and prices, which further 
stimulated import demand. The recent spurt in foreign direct and portfolio 
investments also led to profit and dividend outward remittances, which increased to 
be 0.68 percent of GDP and 1.79 percent of exports in 1990.
If the present trend of the current-account deficit continues, the external 
debt, this time of the private sector, may again rise to levels that would undermine 
foreign confidence in the economy. As exports are already growing very fast, it is 
clear that macroeconomic policies should concentrate on reducing domestic con­
sumption and import demand.
Direct foreign investment inflows in recent years concentrated on export- 
oriented activities. But they also concentrated on sectors or activities with a high 
import dependency and low linkages with domestic economy. This pattern is unde­
sirable and investment incentives may be used to steer projects to sectors with 
greater backward and forward linkages and with a lower import dependency. In 
addition, the second phase import substitution should be emphasized to promote in­
vestment in upstream activities which can produce substitutes for imported raw 
materials and intermediate products as well as capital goods. In these areas, the 
Board of Investment can play an important role by using its incentive scheme.
To narrow the widening domestic savings gap, domestic savings have to be 
encouraged in the private sector. Some fiscal policy instruments may be helpful to 
induce higher private sector savings in the form of tax incentives given particularly 
to long-term savings, for example, mutual fund and pension fund. Moreover, new 
types of financial instruments issued by the private sector have to be encouraged, so 
that they can attract more private sector savings.
The main policy instruments for macroeconomic management remain fis­
cal or public sector policy and monetary policy. In the last few years, the record of 
fiscal policy has been exemplary; large surpluses were realized that were necessary 
to balance private sector deficits. It is to be expected, however, that in the coming 
years spending pressures will increase. In fact, the preceding observations suggest 
that the level of public sector spending will have to be increased to support future 
private sector expansion. And, when growth rates decline from their present high
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level, the rapid increase in tax revenues may also fall. It is, therefore, likely that the 
public sector surpluses will diminish in the near future. That would make it even 
more urgent to address the large private sector savings gap. Can monetary policy 
help to do that?
In the past, monetary policy has always been cautious. Public sector deficits 
were financed through borrowing rather than money creation. The record of low in­
flation rates show the great success of these policies. However, with the disappear­
ance of public sector deficits, this function has become less urgent. Control of the 
private sector deficits has proven to be more difficult. The trend towards the in­
tensification and liberalization of the linkages between the Thai financial markets 
and the international markets has been strengthened in the last few years. In the 
process, the monetary authorities have lost some of the direct controls over the 
monetary aggregates, and the implementation of monetary policy has certainly 
become more difficult and probably less effective. The usual policy to deal with 
excess spending and the current-account deficit would be credit restriction and high 
interest rates. However, the last years show that such policies may have perverse 
effects. The high interest rates do little to stimulate aggregate domestic savings or to 
discourage private investment, but they do attract a large inflow of foreign funds, 
which further add to the liquidity of the financial system.
Increasingly, the focus of monetary policy will be on the control of the ex­
change rate. Interventions on the domestic money market and on the foreign ex­
change market will be used to keep domestic interest rates in line with foreign rates, 
so as to control the exchange rate. As a result, the control over the domestic mone­
tary aggregates will be looser. An appropriate and stable exchange rate is a crucial 
factor for an open economy like Thailand, whose growth depends on exports and 
foreign investment. It ensures international competitiveness and investor confi­
dence.
The conclusion at the end of this study may be short. The impact o f foreign 
finance on the Thai economy in the last two decades has been strong and decisive. It 
has affected the sectoral allocation of investment, the growth performance and the 
stability of the economy. In the first period of capital inflows, public sector invest­
ment grew rapidly, but eventually this resulted in an unsustainable external debt 
burden and in substantial domestic imbalances. After a period of structural adjust­
ment to deal with these problems, the second period of capital inflows showed even 
stronger impacts. The private sector investment ratio and the economic growth rate 
rose to unprecedented levels. Inflationary pressures were contained through a strin­
gent fiscal policy, but the current-account deficit widened substantially.
The main macroeconomic problem remains the level of domestic savings, 
which is too low for a country with such high levels of investment. At the sectoral 
level, the main problem is the growing gap between productivity and income levels 
between major sectors and regions. As argued, policy making should concentrate on 
the removal of these two obstacles to stable and equitable growth.
Appendix to Chapter 2
Concepts and Compilation of 
the MSAF
I n  Tabic 2A. 1, Ihe outline for the MSAF is presented and in Tables 2.1 and 2.2 the 
MSAFs for 1975 (MSAF75) and 1985 (MSAF85) are presented in millions of 
current baht. Referring to Table 2A. 1, it can be observed that the major breakdown 
of the MSAF is into a matrix of current transactions (row/columns 1 to 12) and a 
matrix of capital transactions (row/columns 13 to 22). Within these two matrices 
some blocks can be identified.
In the matrix of current transactions, four blocks can be distinguished: 
Block 1 (row/columns 1 to 4) contains the input-output relationships between the 
sectors of production; it describes the technical production structure and the inter­
dependencies between the productive sectors.
Block 2 is the value-added block. Value added at factor costs are broken 
down over wages (row 5) and profits— the latter is further disaggregated into the 
gross operating surplus of the unincorporated sector (row 6)— and that of (private 
and state) corporations [row 7]). Adding row 11 (indirect taxes), leads to value
added at market prices. Adding vertically leads to total output or supply. Taking
agriculture as an example (column 1):
• rows 1 to 4 add up to the total intermediate inputs into agriculture;
• rows 5 to 7 add the Value Added produced in the sector;
• row 11 adds the indirect taxes;
• and row 12 adds the imports o f agricultural commodities; the grand to­
tal is the total supply of agricultural commodities, which, o f course, 
must be equal to the total demand, i.e., the total of row 1. Block 3 
shows how the current income is distributed and redistributed. First, 
there is the distribution of the income of the factors of production (as 
was given in the value added block) to the economic agents or institu­
tions (cells 5,8 to 11,7). For example, the wage incomes earned in the 
four productive sectors (cells 5,1 to 5,4), as well as wages earned 
abroad (cell 5,12), are received by the households (cell 8,5). The other
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element in this block is the current transfers between these institutions, 
such as interest and dividend payments, direct tax payments, govern­
ment subsidies and current transfers with the rest o f the world 
(row/columns 8 to 12). For example, the payments of dividends by pri­
vate corporations to share-owning households and payments of interest 
on the deposits of households with the private banks is reported in cell 
8,9. Block 4 is the last block in the current transaction sub-matrix. It 
includes domestic consumption demand for the commodities of the 
four sectors (split over household [column 8] and government [column 
11] consumption) and the foreign demand for these commodities 
(export of goods and services, column 12). This block shows how cur­
rent income is spent on current consumption. The difference between 
current income and current spending are the savings.
T able A2.1 M acroeconom ic Social Accounting Fram ew ork, the Concepts
CURRENT TRANSACTIONS ACCOUNT
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9  
AGR MFG CON SER WAG UIN. COR HH PR.
PR P.PR CRP
1 AGRICULTURE
2 MINING&MFG
C A 3 CONSTR&PUBL.UTIL. 
U C 4 SERV1CES&OTHERS 
R C 5 WAGES 
R O 6 UNINC.PROFITS 
E U 7 CORP.PROFITS 
N N 8 HOUSEHOLDS 
T T 9 PRIV.CORP.
10 STATE ENTERPR.
11 GOVERNMENT
12 REST OF WORLD
BLOCK 1 BLOCK 4
BLOCK 2 BLOCK 3
13 HOUSEHOLDS
14 PRIV.CORP.
C A 15 STATE ENTERPR. 
A C  16 GOVERNMENT 
P C  17 OTHER WEALTH 
I O  18 BANK OF THAIL 
T U  19 COMMERC.BANKS 
A N 20 OTHER FIN.INSTIT.
L T 21 INFORMAL FINANCE 
22 REST OF WORLD
GRAND TOTAL
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These savings provide the link to the sub-matrix of capital transactions. In 
the matrix of capital transactions, three blocks have been separated Savings of the 
various institutions are given in block 5, including foreign savings (cell 22,12). 
These savings are used to finance investments. In block 6, the capital formation of 
each institution is given.
Together with block 4, block 6 also adds up to total final demand, which is 
composed of consumption by households (column 8), consumption by government 
(column 11), exports (column 12) and investments (columns 13 to 21). Together 
with the intermediate demand of block 1, final demand adds up to total demand. For 
agriculture, row 1, for example, total demand is made up of:
total intermediate deliveries (columns 1 to 4); 
household consumption of agricultural commodities (column 8); 
government consumption of agricultural commodities (column 11); 
exports o f agricultural commodities (column 12); and 
investments in agricultural commodities (columns 13 to 17).
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Conceptually, this is where most SAMs stop. The innovative aspect of the 
MSAF is that it tries to make financial linkages in the economy, and of the economy 
with the rest of the world, somewhat more explicit. It is clear that for each 
individual agent, investments and savings do not match. In MSAF85, for example, 
investments by non-financial private corporations are 110,315 million baht, while 
savings arc only 83,497 million baht. This gap has to be filled. The flow-of-funds 
block of the MSAF, block 7, shows how this is done. In block 7 there is a sub-block 
of direct capital transactions among institutions (row/columns 13 to 16). 
Households, for example, provide share capital to private corporations (cell 14,13) 
or buy government securities (cell 16,13). Corporations may provide credit to each 
other and to state enterprises, etc. The rest of the flow-of-funds block shows the pat­
terns of financial intermediation, i.e., the flows of funds that occur through finan­
cial institutions. Adding block 5 and block 7 horizontally gives the total sources of 
funds for each of the institutions. Private corporations, row 14, for example, obtain 
funds from:
own savings (column 9);
capital transfers from households (share capital, column 13);
capital transfers from state enterprises (for example, trade credit, 
column 15);
credit from commercial banks (column 19);
credit from other financial institutions (column 20); and
funds from abroad (column 22).
To see how private corporations use these funds, we can add vertically, i.e., 
column 14:
own investments (rows 1 to 4); 
giving credit to households (row 13);
obtain financial assets with other private corporations, for example, 
through trade credit or purchase of shares (row 14);
obtain financial assets with state enterprises (row 15);
purchase government securities (row 16);
invest in inventories (row 17);
increase holdings of currency (row 18);
increase bank deposits (row 19);
increase deposits with other financial institutions (row 20); 
set out credit through the informal money market (row 21); and 
obtain foreign financial assets, or repay foreign debts (row 22).
The compilation of the MSAF is a complex task of integrating information 
from various, often inconsistent, data sources. We chose to compile MSAFs for
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1975 and 1985, mainly because the availability of data for these years was some­
what better than for other years. For 1975, a rather complete information set was 
available, consisting of: (a) the 1975 National Accounts as revised in 1987 (NESDB 
1988), (b) a Social Accounting Matrix for 1975 (NESDB-IBRD 1982), (c) an Input- 
Output table (NESDB, the Institute of Developing Economies, and the National 
Statistical Office 1980), (d) Flow-of-Funds Accounts (NESDB/Bank of Thailand 
1982), and (e) financial statistics published in the Bank of Thailand quarterly.
There are discrepancies, first of all because (b), (c) and (d) still refer to the 
old (i.e., before the recent revision) National Accounts estimates, and also because 
the various sources use different concepts and definitions and different estimation 
methods.
In the MSAF75, we have used the new National Accounts estimates as ref­
erences for the macroeconomic aggregates (Value Added, Consumption, 
Investment, Exports, Imports) and used other sources (for example, the 
Input/Output table and SAM) to estimate the sectoral and institutional breakdown of 
these aggregates. The Input/Output table was the main source for blocks 1 and 4 of 
the MSAF75; the I/O table was used together with the SAM to fill in blocks 2 and
6. The figures in block 3 were mainly derived from the National Accounts, and 
blocks 5 and 7 were based on National Accounts, Flow-of-Funds Accounts and 
financial statistics. The statistical discrepancies that remained after this were 
relatively small and acceptable. Account 17 of the MSAF, “Other W ealth,” which 
conceptually should include changes in stocks, was used as a residue category to 
bring overall balance to the MSAF. Account 17 of the MSAF75 shows an 
accumulation of “Other Wealth” of 5,346 million baht, whereas the National 
Accounts of 1975 give an estimate of “Changes in Stocks” of 11,754 million baht. 
The data situation for 1985 is considerably more problematic. No SAM for 1985, or 
a nearby year, was available. An Input/Output table and Flow-of-Funds Accounts 
were only available in provisional and incomplete form. Some gaps could be filled 
by making, hopefully reasonable, assumptions based on secondary' data. But 
significant discrepancies remained and the entries in account 17, necessary to 
balance row and column totals, are in some cases substantial. The problems are 
concentrated in the flow-of-funds block, where the gaps between the total sources 
and total uses of funds of the household, private and public corporate sectors are 
quite substantial. We have assumed that the recorded sources and uses of funds are 
correct and that any discrepancy between them is due to unrecorded sources or 
unrecorded uses of funds; these unrecorded funds are then included in account 17. 
These data problems should be kept in mind in the rest of this study, when 
conclusions are drawn from the comparison of the two MSAFs.
.
Appendix to Chapter 4
Data Sources and Definitions
T h e  main data source is the National Accounts (NESDB, annual). The National 
Accounts of Thailand disaggregates gross savings into:
a) savings of households and unincorporated enterprises;
b) net savings of private corporations and  state enterprises;
c) savings of general government; and
d) depreciation allowance.
The same source disaggregates Gross Fixed Capital Formation into:
i) private (households and  corporations); and
ii) public (state enterprises and  government).
The Flow-of-Funds Accounts for Thailand (available for the years 1967 to 
1983, see NESDB/BOT 1982, 1983, 1986; for the years 1984-1990 some provi­
sional and incomplete flow-of-funds data were available) provide disaggregated 
gross savings and investment data for all four agents. The problems with the Flow- 
of-Funds Accounts are (a) that they are not available for recent years and (b) that 
they are still based on the old National Accounts estimates.
The basic data series for the period 1970-1990 for savings and investments 
of the four agents were constructed as follows:
1) “Savings of households and private non-profit institutions,” as re­
ported in the new series of the National Accounts, are taken as 
“household savings.” These savings include savings by households and 
by unincorporated (family) enterprises; we will refer to them as 
“household savings” (always as a proportion of GDP: Sh).
2) “Savings of general government,” as reported in the new series of the 
National Accounts, are taken as “government savings” (Sg).
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3) (net) “Savings of corporations and government enterprises” and 
“provision for the consumption of fixed capital,” as reported in the 
new series of the National Accounts, are added together as “gross 
savings of the corporate sector,” For the period 1970-1990, this total is 
distributed over private and state corporations according to the 
proportions found in the Flow-of-Fund tables (n.b., the actual figures 
in the Flow-of-Fund tables are somewhat different, as the Flovv-of- 
Funds tables are still based on the old National Accounts scries).
This approach enabled us to make estimates of gross savings of 
state enterprises (Sv). Gross savings of private corporations (Sc.) arc 
then derived by deducting state enterprise savings from the total 
corporate savings as given in the National Accounts.
4) In the Flow-of-Funds Accounts, “household investments” (I/j) arc es­
timated as the sum of the National Accounts categories “private 
residential construction” and “investment in new lands.” We have 
followed the same practice and calculated “household investments” 
from the National Accounts. It should be noted that the household 
sector includes household businesses and that the household in­
vestments, as now defined, certainly underestimates the investments 
made by such firms (as a proportion of GDP).
5) “Private corporations investments” (Ic) are obtained by deducting the 
household investment defined under 4) from total private investments 
as given in the National Accounts.
6) “Government investmcnt”(Ig) is set equal to “government capital ex­
penditure,” as reported in budget data (Bank of Thailand, quarterly).
7) “State enterprise investment” (1$) is obtained by deducting government 
investment as defined under 6) from total public sector investments as 
given in the National Accounts.
The resulting time series, as percentage of GDP, are presented in Table
4.1.
The estimates of capital inflow present some problems. In many studies, 
capital inflows are measured by the current account balance of the balance of pay­
ments (with reversed sign: a current account deficit means a positive capital in­
flow). The balance-of-payments equation can be written as:
(current account balance) + (capital account balance)
+ (monetary movements) + (errors and omissions) = 0
One could thus also take the capital account balance as a direct estimate 
of the net capital flows. The difference in capital inflows measured from the current 
account and those measured from the capital account is explained by the accumula­
tion of monetary reserves and by the errors and omissions.
A third way of measuring capital inflows arises from the National 
Accounts: the national resource balance (investment-savings) should be covered 
with capital inflows.
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The three measures of capital inflow give different results. The estimates 
from the current account, from the capital account and from the national resource 
balance do not coincide. Differences are explained by monetary movements and 
errors and omissions (for the two balance-of-payments estimates) and by the 
statistical discrepancy of the National Accounts.
We have decided to use the estimates from the capital account of the bal­
ance of payments, as these can be broken down by institutions receiving the inflows. 
In Table 4.2, the capital account of Thailand's balance of payments is used to define 
capital flows to the different economic agents (all variables are expressed as a pro­
portion of GDP):
a) total net capital flow is defined as the net balance of the capital 
account as a proportion of GDP (variable: F);
b) capital inflow to the private corporate sector is defined as “direct 
investments,” plus “net long-term loans and credits to private 
enterprises” and “portfolio investment,” plus “private short-term 
loans” and “trade credit” (Fc or Fpr)\
c) net flow received by government enterprises is defined as “net long­
term loans and credits to government enterprises,” plus “net short­
term loans and credits to government enterprises” (F5); and
d) capital flow received by the government is defined as “net government 
loans” and changes in long-term assets of the government (Fg).
r
Appendix to Chapter 5
Data Sources and Compilation
X  he equation system 5.8 to 5.12 sets the main sources and uses of each sector 
against each other.
HH: S h + FLF/, + NOFL/, + NWFL/, = 1/, + FAF/, (A5.8)
CORP: Sc + FLFC + NOFLc + NWFLC = Ic + FAFC (A5.9)
GVT: Sg + FLFg + NOFLg + NWFLg = Ig + FAFg (A5.10)
SE: S5 + FLF5 + NOFLy + NWFLy = h  + f a f . ? (A 5 .ll)
FI: Sf, + FAF/, + FAFC + FAFg  + FAFS 
=  I/j + FLF/,+FLFC+FL Fg + FLF5
+ NOFL/; + NWFL/;
(A5.12)
In these equations:
S, = own savings of sector: i =  HH, CORP, GVT, SE and FI. Note
that in the analysis of Chapter 4, the savings of the financial 
institutions were included in the corporate sector.
1/ =  own investment of each sector.
FLF, = financial liabilities incurred with financial institutions, i.e.,
funds obtained by the sector from domestic financial institu­
tions (e.g. loans from banks).
NOFL; = net other financial liabilities incurred. A positive sign implies
a net inflow of liabilities, i.e., funds obtained by the sector 
from domestic non-financial sectors (e.g. share capital 
acquired by corporations or government transfers received by 
state enterprises); a negative sign indicates other domestic 
financial assets acquired (e.g. equity shares obtained by house­
holds).
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NWFL, = financial liabilities incurred with the rest of the world (e.g.
foreign loans) or, if the sign is negative, foreign assets ac­
quired.
FAF, = financial assets acquired with financial institutions (e.g. 
deposits or promissory notes).
To establish the main sources and uses of funds of the various agents over 
the period 1970-1989 it is necessary to use different data sources. The combination 
of different data sources creates problems of discrepancies, differences in concepts 
and definitions, and differences in estimation methods.
In principle, the best reference for the sectoral sources and uses of funds is 
Thailand's Flow-of-Funds Accounts (see NESDB/BOT 1982, 1983 and 1986). 
Unfortunately, these Accounts suffer from a number of shortcomings that make 
them less appropriate for the present study.
The first is that the Accounts do not cover the entire period of our analysis. 
Complete accounts are available up to 1983; for the years 1984-1990 provisional 
accounts are available. A second problem is that the Flow-of-Funds Accounts are 
still based on the old National Accounts; the revision of the National Accounts that 
was published in 1987 showed considerable adjustments, particularly in the esti­
mates of savings. The estimates of sectoral savings as obtained from the Flow-of- 
Funds Accounts are, therefore, not fully comparable with the estimates we used in 
Chapter 4. A similar problem is found in the estimates of foreign capital flows. The 
Flow-of-Funds Accounts measure changes in assets and liabilities, whereas in 
Chapter 4 we used Balance-of-Payments estimates of the flows of foreign finance. 
There can be substantial differences between the two concepts. Some of the capital 
inflows do not create a liability (for example, direct foreign investment) and the 
value of foreign assets or liabilities may change without any related capital flow (for 
example, as result of exchange rate variations).
We have, therefore, decided to use the estimates of sectoral savings and in­
vestment as derived from the new series of National Accounts and the estimates of 
sectoral capital inflows as derived from the capital account of the Balance-of- 
Payments statistics (see the Appendix to Chapter 4 for the steps followed in the cal­
culations). It should be noted that savings and investments by the financial institu­
tions are included in the estimates of the private corporate sector (see the later 
comments on Table 5.3).
The Flow-of-Funds Accounts were used to derive the estimates of the 
“financial liabilities through the financial system” of the four sectors; this repre­
sents the funds raised by these sectors from the financial institutions. The Flow-of- 
Funds data have also been used to provide the disaggregated estimates of the 
sources of the financial system's liabilities: this provided the estimates for FAF/,, 
FAFC FAFV and FAF^; these are the assets (deposits, etc.) that these four institu­
tions obtained with the financial institutions.
The estimates of the net other domestic financial liabilities were then ob­
tained as a residue.
Equation 5.12 for the financial system cannot be fully filled in. The savings 
and investments by private financial institutions are included in the National 
Accounts estimates of private corporations and those of public financial institutions 
in the public sector estimates. The Flow-of-Funds Accounts give some separate
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estimates for the period 1970-1986, but these sufTer from the same problems as 
those related to the Flow-of-Funds. Anyway, own savings and investments of 
financial institutions are a relatively small part of their sources and uses of funds, 
since their main business is intermediation.
In Table 5.3, we have added the financial assets obtained from financial in­
stitutions by the household, corporate, government and state enterprise sectors to get 
the total of financial liabilities incurred by the financial system. Similarly, we have 
added the financial liabilities incurred by these four sectors from financial institu­
tions to obtain the increase in the domestic financial assets of the financial sector. 
To maintain consistency in the data set, the estimate of the net foreign liabilities of 
the financial sector was obtained, as was done for the other sectors, from the 
Balance-of-Payments statistics. The balance of the monetary movements account 
was used to estimate the net flow of net foreign liabilities of the financial system.
r
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